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Resumo: A dissertação defende o realismo em estética—em particular, no que 
diz respeito às propriedades estéticas das obras de arte (incluindo obras 
literárias). O capítulo 1 caracteriza o debate geral sobre realismo acerca do 
mundo exterior, e de seguida o debate na estética e na filosofia da arte 
respeitante ao realismo estético. Os capítulos 2 e 3 consideram dois desafios 
proeminentes ao realismo estético. O capítulo 2 examina um ataque geral à 
objectividade dos valores. O capítulo 3 examina uma tese que alegadamente 
inviabiliza o realismo estético: a chamada ‘tese da autonomia’. Ambas as formas 
de oposição ao realismo são rejeitadas. O capítulo 4 é sobre o ensaio de Hume 
‘Sobre o Padrão do Gosto’. Será sugerido que o sentimentalismo de Hume é 
compatível com, e talvez sustenta um realismo estético moderado. Os capítulos 
5 e 6 fazem uma defesa positiva do realismo estético. O capítulo 5 invoca alguns 
argumentos principais a favor do realismo estético. O capítulo 6 oferece uma 
análise realista das propriedades estéticas. 
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Abstract: The dissertation defends realism concerning the aesthetic—in 
particular, concerning the aesthetic properties of works of art (including works 
of literature). Chapter 1 characterizes the general debate over realism about the 
external world, and then the specific debate in aesthetics and the philosophy of 
art concerning aesthetic realism. Chapters 2 and 3 consider two prominent 
challenges to aesthetic realism. Chapter 2 examines a general attack on the 
objectivity of values. Chapter 3 examines a thesis that purports to block aesthetic 
realism: the so-called ‘autonomy thesis’. Both forms of opposition to realism are 
rejected. Chapter 4 focuses on Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. It will be 
suggested that Hume’s sentimentalism is compatible with, and perhaps gives 
support to, a moderate aesthetic realism. Chapters 5 and 6 provide a positive 
defence of aesthetic realism. Chapter 5 invokes some main arguments for 
aesthetic realism. Chapter 6 gives a realist account of aesthetic properties. 
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Preface 
 
 
This dissertation defends aesthetic realism: the view that there is a (non-mental) 
aesthetic reality, which our aesthetic beliefs and assertions can be reckoned to 
represent more or less adequately. The focus is restricted to contemporary 
discussion conducted in the analytic tradition (including some arguments by 
Hume and Kant that analytic philosophers have addressed, and which will be 
considered more or less on their own). The project has three main steps. Firstly, I 
consider and defuse scepticism concerning the significance of the ontological 
debate about aesthetic reality. Secondly, I discuss two powerful attacks on 
realism and I defend realism against them. Thirdly, I attempt to provide a 
positive defence of aesthetic realism.  
Chapter 1 describes the realism/anti-realism debate, first in general 
(concerning realism about the external world), then more specifically, 
concerning aesthetics and the philosophy of art (including the philosophy of 
literature). My aims are twofold. Firstly, I aim to introduce the discussion of 
aesthetic realism. Secondly, I aim to counteract scepticism about the very 
significance of the ontological debate by doing what the sceptic claims to be 
impossible, namely providing a description of the issue which is acceptable to 
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both realists and anti-realists about the aesthetic. Aesthetic realism and anti-
realism are briefly characterized. 
 Chapter 2 considers a sceptical challenge to realism which claims that 
commitment to the objectivity of values is a mistake ingrained in common-sense 
moral (and generally evaluative) thought and discourse. The sceptic claims that 
the mistake calls for correction, by means of an ‘error theory’. My reply is that 
common-sense is not committed to the sort of objectivist view correctly seen by 
the error-theorist as implausible. Therefore, I claim, the error theorist’s charge is 
not decisive against realism. 
Chapter 3 concerns the claim, commonly invoked against realism, that 
since aesthetic judgements must be made based on first-hand acquaintance with 
the object judged, the properties attributed in aesthetic judgements cannot be 
construed in a realist manner since, if they were real, their content could be 
transmitted via testimony. Some realists respond to this challenge by denying 
that aesthetic judgements require first-hand acquaintance. I defend the other 
option, claiming that the requirement of first-hand acquaintance is compatible 
with realism. My first argument for this view is empirical and involves an 
analogy with colours. I note that in the case of colours, just as in the aesthetic 
case, judgement exhibits ‘autonomy’. That is, we would not typically change our 
judgement based only on the opinions of others: imagine ten friends trying to 
deceive you and claiming that a clearly red cube is brown. So I claim that 
‘autonomy’ is not peculiar to the aesthetic case: the colour case and the aesthetic 
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case run parallel in this respect: your ten friends’ deceiving plan would typically 
not succeed. The upshot is this: autonomy concerning colour (per se) does not 
block realism about colour. Just because I need to rely on my own judgement to 
grasp a property, that does not entail that the property in question is not an 
objective (genuine) property of the object. Likewise, aesthetic autonomy, by 
itself, cannot be invoked as a claim against aesthetic realism. My second 
argument is as follows. I argue that an epistemological thesis need not directly 
threat ontological claims and, in particular, I claim that the epistemologic thesis 
of aesthetic autonomy thesis is not decisive against aesthetic realism. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to Hume’s most significant contribution to 
aesthetics and the theory of literature, his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ (1757). 
I suggest that Hume’s exploration of the notion of a standard of taste is part of a 
programme akin to realism. This suggestion is based on a close reading of 
Hume’s essay and on argument advanced by other commentators which 
emphasizes that for Hume the standard of taste is discovered (as opposed to 
being constituted) by the ‘true judges’. Such a programme is, indeed, at odds 
with some of Hume’s earlier writings, but it is not incompatible with Hume’s 
general sentimentalism which is an epistemological doctrine concerning how 
(aesthetic) truths are known. My claim is that Hume’s epistemology of beauty 
leaves room for, and perhaps lends support to, a moderate aesthetic realism. I 
focus on the purported ‘wide’ distinction between ‘judgement’ and ‘sentiment’ 
(and the possibility of an ironic reading of the ‘species of philosophy’ which 
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proposes such wide distinction); on the status of the standard of taste (as 
discovered by the true judges); and on the role and import of the story of 
Sancho’s kinsmen. 
Chapter 5 introduces the doctrine of aesthetic realism more directly, by 
reviewing some of the strongest arguments for the view. At bottom, the positive 
defence of realism is based on explanatory considerations. Aesthetic realism is 
defended via an inference to the best explanation of the normativity of aesthetic 
discourse. In particular, the patent limitations on the applicability of aesthetic 
terms (including the most general aesthetic terms) seem to be best explained by 
realism. 
In Chapter 6, I provide an account of aesthetic reality: more precisely, I 
say how aesthetic reality is to be like, if we accept that it exists. I focus on the 
merits of some of the main realist theories of aesthetic properties. In particular, I 
address Sibley’s epistemic notion of taste, and then go on to invoke three realist 
views of aesthetic properties, which I take to be compatible and complementary: 
as value-grounding properties (Beardsley), as higher-order ways of appearing 
(Levinson), and as desire-mediated properties (Zemach). I explain why, contrary 
to claims by Levinson and Moore, beauty should be included among the 
aesthetic properties.  
Finally, I point to two important aspects of this unified account of 
aesthetic properties for the philosophy of art. The first is that it explains the 
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normativity of even the most general aesthetic judgements. The second is that it 
leaves room for an aesthetic theory of art. 
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Chapter One 
Realism 
 
 
1.1 What is realism? 
 
This dissertation is about aesthetic realism. Realism, as I shall understand it, is a 
thesis about (some portion of) the world and our sensitivity to it, as opposed to a 
thesis about language and our use of it.1 In general, realism about x is the claim 
that x exists objectively, that is, independently of human minds. Anti-realism 
about an alleged entity, x, is the rejection of realism about x. Anti-realism either 
denies that x exists or else it denies that x’s existence is independent of human 
minds. 
Given that the realism/anti-realism debate has been understood in a 
variety of ways, it is important to first clarify, as far as possible, what will be at 
issue here. My aim in this chapter is to arrive at a characterization of the debate 
that both realists and their opponents can accept. By doing so I also aim to 
defuse scepticism concerning the very significance (or worth) of the debate 
                                               
1 As Alston ([1979] 1999, 628) notes in this respect, ‘Sometimes we are talking about language, 
but most of the time we are not.’ 
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between aesthetic realists and aesthetic anti-realists.2 I shall begin by briefly 
characterizing the general debate concerning common-sense realism about the 
external world, in order to see what light this can throw on the local debate in 
aesthetics and the philosophy of art (including the philosophy of literature) with 
which this study is concerned.  
Realism is, under one traditional conception, contrasted with idealism, 
the doctrine that reality is fundamentally mental.3 According to realism, the 
world is fundamentally non-mental and mind-independent. My aim in this 
dissertation is to defend the view that aesthetic reality is objective (and non-
mental) in the sense that is it is independent of what particular minds think. But 
first consider what philosophers have said about general realism:4 
 
Realism [is] a claim about what entities exist and a claim about their 
independent nature. (Devitt 1984, 14) 
 
The leading idea is that the world consists of objects whose existence, nature, 
and relations are fixed independently of what we happen to think, feel, or desire. 
(Loux 2002, 252) 
 
                                               
2 Brock & Mares (2007, 34-36) make the claim that scepticism (‘quietism’) is defused if we do 
what the sceptic says cannot be done. 
3 I rely heavily on van Inwagen’s (1993) and Loux’s (2002) description of realism(s). 
4 The following passages by Devitt (1984) and Miller (2002) are quoted in Brock & Mares 
(2007, 3-4). 
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There are two general aspects of realism [...]. First, there is a claim about existence. 
Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table’s 
being square, the rock’s being made of granite, and the moon’s being spherical 
and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of 
macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the 
moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say 
or think about the matter. (Miller 2002, 1) 
 
These passages claim, then, that realism is the thesis that a certain disputed 
portion of reality is objective, that is, it exists and its existence is independent of 
what we might think or feel or be able to grasp, or desire. No amount of thought 
or feeling (let alone desire) on the part of a subject will make or change the way 
such reality is; and reality most probably transcends our knowledge: it is likely 
that we do not know everything about it.5 The interest of this general debate for 
aesthetics (and for the philosophy of art) should be clear: whether or not we take 
the world to contain, say, aesthetic properties or values will have a bearing on 
(e.g.) what works of art are. For instance, a work of art may not simply be 
identified with a physical object, but with an object with aesthetic properties and 
                                               
5  The claim sometimes made in this respect is that realism has a ‘modest’ and a 
‘presumptuous’ component. Wright (1987, 1): ‘Realism is a mixture of modesty and 
presumption. It modestly allows that humankind confronts an objective world, something 
almost entirely not of our making, possessing a host of accasional features which may pass 
altogether unnoticed by human consciousness and whose innermost nomological secrets 
may remain forever hidden for us. However, it presumes that we are, by and large and in 
favourable circumstances, capable of acquiring knowledge of the world and of 
understanding it.’ See also Wright (1992, 2). 
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aesthetic value as well (perhaps intrinsic value) from which it cannot be 
separated. If the properties and value an object is said to possess exist objectively, 
then any description of the object in question which does not consider these 
properties and this value will be inappropriate or at least incomplete.  
Under another (not obviously incompatible) traditional conception, 
which Loux discusses (2002, 252), realism is a claim about objective truth.6 As 
van Inwagen also notes (1993, 56), an area of thought and discourse is objective 
in this sense when the truth of our beliefs and assertions depend not on our 
thoughts and feelings and desires but on their objects, on the things our beliefs 
and assertions are about or represent.7 One image sometimes invoked to pick 
out this relation between our beliefs and assertions and what they are about is 
that of a map.8 A map is supposed to ‘get the territory right’9 (in other words, it 
is to represent the territory), and so, the realist claims, are our beliefs and 
assertions. Realism thus is the claim that an area of thought and discourse is 
representational in this sense: it aims to be an accurate and reliable map of an 
area of reality. 
                                               
6 van Inwagen (1993, 59-60). 
7 van Inwagen (1993, 60) proposes that we distinguish the traditional opposition between 
realism and idealism, from the opposition between Realism (with a capital R), the view that 
‘there is an objective truth’ (ibid.), and anti-Realism, which denies this. Later on (1993, 68-69) 
van Inwagen rejects that anti-Realism is a metaphysic: ‘It is […] misleading to think of anti-
Realism as a metaphysic, in the sense in which idealism or lowercase-r realism is a 
metaphysic. Anti-Realism, rather, is a denial of the possibility of metaphysics, since the very 
enterprise of metaphysics is the attempt to discover the nature of ultimate reality.’ 
8 See, for instance, Wright (1992, 2). 
9 van Inwagen (1993, 56). 
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 Loux (2002, 251, 253) also notes that realism not only claims that the 
world is independent of the human mind, but it also takes the world to function 
as a standard for the truth of our beliefs and assertions. Furthermore, realism 
claims that reality (or the world) might transcend, and that it plausibly 
sometimes does transcend, our ‘best efforts’ to know it (Loux 2002, 253). For the 
realist truth is ‘epistemically unconstrained correspondence’ (Loux 2002, 258), a 
conception which implies not only that truth is a matter of fit (2002, 252) with 
respect to reality, but also that reality is independent of our best tools for 
knowing and of our best knowledge (2002, 253). Even if we know very little, or 
nothing, about an area of reality, that has no bearing on the objective existence 
and independence of that area.  
In twentieth-century philosophy, metaphysical realism has been 
challenged in a novel way via a debate in the philosophy of language in which 
Dummett’s work has played a prominent role.10 For Dummett metaphysical 
questions are, at bottom, semantic questions, that is, questions about language 
and meaning.11 As Loux (2002, 258) explains, Dummett rejects the claim that 
meaning concerns a relation of correspondence ‘between statements and mind-
independent states of affairs’, and claims instead that meaning is best conceived 
of as an epistemic notion: the meaning of a statement depends on what counts as 
                                               
10 See especially ‘Realism’ [1963] in Dummett (1978). Another philosopher who treats the 
issue of realism as an issue belonging to the philosophy of language is Putnam—cf. Loux 
(2002, 257). 
11 This anti-metaphysical attitude is visible in Putnam. See, e.g., Putnam (1990, 39): ‘what I 
think we have learned since Newton is that metaphysics is not a possible subject’.  
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evidence for that statement. Therefore, according to this view, truth cannot, 
contrary to what the realist maintains, be independent of, and plausibly 
sometimes transcend, the possibility of knowing it. As Loux (2002, 259) notes, 
for Dummett truth is ‘warranted or justified assertability’ (i.e., what can 
warrantedly be said), not correspondence with a mind-independent reality. By 
contrast, as we saw, for the realist statements can be true even when it is 
impossible to know whether they are true. Whether or not the ancient Greek 
playwright Aeschylus was killed by a tortoise dropped on his head by an eagle 
is, for the realist, true or false independently of the evidence or justification we 
might have, or forever lack, concerning the matter. In other words, a statement is 
true (or false) independently of verification. 
 Whether or not the realism/anti-realism debate can adequately be 
approached via a debate in the philosophy of language will not concern me here. 
I will also try to remain neutral on whether the realism debate can be reduced to 
a debate about objective truth.12 My interest is not in any question which is, at 
least strickly speaking, semantic, such as the question of whether a disputed 
class of statements is genuinely assertoric. 13  Rather, my interest is in an 
ontological question:14 whether a certain area of thought and discourse relates to 
                                               
12 For a defence of the thesis that the realism/anti-realism debate is not about objective truth, 
see Devitt (1984).   
13 For a defence of the possibility of aesthetic realism based on the claim that aesthetic 
judgements are genuinely assertoric, see Pettit ([1983] 2004).  
14 This strictly ontological approach to the question of realism (as opposed to the semantic 
approach) is taken, for instance, by Tappolet (2000, 39), concerning values in particular: 
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a domain that exists objectively, that is, independently (in a sense to be 
explained) of the human mind. (Another way of putting the question is by 
asking whether realism is true about ‘a domain of properties’ 15 ). Before 
addressing the ontological question, however, we should consider and evaluate 
one specific semantic approach to the debate concerning realism and anti-
realism which has brought a new focus to the ontological debate (§1.2). And we 
should contemplate also another option, which consists in the very rejection of 
the ontological debate: ‘quietism’ (§1.3). 
 
 
1.2 Redirecting the debate: minimalism, pluralism and ‘cognitive command’ 
 
Wright (1992, 1996a, 1996b) has proposed that the realism/anti-realism debate be 
construed, and conducted, in a new way. In particular, Wright has proposed a 
minimalist (‘non-metaphysically committed’) conception of truth-aptitude and 
of truth, coupled with a pluralistic account of the concept of truth, so that the 
realism/anti-realism debate be carried out ‘by examining the substance’, or 
‘metaphysical weight’, of the truth-predicate in each disputed area of discourse. 
Truth-aptitude or the possibility of truth in a discourse, Wright’s proposal goes, 
is not sufficient to ‘secure’ realism. Other ‘realism-relevant cruces’ in each area 
                                                                                                                                     
‘Contrairement à nombre de contemporains, j’adopterai une conception strictement 
ontologique de la notion de réalisme.’ 
15 The phrase is used by Yates (2008, 348). 
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must be considered and the realism/anti-realism debate is significant only 
beyond discussions about truth. 
This proposal has an important consequence for realism in the aesthetic 
realm, namely that aesthetic realism is not secured by truth-aptitude or truth 
alone.  That is, even if aesthetic statements are shown to be genuinely assertoric, 
and even if some of them are shown to be true, that is not sufficient to secure 
aesthetic realism.16 So it is important to give some attention to Wright’s proposal. 
I shall summarize Wright’s project and address, in particular, the realism-
relevant constraint of ‘cognitive command’, and consider its relevance to the 
defence of aesthetic realism in particular.17 
Wright’s main motivation for proposing a ‘shift’ in the realism/anti-
realism debate is dissatisfaction with the available anti-realisms, in particular 
expressivism and error theory.18 Two theses are central to the approach Wright 
recommends. One is minimalism about truth and truth-aptitude. As Wright 
explains the thesis, 
 
it is necessary and sufficient, in order for a predicate to qualify as a truth-
predicate, that it satisfy each of a basic set of platitudes about truth: the 
                                               
16 So, for instance, Pettit’s claim that aesthetic attributions are ‘genuinely assertoric’ is not 
sufficient, according to Wright, to establish aesthetic realism (see Pettit [1983] 2004). 
17 In this section I try to summarize Wright’s view. When helpful, I use (or else refer to) 
Wright’s own phrases. It should remain clear that the ideas are all his. 
18 Expressivism is the view that the statements of a discourse are not truth-apt (because they 
concern the expression of feelings or attitudes); error theory is the thesis that the statements 
of a discourse are all systematically false (because they refer to entities which are believed 
not to exist). 
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platitudes, for instance, that to assert a statement is to present it as true; that ‘S’ 
is true if and only if S (the Disquotational Scheme); that statements which are apt 
for truth have negations which are likewise; that truth is one thing, justification 
is another; that to be true is to correspond to the facts; and so on. (Wright 1996a, 
864) 
 
But these minimal ‘platitudes’, Wright claims, are satisfied (met) in all truth-apt 
discourses. And, for Wright, this does not entail that the truth-predicate and, 
accordingly, the ‘phraseology of correspondence’ used (1992, 143), have genuine 
representational function (i.e. refer to self-standing states of affairs) and can 
thereby be given a realist construal. In other words, satisfying the minimal 
platitudes of truth-aptitude is not, for Wright, sufficient for realism to be in place 
about that discourse:  
 
acknowledging that a discourse is possessed of assertoric content, and indeed 
that its practitioners frequently hit the truth, when truth is so [‘minimally’] 
conceived, is to be something which is neutral on the preferability of a broadly 
realist or anti-realist view of the discourse in question. (Wright 1992, 33)  
 
In short, for Wright the realism/anti-realism debate is not about whether the 
statements in a discourse are truth-apt, or whether any of them are true. The 
realism/anti-realism debate comes after those findings, Wright thinks, when we 
examine the ontological weight to give to the truth predicate in each area. The 
 22 
realism/anti-realism debate should not focus on truth and truth-aptitude 
generally conceived. 
The other key thesis Wright defends is pluralism about truth. Pluralism is 
the view that the ‘ontological nature’ (or ‘weight’) of the truth-predicate may be 
different in different discourses: ‘There are a variety of features that may be 
possessed by minimally truth-apt discourses, any of which may contribute in 
some measure towards clarifying and substantiating realist preconceptions 
about it’ (1992, 141). 
As Wright (1996b, 923) remarks in a reply to Sainsbury (1996), pluralism 
is not incompatible with a uniform characterisation of the concept of truth: ‘the 
concept [of truth] admits of a uniform characterisation wherever it is applied—
the characterisation given by the minimal platitudes, which determine 
everything that is essential to truth’ (ibid.). What the thesis of pluralism is 
sensitive to is the phenomenon of ‘variable realisation’ (1996b, 924): discourses 
which are truth-apt may possess very different features, which may deserve 
different ontological status (1992, 141). The realism/anti-realism debate must 
thereby focus on the ‘weight’ or ‘metaphysical substance’ to give to the truth-
predicate in each particular truth-apt discourse, not on truth generally. Again, 
the point is that the possibility of truth-aptitude, or of truth, in a discourse is not 
sufficient to secure realism. Wright’s proposal is, then, that the surface grammar 
of the sentences in a discourse does not tell us anything decisive about the 
‘metaphysical substance’ of the truth predicate in the discourse.  
 23 
Another claim vital to Wright’s account is that in some minimally truth-
apt areas of judgement and discourse at least some disputes may not involve a 
cognitive failure. By contrast, in other areas all disputes must concern—‘where 
not within the tolerances permitted by various relevant kinds of vagueness’— 
some form of cognitive error ‘on the part of at least one of the disputants’ (1996a, 
866). Areas in which all disputes concern a cognitive shortcoming are said to 
exhibit ‘Cognitive Command’: 
 
When a discourse exhibits Cognitive Command, any difference of opinion will 
be such that there are considerations quite independent of the conflict which, if 
known about, would mandate withdrawal of one (or both) of the conflicting 
views. (Wright 1992, 103) 
 
The cognitive command constraint is said to provide a test for the applicability 
of realism. In particular, as Wright notes, it is a crucial tool for the anti-realist 
because, according to Wright, if a disputed subject matter can be shown not to 
meet the cognitive command constraint, then realism about that subject matter is 
shown to be impossible. 19  As Wright puts it: ‘show that a discourse lacks 
[cognitive command] and you will blow away with one stroke all conceivable 
forms of realist resistance’ (1992, 148). 
                                               
19 Wright (1992, 148) also ‘suspects’ that ‘all roads to realism have to go through Cognitive 
Command’, but he claims that he lacks arguments that could motivate such claim. 
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The notion of cognitive command is thus introduced to provide a ‘test’ 
for the applicability of realism. According to Wright the realism/anti-realism 
debate must redirect its focus: its interest bears on (and its focus should be on) 
the ontological interpretation of the ‘correspondence relation’ apparently 
invoked in each truth-apt discourse (1992, 143). A discourse which does not 
meet the condition is to be considered only minimally truth-apt, and minimal 
truth-aptitude, thinks Wright, is not sufficient for a discourse to be considered 
representational. Realists and anti-realists can, then, ‘substantially disagree’ 
concerning whether a discourse exerts (or not) cognitive command. Once the 
realism/anti-realism debate does take place, quietism, that is, scepticism about 
the significance (meaningfulness) of the debate, is eliminated. Wright 
characterizes the cognitive command condition as follows:   
 
It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, unless 
excusable as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in the standards of 
acceptability, or variation in personal evidence thresholds, so to speak, will 
involve something which may properly be regarded as a cognitive shortcoming. 
(Wright 1992, 144) 
 
it must be true a priori for us, in any region of thought where our beliefs are the 
products of genuinely representational cognitive function, that differences of 
opinion—where not within the tolerances permitted by various kinds of 
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vagueness—have to involve some form of cognitive shortcoming. (Wright 1996a, 
866) 
 
It is important to stress that Wright thinks that cognitive command ‘is a 
significant additional constraint on minimally truth-apt discourses’ (1992, 94), 
that is, not all truth-apt discourses meet it. This means that some truth-apt 
discourses allow for a scenario in which differences of view may not involve a 
cognitive shortcoming on any side (ibid.), that is, the disagreements involve no 
fault. 20  
Wright also thinks that the formulation of the constraint must be spelled 
out as an a priori condition. That is, the objectivity of a discourse cannot depend 
on the empirical discovery even that every disagreement in that discourse 
involves a cognitive shortcoming (ibid.). The cognitive command constraint is 
thought to encompass the idea that a discourse, ‘by virtue of its very content’ (ibid.) 
is ‘seriously representational’ (ibid.) and thereby identifies an objective domain 
of reality.  
What matters for the realism/anti-realism debate is that the notion of 
cognitive command can provide a significant test for the applicability of realism, 
in the sense that a discourse’s failing to meet the constraint blocks the possibility 
of a realist construal of that discourse. Therefore, the appeal to cognitive 
command answers, at least, the quietist’s sceptical challenge by rendering the 
                                               
20 The example that Wright gives is that of comic discourse. 
 26 
debate possible and significant. Wright’s minimalist thinks that in different areas 
of discourse, truth predicates can have different weight: the phrases ‘is true’ and 
‘corresponds to the facts’, may not always, despite appearances, require or even 
allow for a ‘substantial interpretation’. Since Wright’s ‘neutral’ stance is that the 
burden of proof is on the realist, it is not surprising that Wright’s discussion of 
comic discourse has focused on attempting to undermine the possibility of 
comic discourse’s exerting cognitive command: that alone, thinks Wright, would 
eliminate realism about the comic. 
Wright’s proposal, we have seen, has brought new focus to the 
ontological debate over realism. If we apply it to the realism/anti-realism debate 
in aesthetics, we are then invited to look at the local truth predicate, beyond the 
possibility of truth-aptitude and of truth. Preliminary work involves considering 
whether aesthetic statements can be true or false, that is, whether there can be 
genuine assertions in the discourse, and whether some at least can be true. A 
negative answer to this question would settle the debate: it would settle it in 
favour of anti-realism. But Wright’s point is that a positive answer to this 
question does not yet settle the debate about aesthetic realism. True aesthetic 
statements may or may not correspond to (or identify) an objective reality. But 
the cognitive command constraint provides a useful test for the applicability of 
realism: if aesthetic discourse is not to be prevented from being genuinely 
representational, then all aesthetic disagreements must involve (vagueness apart) 
some mistake ‘on the part of at least one of the disputants’.  
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It may seem that Wright’s approach leaves anti-realism as the most 
plausible option concerning aesthetics, for at least two reasons. First, for Wright 
the burden of proof is on realism: the ‘default position’ is to hold that a 
discourse that is only minimally truth-apt is non-representational. Second, 
disagreements concerning the aesthetic merits of works of art often seem to 
involve merely differences in tastes or preference. It is not evident that such 
disagreements always rest on a mistake, on the part of at least one party to the 
disagreement, concerning the features the works have. In later chapters I shall 
defend aesthetic realism more specifically, but for now it is important to note at 
least that Wright’s account of realism/anti-realism debates does not undermine 
the aesthetic realist’s project. My first claim, in reply to such preliminary worries, 
is that we need good reasons to adopt the view that the ‘default position’, or the 
starting point, is anti-realist. My second claim is that it is not clear either that 
aesthetic disagreements are, at bottom, about preference or ‘tastes’.21 Aesthetic 
disagreements appear to concern self-standing states of affairs, since they appear 
to consist in claims which clash (or cohere) with other claims, and about which 
disputants sometimes are (and therefore can be) mistaken. Aesthetic discussions 
                                               
21 As I shall claim later in the main text (p. 40; see also note 35), it is usually (or often) 
possible to distinguish, in aesthetic discourse, personal aesthetic-preference claims from 
objective (universal) aesthetic claims. For instance, someone might claim that he prefers 
Ovid’s Tristia to the Metamorphoses whilst recognizing that, objectively, Metamorphoses is 
aesthetically (and artistically) superior to the Tristia. Realism/anti-realism about the aesthetic 
concerns the treatment to give to the objective claims (whether they are genuinely 
representational, whether the disagreements are genuine), not to the aesthetic-preference 
claims. If someone claims that aesthetic disagreements are only apparent disagreements, 
then he prevents the realism/anti-realism debate to arise (so it is important to show that such 
move is not successful). 
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seem to be about what is and what is not in place in a work, about what is and is 
not a mistake, and disagreements, if they are genuine, will involve at least one 
cognitive shortcoming (or misapprehension) on the part of at least one of the 
disputants. Works cannot be (say) simultaneously beautiful and ugly with 
respect to the same aspect, even though they can, of course, contain both 
beautiful and ugly aspects. De gustibus non disputandum can be disambiguated 
for our purposes here: what the Latin adagio means is that concerning mere 
tastes or preferences we can only express personal attitudes concerning 
subjective experience, which will not bring about a dispute about the world. By 
contrast, which properties and values a work can be said to possess is, at least 
apparently, a genuine question, not a matter of personal taste which would not 
yield any substantive disagreement. It is the latter sort of disagreement which is 
relevant to the question of whether aesthetic discourse exhibits cognitive 
command and, in turn, to realism and anti-realism about the aesthetic.  
 
 
1.3 Quietism 
 
Blackburn (1984, 146) writes that:  
 
there can be the attitude which I christen quietism or dismissive neutralism, which 
urges that at some particular point the debate is not a real one, and that we are 
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only offered, for instance, metaphors and images from which we can profit as 
we please. Quietism is a relative newcomer to the philosophical world, owing 
much of its inspiration to the positivist mistrust of metaphysics, and to the belief 
of the later Wittgenstein that such problems required therapy rather than 
solution. 
 
Quietism is the view that substantial metaphysical discussion is impossible, 
meaningless, or worthless.22 For the quietist there is no reason to take part in the 
realism/anti-realism debate, since metaphysical discussion provides us only 
with illusion, not with progress. The reason for this is that the alleged problems 
of metaphysics are pseudo-problems, stemming from a confused use of 
language. They need to be uncovered and dissolved, rather than solved. If 
quietism is true, then the realism/anti-realism debate should come to an end, but 
not via a solution. The debate, the quietist claims, should be simply dismissed. 
Given my intention to defend aesthetic realism, it is appropriate for me to 
attempt to answer the quietist challenge. 
 A reply to quietism will involve, at bottom, a defence of the possibility 
and significance of metaphysical discussion. This defence need not be direct, 
however. It can be indirect, for instance by engaging in a debate that the quietist 
                                               
22 On quietism see also, for instance, Wright (1992, 202-230).  
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says is impossible.23 , 24  Even though I shall be content with that, I will also 
identify, and try to respond to, some of the motivations for preferring quietism.25 
 One motivation for quietism is the thought that the realism/anti-realism 
debate (and perhaps philosophical debates generally) could be dissolved via 
clarification. This means, the thesis goes, that disagreement between realists and 
anti-realists is simply a result of lack of clarity, not of substantial difference in 
opinion. But we can oppose that thought if realists and anti-realists can arrive at 
a common understanding of what is the issue and still disagree about whether 
the disputed discourse should be given a realist construal. If the disagreement 
survives this clarification, then something substantial, beyond a 
misunderstanding over language, is being discussed. In the next section (§1.4) 
we shall see that at least the debate in aesthetics can be described in a way that is 
acceptable to both realists and anti-realists. So, plausibly, the debate is not 
meaningless.  
Another, related, motivation for quietism is the thought that there is 
nothing substantial to be said about, say, values in general. For the quietist it 
makes no sense to say that there are values, independently of our affective 
responses, that we could be talking about. General talk of values is 
                                               
23 Brock & Mares (2007, 36) make this claim: that the quietist is silenced if we can have a 
debate that the quietist says is impossible, or unintelligible. 
24  I should perhaps distinguish between global quietism (the view that metaphysical 
discussion is impossible, meaningless or worthless) and local quietism (the view that such 
discussion is impossible about some specific realm). I am here considering the motivations 
for, and some objections to, global quietism, but I hope that they apply to the aesthetic case. 
25 For other reasons motivating quietism, see Brock & Mares (2007, 35-36). 
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meaningless.26 Again, in the next section, and in subsequent chapters, we will 
engage in such discussion. The burden of proof will then be on the quietist to 
show that such discussion is without meaning.   
Another possible motivation for quietism is the disbelief in the possibility 
of a ‘God’s-eye view’. As Blackburn (1984, 147) puts it: ‘Quietism is currently 
expressed by denials that there is a “god’s-eye view” or an “external” or 
“Archimedean” point from which we can discover whether some commitment is, 
as it were, describing the undraped figure of nature’. However, as we shall see 
in more detail in the next chapter, realism (at least aesthetic realism) does not 
require a ‘God’s-eye view’. More precisely, and as I shall be claiming, following 
McDowell, the possibility of aesthetic realism being true is not undermined by 
the requirement of a human point of view. To the contrary, the apprehension of 
aesthetic objects and their properties plausibly requires a human point of view. I 
shall be claiming (following McDowell) that this need not count against their 
objective reality as aesthetic objects. 
 So, if we are allowed to exclude quietism, the realism/anti-realism debate 
can come to an end only after a satisfactory realist defence, or else after anti-
realism is established. Realists must engage in meeting the anti-realist challenge, 
either by giving positive argument for realism, or at least by showing the 
shortcomings of anti-realism. The mind-independence of the world, and its 
                                               
26 For a view germane to this one, with an anti-essentialist concern in particular, and applied 
to aesthetics, see Weitz ([1956] 2004). 
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nature, is, in the end, the content of the general realism/anti-realism debate, and 
it is also the content of the more specific debate in aesthetics and the philosophy 
of art (including the philosophy of literature) on which I shall from now on 
focus. 
 
 
1.4 Realism in aesthetics: creativity and the world 
 
In aesthetics and, especially, in the philosophy of art, the realism/anti-realism 
debate can be characterized as follows. Some philosophers, based on persistent 
disagreements, even among well-trained critics, concerning for the most part the 
evaluation of specific works, conclude that the judgements critics make are 
subjective, affective, or the expression of non-propositional attitudes towards the 
works. Characterizations of a work as ‘[being] balanced’, ‘[being] delicate, 
‘[being] elegant’, etc, must be taken as projections of feelings and emotions, not 
as factual claims about the work in question. Preference and differences in 
sentiment—affective differences—are what ultimately explain why even the best 
critics who agree on the formal characterizations of works might disagree about 
their value (Goldman 1993, 1995). At least concerning persistent disagreements, 
there are no facts of the matter there to be discovered (Bender 1996, 2003). 
Aesthetic properties are not real properties, that is, we should not include 
aesthetic properties in our ontology (Matravers 2005). 
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 Other philosophers, animated by ‘realist’ concerns, claim that the 
characterizations critics make of works must be conceived as referring to 
properties of the works. Those philosophers think that, to make sense of critics’ 
discourse, there must be a common, ‘objective’, base. The critics’ object of 
discussion is the work (not merely their aesthetic experience), and 
disagreements among critics must be conceived to concern which properties 
works have (or do not have). Whether or not a work is balanced or delicate or 
elegant depends upon ‘objective’ properties of the work, allowing that a person 
(any person, in principle) might recognize that the work is, as a matter of fact, 
balanced or delicate or elegant. Even when a general sensibility is needed, or a 
specific form of education, so that the presence of a certain quality is detected, 
that does not make the quality’s presence in the work dependent upon any 
particular discernment. No effort of perception or imagination will make the 
work balanced or delicate or elegant if those properties are not, in the relevant 
sense, properties of the work. In sum, either the property is present and can 
thereby be discerned in the work; or it is not present, and thus it cannot be 
discerned. We can be mistaken and say, falsely, that a work possesses a certain 
quality. Accordingly, art criticism is about works of art and the aesthetic 
experiences they can afford in virtue of their aesthetic properties, not simply 
about actual aesthetic experiences. (For positions compatible with the doctrine 
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that I am here unifying under the label ‘realism’, see Sibley 27  1959, 1965; 
Beardsley 1973; Levinson 1994, 2001, 2005.) 
The question of realism in the philosophy of art concerns whether 
aesthetic properties should be taken as real, thereby constituting a portion of 
reality which we should recognize as genuine and to which our beliefs and 
characterizations are to be reckoned more or less adequate; or whether the 
apparent attributions of properties are best construed as merely subjective 
evaluations (as opposed to objective attributions), reflecting attitudes and 
feelings towards the works in question. 
We have seen that ontological debates can be substantial and meaningful, 
in general, and one sign of this is that both realists and anti-realists can agree 
concerning the content of the debate. They can agree on what the debate is about, 
and then disagree about whether some area of thought and discourse really is 
best construed as corresponding to genuine reality. In particular, a description of 
the debate made by an anti-realist that could be accepted by a realist must be 
evidence that both sides agree concerning the substance of the debate, and this 
must be evidence that the ontological debate is substantial and meaningful. An 
anti-realist’s description of the realism/anti-realism debate, and in particular of 
the debate concerning the reality of artistic beauty, can be found in these 
passages by Goldman (1995): 
                                               
27 Sibley is not obviously a realist, but I hope to be able to suggest that his position is in the 
main akin to realism. 
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it is the best explanation for actual disagreements that is crucial for the issue of 
realism. 
 
for realists the explanation why virtually every music lover agrees that the 
opening phrases of Mozart’s Fortieth Symphony and Beethoven’s Sixth 
Symphony are beautiful is that these opening bars are beautiful and that 
experienced listeners can perceive their beauty. There is a property of beauty 
independent of judgments ascribing it that grounds and explains those 
judgments. [...] Nonrealists will explain the agreements on Mozart’s Fortieth and 
Beethoven’s Sixth symphonies in terms of common musical tastes or sensibilities 
developed from similar training or musical upbringing without appealing to an 
independent property of beauty perceived in these cases. [...] a real property of 
beauty would be perceived with far more regularity than we find in ascriptions 
of this property. (Goldman 1995, 29-30)  
 
The above description of the debate, made by an anti-realist, is especially 
interesting for our purposes here because the very same description of realism 
could be made by a realist: Goldman aptly identifies the realist’s view 
concerning whether aesthetic properties should be reckoned as real. Anti-realists 
explain agreement by reference to ‘common musical tastes or sensibilities 
developed from similar training or musical upbringing’, appealing also, 
sometimes, to lack of convergence of opinion as a reason to prefer anti-realism. 
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Realists, by contrast, tend to explain agreement by appealing to the presence of a 
property, which is understood as being detected (as opposed to being conferred) 
by those with sufficient training (when training is necessary). So we can dismiss 
the thought that the ontological debate must be based on a mistaken or unclear 
use of language: here realists and anti-realists seem to be speaking clearly, and 
they seem also to understand what is at issue in each other’s positions. So, it 
seems, what there is to deal with and debate is, in the end, the clear contents of 
each side’s reasons.   
Both realists and anti-realists seem to agree that one aspect crucial for the 
realism/anti-realism debate concerns the question of which view best explains 
aesthetic agreements and disagreements. Goldman puts the realist claim in these 
terms: for the realist, agreement can be explained by the fact that works possess 
certain qualities, whereas the anti-realist explains agreement by reference to 
common education or similarly developed sensibility. The property Goldman 
mentions is the most general aesthetic property: beauty. Beauty is, for the realist, 
there to be detected, as opposed to being a projection, as it is for the anti-realist.28 
The realist would agree with Goldman’s characterization realism concerning 
beauty: the realist takes beauty to exist independently of particular judgements 
                                               
28 Perhaps surprisingly, as we shall see in Chapter 6, not all realists about aesthetic properties 
are realists about beauty, since some take the ‘evaluative component’ of aesthetic properties 
(as opposed to the ‘descriptive component’) to be unreal, and they take beauty to include 
only an evaluative component.  
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of beauty.29 What Goldman says the realist holds coincides with what a realist 
would say a realist holds. So it seems that we have an ontological problem to be 
(hopefully) solved, not a linguistic misunderstanding to be identified and 
dissolved.  
The anti-realist believes that there is no quality of beauty in the world to 
be detected: lack of convergence is, for the anti-realist, a sign that there is no 
mind-independent property of beauty. As Goldman puts it, a genuine property 
would be perceived with far more regularity. So, realists seem to have to explain 
lack of convergence, or the ‘elusive’ nature of aesthetic properties. I shall 
address this in Chapters 5 and 6.30 
One notable and important aspect of the realism/anti-realism debate in 
the philosophy of art, in particular, is that the objects under discussion were 
created by man. So it may seem that their properties are, in an important sense, 
mind-dependent: works have, at least in part (and in the successful cases), the 
properties that their authors intended them to have.31 But such objects and their 
properties are mind-independent in the same way that, say, artifacts (like 
                                               
29 The (realist) claim is that an object can be beautiful even if no one judges that it is so, that is, 
unjudged objects can be beautiful nevertheless. Consider an analogy with the moral case: you 
might do something for me without feeling (realizing) that you are being generous. But your 
action (judged or unjudged), for the realist, can nevertheless be generous. Similarly, I might 
not notice that I am being given something (such as help or advice) and thereby not feel 
grateful, even though gratitude would be appropriate (and even morally required). The 
realist claims, accordingly, that unjudged objects possess their aesthetic properties 
independently of particular judgements. 
30 For the claim that aesthetic qualities are elusive and yet real, see Pettit ([1983] 2004). 
31 The controversial issue of the role of intentions in (literary) interpretation is addressed by 
Livingston (2005). 
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hammers) are mind-independent: a hammer is a hammer after having 
successfully been produced; and a yellow hammer is yellow even if no one ever 
knows that it is yellow (for instance, if it is buried and is not to be found again). 
Its colour is independent of any particular judgement of colour, and of any 
manifestation of colour. 32  Unperceived yellow objects are still yellow. 
Accordingly, for the realist a work can be beautiful even if no one happens to 
perceive or grasp the work’s beauty.  
A methodological question now arises as to what our default position 
ought to be. Ought we to be realists unless the power of argument against 
realism convinces us, or, on the contrary, should we remain anti-realists unless 
the power of realist argument wins us? Bender (2003, 80) asks, of aesthetic 
properties, ‘What worse candidate could there be for a ”real” property?’.. If we 
begin, however, by looking at the surface grammar of aesthetic attributions, the 
default position to recommend seems to be (pace Wright) realist. Compare the 
following predicates: ‘is square’, ‘is blue’, ‘is elegant’ and ‘is beautiful’. If we are 
to accept realism about properties (in general) and yet to reject realism about 
aesthetic properties, then it seems that we have to explain the differences 
                                               
32 It might be claimed that a ‘response-dependence’ account of colour agrees with this, but is 
a variant of anti-realism about colour. Cf. the following account of a response-dependent 
property (Stecker 2005, 64): ‘a property is response dependent if its instantiation in an object 
consists in the object having a steady disposition to bring about a certain reaction in human 
beings.’ A realist, by contrast, will claim that the propensity of an object to elicit a certain 
aesthetic response is not sufficient for the object to possess an aesthetic property. See also 
Chapter 4, p. 115, note 21.   
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between these (apparent) property predicates.33 One feature common to all of 
them is that they do not apply to everything. For example, just as not everything 
satisfies the predicate ‘is square’, so not everything satisfies the predicate ‘is 
beautiful’. Each of these predicates is, it seems, true of some things and false of 
others. But what differences, if any, are there between these apparent property 
predicates, and, if there are any, how should we go about explaining them? 
If we consider the practice of art criticism, two opposed intuitions may 
leave us again divided concerning the place to start. On the one hand, it seems 
that disagreements concern genuine aspects of the works (and it appears also 
that they will involve some misapprehension of those aspects on the part of at 
least one of the disputants). On the other hand, disputes seem also to involve 
affective differences, or preferences which may not involve a critical mistake. 
Concerning the first, and as Hume well noted in his essay ‘On the 
Standard of Taste’,34 critical judgements are not all upon an equal footing, and 
this seems to point towards realism. The normative aspect of critical judgements 
implies that disagreements are, at least sometimes, based on critical mistakes 
(such mistakes are the issue in discussion). Critics are looking for the most 
adequate (perhaps also the most enlightening) descriptions and evaluations of 
works of art. Accordingly, critical progress is possible. It is based on knowledge 
                                               
33 Cf. Meskin (2004, 88): ‘although claims of beauty have the surface form of claims about 
objective features of the world, the folk view is that in truth they amount to little more than 
declarations of how objects seem to us, or how we experience them.’ 
34 Hume ([1757] 1985). I discuss Hume’s essay in Chapter 4. 
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gained via the detection of critical errors and the replacement of less adequate 
descriptions (or even mistaken descriptions, or at least partially mistaken 
descriptions) with more adequate descriptions. 
Competent critics will be able to distinguish that which concerns their 
personal preference from that which is intrinsically valuable. A critic might say, 
without contradiction, that he prefers work x, whilst recognizing that work y is 
aesthetically or, more broadly, artistically superior to x.35 Such a critic may avow 
that he prefers (the experience of reading) Dante’s Vita Nuova to Commedia, 
Tolstoy’s Resurrection to Anna Karenina, T. S. Eliot’s ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock’ to The Waste Land, whilst recognizing that, objectively, Commedia is 
superior to Vita Nuova, Anna Karenina is superior to Resurrection, and The Waste 
Land is (perhaps) superior to ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’. Accordingly, 
differences in preference between critics do not need to involve mistakes, but 
only differences in sensibility, faultless personal preferences for certain themes, 
genres, etc., which can in principle be separated from universal claims about 
works and their (I wish to say objective) aesthetic differences.  
                                               
35 Cf. Lamarque (2009, 273): ‘It is not uncommon for one and the same person to make an 
objective (i.e., impartial) judgment that goes one way, and a subjective judgment (i.e., based 
on personal preference) that goes the other, over a single work. Such a person might 
acknowledge that a work is “great” or “important” or “significant” while offering a negative 
personal view: “a good work but it doesn’t appeal to me.” Or the other way round: “I like it 
but I agree it is not a great work.”’ See also Budd (1995, 21, note 25): ‘what pleases you more 
may not be what you credit with the higher artistic value: you can derive more pleasure 
from a work that you do not judge to be better than another […]; moreover, you can be 
emotionally dead to an over-familiar work of high quality’. 
 41 
But on the other hand, as Goldman (1995) stresses, the cases in which the 
discussion is focused on the affective dimension of judgements seem to be the 
norm, not the exception: aesthetic disagreements seem to concern, for the most 
part, evaluation. And these faultless disagreements suggest that anti-realism 
ought to be the default position, for they concern the critics’ differences in 
sensibility, not (ultimately) the works’ properties. 
We have reached, it seems, an impasse. The sceptic will take the 
opportunity to say that both realists and anti-realists seem too attached to their 
personal inclinations, and that the arguments adduced are not conclusive so as 
to alter each other’s views. Where we decide to start the debate will determine 
where we will end up, with no progress. Anti-realists emphasize disagreements 
based on differences in sensibility. Discussions amongst ideal critics are about 
their differences in attitudes, they claim, more than about the properties of the 
objects in question or about interpretive (and evaluative) mistakes. Realists, by 
contrast, emphasize the predominance of agreement that would exist amongst 
ideal critics, and they claim that agreement is best explained by the fact that the 
works do possess the qualities agreed upon. Realists will perhaps add that (real) 
critics tend to agree also concerning which works are superior, even when their 
personal preferences diverge from those verdicts. In the optimistic words of one 
realist, 
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Even if irresolvable disagreements among appreciatively ideal observers, 
stemming from differences of attitudinal or perceptual sensibility, persist in a 
fair number of cases, precluding realist interpretation of aesthetic attributions, 
nothing precludes realist interpretation of aesthetic attributions, interpretation of 
them as assertibly true or false, in the majority of cases. An aesthetic realist, it 
seems, can rest reasonably content with that. (Levinson 2001, 80) 
  
According to the realist, then, widespread agreement suggests that aesthetic 
discourse is genuinely representational: it constitutes a reliable map of aesthetic 
reality. Irresolvable disagreements (the difficult cases for the realist) which 
remain are an exception. The vast majority of aesthetic disputes can be settled 
via argument.  
I the following chapters I will address the realism/anti-realism debate in 
aesthetics. We have seen that ontological questions can be genuine questions 
and that we can make progress in the way of answering them. My aim now is to 
defend the ontological doctrine of aesthetic realism, first by invoking some of 
anti-realism’s important shortcomings and then by offering positive arguments 
for realism. In Chapters 2 and 3, I shall be concerned with two very powerful (as 
we shall see basically epistemic) challenges to aesthetic realism. 
 
 
 
 
 43 
 
Chapter Two 
Error Theory 
 
 
 
2.1 Mackie’s error theory of values 
 
The error theory of Mackie (1977) holds that moral claims (and evaluative 
claims generally) are systematically false. More precisely, the core thesis of error 
theory (1977, 18) holds that moral claims are all false because they refer to 
entities which are thought not to exist (values).1 In this chapter I address this 
influential anti-realist view. 
Mackie’s theory is an error theory because it aims at exposing and 
countering an alleged mistake in common-sense views of morality (and of 
                                               
1 Mackie says explicitly that his view about values encompasses aesthetic values. See, for 
instance (1977, 15): ‘It also includes non-moral values, notably aesthetic ones, beauty and 
various kinds of artistic merit. I shall not discuss these explicitly, but clearly much the same 
considerations apply to aesthetic and to moral values, and there would be at least some 
initial implausibility in a view that gave the one a different status from the other.’ For 
Mackie, however, the temptation to objectify values is weaker in the aesthetic case: 
‘Aesthetic values are logically in the same position as moral ones; much the same 
metaphysical and epistemological considerations apply to them. But aesthetic values are 
less strongly objectified than moral ones; their subjective status, and an ”error theory” with 
regard to such claims to objectivity as are incorporated in aesthetic judgements, will be 
more readily accepted, just because the motives for their objectification are less compelling’ 
(1977, 43). 
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values generally). The mistake is to see moral language as language to be taken 
at face value, as if there really were values. According to Mackie this alleged 
mistake needs correction and, in particular, it prompts a sceptical2 look into 
thought and discourse about value. 
The thesis that there are no objective values is supposed to be an 
ontological claim, as opposed to a merely linguistic or conceptual claim. So it 
addresses exactly the concerns I am interested in examining. Mackie’s topic and 
concern is not only semantic realism, but also (and ultimately) ontological realism 
about values. This last concern is explicitly mentioned in the following 
formulation (1977, 17) of his main thesis: ‘[the thesis] says that there do not exist 
entities or relations of a certain kind, objective values or requirements, which 
many people have believed to exist.’ Another aspect common to Mackie’s 
project and my own is that Mackie’s error theory takes the question of realism 
to be a genuine question, requiring ‘factual analysis’ (1977, 19), as opposed to 
merely linguistic or conceptual analysis. But the error theory is against 
common-sense, and it is also against what the surface of evaluative discourse 
suggests. As Mackie admits, discourse about value invites an objective reading. 
So, as he also claims, we need good reasons before we adopt the error theory of 
values.3  
                                               
2 Mackie names his view both ‘moral scepticism’ and ‘subjectivism’, adding however that 
both phrases can be misleading. See Mackie (1977, 15-17). 
3 Mackie himself (1977, 35) admits that we need to be convinced to adopt the error theory: 
‘But since this is an error theory, since it goes against assumptions ingrained in our thought 
and built into some of the ways in which language is used, since it conflicts with what is 
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According to Mackie, philosophers have tended to see values as real or 
factual rather than illusory because moral philosophy, ordinary thought and 
even the meanings of moral terms have, in the western tradition going back to 
Plato, invited that thought. When someone reads or hears the sentence 
‘Aristotle was a good man’ (or ‘Alcibiades was a beautiful man’), he is led to 
think that this sentence could actually be true in the same way that the sentence 
‘Aristotle was a Greek philosopher’ can be true. But for the error theorist this 
assimilation is a mistake, resulting from an inappropriate objectification of a 
value, goodness (or beauty), and this mistake must be corrected.  
The ‘objectification’ calls for explanation, and to argue for his error 
theory Mackie explains it in two ways. First, the notion of an objective value is 
for Mackie created by the widespread belief that desires must depend upon 
values instead of the converse: ‘We get the notion of something’s being 
objectively good, or having intrinsic value, […] by making the desire depend 
upon the goodness, instead of the goodness on the desire’ (1977, 43).  
The objectification of values is also triggered by something akin to 
religious belief, Mackie thinks, which brings about the desire to attribute to 
moral judgements a ‘fictitious external authority’ (1977, 34). According to 
Mackie, western moral philosophy has been misled by this tendency towards 
objectification, and so have ordinary thought and language. This is the reason 
                                                                                                                                    
sometimes called common sense, it needs very solid support. [...] If we are to adopt this 
view, we must argue explicitly for it.’ 
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why linguistic and conceptual analysis are not good guides for investigating the 
reality of values, for they incorporate the tendency to see values as real, thus 
replicating the mistake and providing us only with (systematic) error. If we are 
adequately to differentiate between reality and appearances, we must begin by 
seeing the mistake, so as to correct it. Exposing the purported mistake is the 
error theorist’s project. 
To argue for the error theory Mackie cites two ‘traditional’ arguments 
against the existence of values: the ‘argument from relativity’ (1977, 36-38) and 
the ‘argument from queerness’ (1977, 38-42). The argument from relativity is an 
empirical argument which claims that since judgements of value vary so much 
across cultures, and even within the same culture, it is implausible that these 
beliefs could be about anything other than appearances. Perhaps they concern, 
as Mackie suggests, only ‘different ways of life’ (1977, 36).4 I will focus on the 
argument ‘from queerness’ only, however, which Mackie himself takes to be the 
more important and the more ‘generally applicable’ (1977, 38) of the two 
arguments.  
The argument from queerness has, Mackie claims, two parts, one 
metaphysical and another epistemological. Mackie gives two versions of the 
                                               
4 As Mackie notes (1977, 36), it might be replied that also in science there are irresolvable 
disagreements. Mackie suggests that in matters of values, as contrasted with scientific 
matters, disagreements may not involve a fault on the part of any of the disputants: 
‘Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are 
no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific 
disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on 
inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same 
way.’ 
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argument from queerness. The first is directed generally against the existence of 
values, whereas the second is directed in particular against Plato’s Form of the 
Good.  
The metaphysical part of the first version of the argument says that if 
values were real, they would be entities or relations unlike anything else in the 
universe. They would be ‘queer’ for being intrinsically motivating, or 
‘objectively prescriptive’ (1977, 24). So, there are no values.  
But invoking ‘queerness’ is not decisive against realism: 5  even if 
something is queer, if it is really out there, what can we do but recognize its 
presence? 6  Queerness, per se, gives no reason to eschew the objects and 
properties of a disputed region of reality. Regions of reality can be odd, and in 
effect any area of reality can be reckoned different from other areas. So the 
opponent of realism should say more than merely that the disputed entities 
would be utterly different from anything else in the universe. Queerness is not 
enough.  
We can find the same difficulty in another formulation of the thesis that 
there are no values. Earlier on in the chapter, building on Kant’s distinction 
between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, Mackie had described his 
thesis thus:  
                                               
5 It is fair to note that it is the way in which the moral is ‘queer’ that Mackie takes to provide 
a case for error theory. It is not just the bare fact that the moral is different from other 
realms, even though he does begin by invoking that fact.  
6 McGinn (2000, 108) makes a similar point about truth (which he takes to be a ‘queer’ 
property): ‘It is “queer”. But [...] sometimes we just have to learn to live with the “queer”: 
denial or denigration are not sensible responses.’ 
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my thesis that there are no objective values is specifically the denial that any 
such categorically imperative element is objectively valid. The objective values 
which I am denying would be action-directing absolutely, not contingently […] 
upon the agent’s desires and inclinations. (1977, 29)  
  
What error theory denies is that values could of necessity (categorically) direct 
action, independently of the agent’s desires and inclinations. Something forcing 
action in this way is indeed strange to conceive. But the strangeness can only be 
invoked if values must be conceived as objectively prescriptive entities in the 
first place. The relevant question to ask is whether western moral tradition 
endorses this radical conception of values.   
Mackie adds that in respect to thought and reasoning about morality, 
error theory says that moral arguments are not ‘objectively valid’ because 
somewhere in the reasoning ‘there will be something which cannot be 
objectively validated’ but is ‘constituted by our choosing or deciding to think in 
a certain way’ (1977, 30). That is, some premise will not be ‘simply true’, or else 
some form of argument will not be ‘valid as a matter of general logic’, but will 
depend on a personal decision to see things in a certain way. So it seems that 
our evaluations depend more on (blameless) choices than on findings. Hence 
they should not be construed in a realist manner. But it might be said in reply 
that even choices can be compared and found superior or inferior to other 
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choices. And this is prima facie based on the comparison between different 
values. The error theorist must tell us that such objective comparisons cannot be 
made, or that they are not based on something alleged belonging to the external 
world.  
The epistemological part of the argument says that if values were real, 
we would need a special faculty of perception or intuition to grasp them, which 
makes such knowledge seem mysterious: 
 
none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the 
framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical 
construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a 
satisfactory answer; a ‘special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one 
to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort. (1977, 39) 
 
The epistemological part of the argument is more plausible than the ontological 
part because instead of aiming to make an ontological claim, it passes the 
burden of proof to the realist. To show that values exist, the realist can choose to 
provide an epistemology that makes more plausible the idea that knowledge of 
value is genuine knowledge, or else, Mackie suggests, he can try and find other 
cases of knowledge for which empiricism alone cannot account. If we could find 
other cases of areas of knowledge where non-(strictly)-empiricist theories of 
 50 
knowledge are not available, knowledge of values would not look ‘queer’: 
knowledge of values would be like knowledge of those other areas.   
Mackie’s realist has a considerable list: ‘our ideas of essence, number, 
identity, diversity, solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and 
infinite extension of time and space, necessity and possibility in general, power, 
and causation’ (1977, 39). All of them are more or less classical notions from 
metaphysics. Mackie responds to this list as follows:  
 
I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given 
in empirical terms. If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist 
such treatment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, 
among the targets of the argument from queerness. (1977, 39) 
   
What can now be said is that the argument for the claim that knowledge of 
values is strange has now by Mackie’s own words encompassed not just values, 
but, if they resist an empirical treatment, also necessities or essences, dubbed 
‘metaphysical’. Values might be ‘queer’, but they are not, perhaps, alone in their 
queerness.  
Mackie anticipates the objection that error theory might be targetting 
value statements only because of their ‘unverifiability’ (1977, 39). The 
epistemological aspect of the argument for error theory could be stemming 
from ideas akin to those of the logical positivists, serving a more general anti-
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metaphysical project. But Mackie anticipates this objection and replies to it by 
saying that, contrary to the view of the logical positivists, his account does not 
take moral judgements to be meaningless. Rather, it declares them all to be false. 
Accordingly, the question of ontological realism about values is not, for him, a 
pseudo-question as the logical positivists would have supposed. On the 
contrary, it is a genuine question, to be answered negatively: there are no values 
(1977, 40). 
 This reply is not entirely satisfactory, however, for although it accounts 
for the falsity of moral judgements, it seems that it will not yet explain how it is 
that they are systematically false, which is the error theorist’s specific claim. And 
if the reply to the objection is not entirely satisfactory, then we can still say, 
following Mackie’s own advice, that we need more solid argument before we 
adopt an error theory of values. 
 It seems, indeed, that the ‘metaphysical’ notions that the error theorist is 
suspicious of are difficult to dispense with. The option, open to the realist, of 
finding ‘companions in guilt’ (1977, 39) seems to be advantageous for realism, 
for they are not difficult to find. Nevertheless, the explanation of how extra-
natural qualities or relations could be known is still a difficult task for the realist 
to accomplish, if that is what values must be.  
 Let us see whether the second version of the argument that values are 
‘queer’ has different results. It consists in Mackie’s presentation of Plato’s Form 
of the Good. Mackie (1977, 40) suggests that Plato’s theory of Forms could 
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provide a model for the kind of realism about values that he wants to criticize 
and reject: ‘Plato’s Forms give a dramatic picture of what values would have to 
be.’  
 The two aspects of the Form of the Good that Mackie finds especially 
problematic are the same that appear in the first version of the argument. One is 
its being intrinsically motivating: the Form of the Good has ‘to-be-pursuedness 
somehow built into it’ (1977, 40), that is, ‘it provides the knower with both a 
direction and an overriding motive’ (ibid.). So it contrasts with the contingency 
upon desires of our ordinary decisions to act in a certain way. Since the Form of 
the Good would be necessarily motivating for any knower, it would be different 
from anything else in the universe that we know of: it would be ‘queer’. (So we 
can engage with this argument as we did with its first version). 
 Another problematic aspect identified by Mackie is the way in which the 
Form of the Good would have to be linked to natural features. ‘[E]ntailment’, or 
a ‘logical or semantic necessity’ (1977, 41), as Mackie puts it, is insufficient to 
explain the connection between the ‘natural fact that an action is a piece of 
cruelty […] and the moral fact that it is wrong’. However, the wrongness is 
somehow a ‘consequence’ of the cruelty: it seems (ibid.) that the action is 
‘wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty.’ ‘But’, Mackie (ibid.) asks, ‘just 
what in the world is signified by this ‘because’?’. This question is a salient one. 
The Form of the Good as Mackie presents it is supposed to be something that 
makes good actions good. But the difficulty is that Plato’s Forms are not in 
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nature (they are famously outside space and time). So it is unclear how the 
Form of the Good could make actions good (beautiful, etc). 
  The alternative picture to the Form of the Good is, Mackie claims, ‘some 
sort of subjective response’ (1977, 41) which could ‘replace the moral quality’ 
(ibid.) and explain how we detect the natural features which ground the 
supposed quality (ibid.). Leaving aside the question of whether such subjectivist 
explanation is more illuminating than Plato’s dramatic picture, it might be 
noted that, although Mackie distances himself from the general anti-
metaphysical project of logical positivism, he has now a larger list of 
‘metaphysical’ notions judged ‘queer’. 
As Mackie says, Plato’s Form of the Good can only be a dramatic picture 
of how values really could be. What seems plain is that it is some form of this 
picture that Mackie’s error theory aims at countering. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that he claims to be opposing an entire philosophical tradition 
(ingrained in common-sense) going back to Plato. What we need to see is 
whether the western moral tradition, and common-sense in particular, endorses 
this odd theory of values.   
 
 
2.2 McDowell’s reply 
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Mackie’s error theory rejects the claim that thought and discourse about value 
could appropriately be taken at face value. An error theorist would claim that 
the appearance that aesthetic value is present in some (but not all) objects is an 
illusion that we should dismiss.   
McDowell (1983) has considered Mackie’s error theory when applied, in 
particular, to the case of aesthetic value (1983, 1). As McDowell also notes (ibid.), 
Mackie had examined morality specifically, but he had claimed that ‘the same 
considerations apply to aesthetic and to moral values’ and that a view giving 
different status to the two areas would be, at least prima facie, implausible (1977, 
15).  
As we saw, Mackie’s error theory aims to call attention to the 
(supposedly) misguided conception of values that tradition, going back to Plato, 
has engendered. After showing what specific mistake McDowell finds in 
Mackie’s account, my aim will be to see what alternative conception McDowell 
could be proposing that could meet the error theorist’s legitimate concern that 
values should not look ‘queer’ (even if queerness, per se, is not decisive against 
realism). 
As he himself admits, McDowell does not wish to respond directly to 
Mackie’s arguments, but only to question ‘whether those arguments attack the 
right target’ (1983, 4). This is my concern as well. McDowell agrees with Mackie 
that the objectivity of value is not merely a semantic issue, that is, an issue about 
the meaning of language (aesthetic or, more generally, evaluative). But he 
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claims that Mackie’s rejection of objectivity for values rests on an inadequate 
notion of objectivity. In particular, McDowell points to an alleged contradiction 
in Mackie’s conception of objectivity, to then suggest that a different 
interpretation of objectivity should replace it, one that would not make values 
look ‘queer’. In other words, McDowell’s point is not to directly defend a 
position in the debate on realism about values, or to speculate about the nature 
of values, but, he claims, to leave room for a defence of them. 
McDowell disputes specifically Mackie’s conception of objectivity. He 
focuses on Mackie’s implied view that whatever is part of the world must be 
objective, and objective in a particular sense. ‘Objective’ in this context is to be 
contrasted with ‘subjective’ (1983, 2), where subjective properties (for instance) 
are those which must be conceived ‘in terms of how the thing would, in suitable 
circumstances, affect a subject—a sentient being’ (1983, 2). As McDowell (ibid.) 
explains (and I paraphrase), a subjective property in this sense would be, for 
example, a colour property, such as redness. 7 Redness concerns the possibility of 
something, x, looking red under certain circumstances (namely with appropriate 
light and at a certain distance). The predicate ‘is red’ applies only to things 
which can look red to human beings in certain circumstances. According to this 
way of differentiating between objective and subjective, aesthetic values (and 
values generally) qualify clearly as subjective, given their essential connection 
with possible effects on (and responses by) human beings. The question is, then, 
                                               
7 This is McDowell’s example. 
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whether subjective properties such as, for example, colours (but also aesthetic 
properties and values) can, too, qualify as objective in the ontological sense, that 
is, whether they can be reckoned as part of the external world. 
What McDowell wants to avoid is that, by restricting the world to what 
is objective in Mackie’s sense, we preclude ‘subjective’ properties such as the 
property of being red from being part of reality, even though their categorial 
bases undoubtedly qualify as real. McDowell (1983, 2) writes: ‘Categorical 
grounds for affective or secondary qualities can be part of the fabric of the 
world, on [Mackie’s] view, even though the subjective properties they sustain 
cannot.’ Nothing in this result is absurd, but the decision to restrict the world to 
primary qualities (the qualities cited in scientific theories) 8  may require 
explanation, since the world as we experience it—the ‘manifest’ 9  world—
includes, or seems to include, more than that. So, again, the question ends up 
being whether the best conception of the world should include or exclude 
colours or aesthetic values, not whether any conception of the world must 
include them.             
So McDowell does not deny that aesthetic values, together with colours 
and other secondary qualities, cannot be conceived to be independent of human 
                                               
8  McDowell (1983, 2) mentions one unwelcome consequence of Mackie’s notion of 
objectivity: ‘Mackie’s implied doctrine that whatever is part of the fabric of the world is 
objective, if [‘objective’] is interpreted in this way, amounts to the doctrine that the world is 
fully describable in terms of properties that can be understood without essential reference to 
their effects on sentient beings.’ 
9 For the contrast between the ‘scientific’ and the ‘manifest’ image, see Sellars (1963, Chapter 
1). 
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experience. His attitude is rather to ask whether, granting that aesthetic value 
must be conceived in connection with a subjective experience, we are ‘thereby 
debarred from supposing that we find aesthetic value […] in the world’ (1983, 
5).10 In other words, should reality be limited to what is independent of human 
experience?  
McDowell attempts to answer these questions by scrutinizing the notion 
of objectivity (the ‘absolute conception’) that, according to Bernard Williams 
(1978) underwrites Descartes’ (and modern science’s) ‘project of pure enquiry’. 
Under this notion of objectivity, ‘objective’ means ‘independent of any special 
point of view’ (1983, 12). McDowell (buiding on Williams’s account) sets up the 
following dilemma for this conception. Either an absolute conception of 
objectivity transcends all particular points of view, or else it assumes a 
particular point of view. If an absolute conception of objectivity transcends all 
particular points of view, it cannot capture any particular points of view. But in 
that case it is an ‘empty’ conception. On the other hand, if the absolute 
conception is to assume a determinate, independent point of view (such as the 
point of view of science), it will still be one point of view, so it is not an absolute 
conception. So an absolute conception of objectivity is incoherent. McDowell 
sees no way out of this dilemma and holds that the idea of objectivity based on 
                                               
10  McDowell (1983, 5) also suggests that ‘[t]he phenomenology of value experience in 
general suggests a visual model for our dealings with value. In the moral case we are prone 
to be tempted away from that model by the distracting influence of the concept of choice  or 
decision; whereas in the aesthetic case […] that temptation is not operative.’ 
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this absolute conception of reality does not make sense. In his words: ‘the idea 
of a view from nowhere is incoherent’ (1983, 6). 
As McDowell notes, Williams, however, is not a sceptic about the 
absolute conception. For Williams the second horn of the dilemma can be 
avoided because, he believes, scientific methods provide universal (objective) 
standards. As Williams sees it, science is not simply one point of view amongst 
others, but, as McDowell puts it, it is an especially ‘transparent mode of access 
to reality’ (1983, 7). So, for Williams, the idea of an absolute conception of reality 
is not incoherent since science provides an independent standard against which 
all other views must be measured. It is not an empty conception either, because 
it is not a conception independent of thought in general, but only (as McDowell 
quotes from Williams) ‘independent […] of all that is arbitrary and individual in 
thought’ (1983, 6).   
McDowell, however, finds two, related, reasons to doubt the plausibility 
of an absolute conception of reality, and in particular to doubt that the scientific 
view could be the one adopted as the ‘measure of all things’. (Aesthetic 
properties and values are of course putative aspects of the world to which a 
purely scientific view would be blind.)  
One reason McDowell gives is that the absolute conception, the 
defenders of which seek to justify for explanatory reasons, fails to be genuinely 
explanatory. The absolute conception aims at surpassing (‘transcending’) 
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particular views and at explaining them.11  But this project is, according to 
McDowell, ‘self-defeating’, because the attempt to go beyond particular 
explanations brings about a ‘regress’. Take his example, the case of colour. An 
explanation of colour apprehension requires reference to those who are located 
in the point of view in question: those who have colour vision.12 The content of 
the appearances can only be understood with reference to those occupying the 
relevant point of view (1983, 10). (That is, to explain what it is to be red we need 
to invoke the phenomenon of looking red to (most) humans under certain light 
conditions, at a certain distance, etc). McDowell’s suggestion is that the absolute 
conception, and in particular the scientific view he considers, might be adequate 
to account for scientific phenomena, but it is not adequate to account for every 
phenomenon. For the scientific view considers the subjective13 properties (such 
as colours) that figure in common-sense views of the world to be merely 
subjective responses to what it takes to be objectively real, thereby leaving them 
unexplained, even though experience seems to reveal them as genuine. So, at 
least in the case of colour, the absolute (scientific) conception fails to be 
explanatory. 
McDowell’s objection to the absolute conception is not decisive. There is 
nothing forcing us to include secondary qualities (let alone aesthetic qulities 
and values) in our picture of the world. Nevertheless, since the absolute 
                                               
11 See Williams (1978, 245-246). 
12 McDowell (1983, 10). 
13 ‘Subjective’ in the sense mentioned above: requiring a particular point of view. 
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conception sets as its goal the explanation of all phenomena, we can reply that 
at least the phenomenon of colour experience, which is natural not to take as 
illusory, and which seems to be a source of genuine knowledge, remains 
unexplained by that view. So, the absolute conception does not achieve its goal. 
Plausibly, and as McDowell’s view implies, this is because the scope of science 
is not absolute, but only scientific. Science may be appropriate to explain 
scientific phenomena, but it is not appropriate to capture every phenomenon. 
What matters for McDowell’s purposes and ours here is that the thought that a 
scientific view could be ‘the measure of all things’ seems at least under-
motivated.    
 McDowell’s aim in the essay, and his point in separating his view of 
objectivity from an absolute conception, is not to establish realism about 
aesthetic values. As he claims, all he wishes is to leave scope for a different 
interpretation of ‘objectivity’, so that the possibility of real aesthetic values could 
remain open, a possibility which ‘the phenomenology of value experience has 
made attractive to philosophers and ordinary people’ (1983, 16).   
McDowell neither provides an alternative conception of objectivity nor 
argues for realism about values. His position, as he admits, just leaves room for 
the question of the reality of values to be asked. Because if we give up the 
thought that all explanations that merit the name must be scientific, we are free 
to consider the plausibility of alternative explanations, that could perhaps make 
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sense of aspects of our experience that we may find important to include in our 
general picture of the world. 
A relevant question, given Mackie’s attack on Platonism, is whether 
McDowell’s alternative to Mackie’s view is Platonistic.  McDowell (1996) 
explicitly recommends a form of Platonism with respect to meaning, which he 
calls ‘naturalized platonism’ to distinguish it from the Platonism that error 
theory about values opposes, which he calls ‘rampant platonism’. McDowell’s 
claim is that Platonism need not be rampant. He distinguishes between the two 
forms thus:    
 
In rampant platonism, […] the structure in which we place things when we find 
meaning in them, is simply extra-natural. Our capacity to resonate to that 
capacity has to be mysterious […] But thanks to the notion of second nature, 
there is no whiff of that here. Our Bildung actualizes some of the potentialities 
we are born with; we do not have to suppose it introduces a non-animal 
ingredient into our constitution. […] Meaning is not a mysterious gift from 
outside nature. (1996, 88) 
 
This Platonism is introduced as an Aristotelian reading of naturalism. By 
relying on the notion of ‘second nature’, this qualified form of Platonism brings 
in the option of potential or possibilities being in nature. According to this 
naturalism moral (and aesthetic) knowledge can be reckoned natural because it 
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concerns a sophistication of our natural capacities. ‘Sensibility’, claims 
McDowell (1996, 87), ‘is one of our natural powers’.  Moral and aesthetic 
knowledge can be understood, according to this account, as resulting from a 
natural use and development of our natural powers.  
The account is basically realist because these powers are considered to be 
forms of world-sensitivity. The view is that ‘the dictates of reason are there 
anyway, whether or not one’s eyes are open to them’ (1996, 91). So an 
appropriate upbringing will include the opening of one’s eyes to the dictates of 
reason.14 In contrast, rampant Platonism, in relying on ‘supernaturalism’ (1996, 
78) to explain knowledge, leaves knowledge of values unexplained. For our 
purposes, one thing is clear: if Platonism can be thus naturalized, then there is 
room for defending (a modest) realism about values.  
In summary, we can say that Mackie had seen the moral philosophical 
tradition going back to Plato, including common-sense, as unified. According to 
Mackie all that tradition was mistaken in objectifying values and argument was 
needed to oppose the learned tendency to objectification. But we have also seen 
that Platonism can perhaps be given a more sensible reading, such as the one 
McDowell recommends concerning meaning. If this reading can meet the 
difficulties Mackie correctly finds in rampant Platonism, we require further 
argument from the error theorist before agreeing with him that the western 
                                               
14 McDowell makes reference to morality, but the same considerations can, mutatis mutandis, 
be applied to the aesthetic case, in particular to aesthetic learning. 
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philosophical tradition going back to Plato and ingrained in common-sense is 
systematically mistaken in taking values to be real.  
 
 
2.3 ‘Common-sense’ realism 
 
The error theorist’s main claim was that value-laden discourse is misleading, in 
that it embodies the thought that there are such things as values, and that this 
mistake requires correction. The error theorist also claims, however, that to 
accept his counterintuitive view ‘solid argument’ is required. How solid, then, 
is Mackie’s case for his brand of evaluative anti-realism? 
 The considerations Mackie adduces in favour of his view are, in 
summary, the following.15 First, he invokes the variability of opinion in moral 
thinking. This variability, he suggests, is not (unlike the case of scientific 
disagreement) necessarily based on mistakes in at least one side but appears to 
concern only different, perhaps sometimes incommensurable, ways of life. 
Second, he calls attention to the strangeness of the supposed objective values, 
especially in respect of their being intrinsically motivating. Third, he mentions 
the problematic relation such values would bear with natural features. Fourth, 
he refers to the difficulty of accounting for our knowledge of such objective 
                                               
15 I paraphrase Mackie’s own summary of his case for ‘moral scepticism’, in (1977, 49). 
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values. Fifth, he explains the common-sense tendency to objectify values (see 
the discussion above in §2.1). 
 If the case against the objectivity of values is not entirely successful, then, 
following Mackie’s own advice, we have no reason to change our ways and 
adopt an error theory. As Mackie writes, 
 
Moral scepticism must take the form of an error theory, admitting that a belief 
in objective values is built into ordinary moral thought and language, but 
holding that this ingrained belief is false. As such, it needs arguments to 
support it against ‘common sense’. (1977, 48-49) 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall agree with Mackie that the most natural 
position to have concerning values is realist, but I shall claim, contra Mackie, 
that there is not, in general, a mistake in that position. So, there is no need for an 
error theory, opposed to ‘common-sense’. 
 My contention is that ‘common-sense’ realism about values is not as 
Mackie says it is. Common-sense views of values are not Platonistic.16 Ordinary 
moral (and, generally, evaluative) thought and discourse do not presuppose 
that there are the extra-natural properties that Mackie presumes objective 
values, if they existed, would be. Nor are the values that ordinary moral (and 
                                               
16 Rather, I claim, common-sense views of values are ‘naturalized platonisms’, as McDowell 
calls them with respect to meaning. The label is not important, but only the notion that 
values need not be identified with extra-natural properties. 
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aesthetic) thought and discourse presuppose the intrinsically motivating 
properties that Mackie (understandably) finds queer. So, in ordinary moral and 
evaluative thought there is no ingrained ‘rampant’ Platonism calling for 
correction. Therefore, a case against Platonism need not be a case against 
ordinary moral and evaluative thought. If ordinary moral and evaluative 
thought does not embody the Platonism which Mackie associates with it, and if 
it is this Platonism which Mackie takes to be the erroneous component of 
ordinary moral and evaluative thought, there is no need for an error theory of 
ordinary moral and evaluative thought and discourse. 
 What, then, is ‘common-sense’ realism about value? The modest realism 
inherent in ‘common-sense’ views of values begins, it seems to me, with an 
epistemological thesis, namely that genuine knowledge of values is possible. It 
seems evident that it is possible to make a mistake concerning value.17 Think, 
for example, of someone insisting that Euripides’ tragedies, or Homer’s two 
epic poems, are worthless aesthetically. Instances of error (or certainty) 
acknowledged by a majority18 must count as reasons for the claim that there is 
something there to know. 
                                               
17 This can be, however, accommodated by the subjectivist, who also accepts standards of 
evaluation. See Mackie (1977, 26): ‘The subjectivist about values, then, is not denying that 
there can be objective evaluations relative to standards.’ The subjectvist and the objectivist 
disagree, however, on the grounds for those standards: for the realist the grounds are in 
external reality. 
18 However, we must accept that some aesthetic knowledge is possessed only by a minority 
of experts (and this need not count against this knowledge being genuine). 
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About what there is to know (about what values are), common-sense is 
unspecific. It does not specify what kind of reality evaluative discourse is about. 
So, a fortiori it does not claim that discourse about values is about extra-natural, 
Platonistic, entities.19  So one way to reply to the error theorist and defend 
realism is by saying that the realist need not make the implausible claims that 
the error theorist attributes to him.  
Common-sense realism, then, is conspicuously silent. However, when 
the error theorist claims that real values would be ‘objectively prescriptive’, and 
that this makes them implausible or queer, the realist should say what he 
himself takes values to be. An appropriate positive response is, I admit, not easy 
to give. One way of leaving open the possibility of values and aesthetic 
properties (my main concern) being objective,20 without denying their subjective 
nature,21 is by saying that values and aesthetic properties (such as, for instance, 
beauty, but also elegance, delicacy, balance, etc.) are known through desire.22 As 
we have seen, colours require perception to be discerned and this need not 
count against their being objective. So perhaps (e.g.) elegance, delicacy or even 
beauty may require a cognitive desire (and imagination) in order to be 
                                               
19 For the suggestion of a realist alternative to Platonism, see the next paragraphs. 
20 ‘Objective’ in the sense of being part of the world. 
21 In the sense that they require human ‘subjectivity’ (participation) to be grasped. 
22 This is the view of Zemach (1997). E.g.: ‘We see things aesthetically because we see things 
as effecting the satisfaction of our wants’ (1997, 95); ‘Aesthetic properties appear only to 
those whose seeing is modulated by desire’ (1997, 103). 
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captured23,24 and yet be taken as genuine values or, more precisely, as evaluative 
properties of objects.  
Mirroring the claim that colours may be reckoned real even though they 
require human perceivers to be detected, we could perhaps say that aesthetic 
properties require imaginative (and perhaps desiring) perceptions, in order to 
be detected. We could say that they cannot be understood independently from 
that perception, but that this need not count against their objectivity. Statements 
attributing such properties to objects are to be judged against reality, not against 
mental projections, so the account falls still clearly on the realist side. The 
objects have or fail to have those properties, the thought goes, and the 
corresponding judgements are true or false depending entirely on the objects, 
not at all on the viewer’s (or reader’s) feelings or attitudes. This is true even 
though ‘subjective’ experience is necessary in order to ascertain whether the 
objects have or fail to have the properties in question. Note that the realist’s 
claim is, so far, only conditional, and tentative. The claim is the following: if 
essential reference to subjectivity, in the case of colour, does not (per se) block 
                                               
23  Another (related) explanation consists in saying that aesthetic properties and values 
require a form of love in order to be discerned. For a development of this thesis (in particular, 
of the thesis that what makes interpretable objects valuable and interpretable is the 
‘friendship’ of a society) see Tamen (2001).   
24 In the radio programme ‘Discovering Music’ (BBC Radio 3, 19th October 2008), Charles 
Hazlewood, speaking of Tchaikovsky’s 18th century-inspired works, Rococo Variations and 
the orchestral suite Mozartiana, used a happy phrase to express this idea: ‘through loving 
spectacles’, to refer to the way Tchaikovsky approached the work of Mozart. Hazlewood 
said: ‘How wonderful, now, to see the classical age through the loving spectacles [...] of this 
great 19th century Russian Romantic master’ (emphasis added). Arguably, aesthetic 
properties require ‘loving spectacles’ to be appropriately discerned, and my contention will 
be that this need not count against aesthetic realism.  
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realism, then perhaps the requirement of an imaginative (and desiring) 
sensibility is not incompatible with aesthetic realism. To argue from one example: 
even if to attribute beauty to some of Van Gogh’s sunflowers paintings 
subjective participation is required, that does not, per se, entail that beauty is 
not a property that the works do possess (or fail to possess): so far nothing 
precludes the supposed property from being real.  
There is another apparent difficulty for the realist account, however. It is 
a difficulty famously noted by Kant. Judgements of aesthetic value seem to 
require personal acquaintance with the object being judged. They seem, then, 
not to possess genuine epistemic content which would be transmissible via 
testimony. So, it seems that they do not concern genuine knowledge. If this is so, 
a fortiori there is no external reality that aesthetic judgements would refer to. It 
is to this supposed difficulty for aesthetic realism that I now turn. 
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Chapter Three 
Aesthetic Autonomy 
 
 
 
3.1 The autonomy thesis 
 
I will now consider perhaps the strongest objection to realism. In essence, it 
consists in the claim that the phrase ‘aesthetic realism’ is an oxymoron. This is 
because ‘realism’ makes a claim to objectivity, whereas ‘aesthetic’ seems to 
indicate that ‘the object of aesthetic judgment is something subjective, rather 
than objective—a feeling rather than any specific property of the object’.1 Given 
the irreducible subjectivity (in this sense) of aesthetic judgements, realism 
concerning the aesthetic realm seems impossible. 
In particular, I wish to consider the claim, commonly invoked against 
realism, that since aesthetic judgements must be made based on first-hand 
acquaintance with the object judged, the properties in question cannot be 
construed in a realist manner. This is because if they were real, then their 
content would be preserved via testimony. The ‘autonomy thesis’ claims that an 
                                               
1 Guyer (1997, 119).  
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aesthetic judgement must be made based on acquaintance with the object being 
judged, and one apparent consequence of this thesis is that an aesthetic 
judgement cannot be made based on someone else’s testimony alone. 2,3,4 
This is a well-known Kantian thesis. 5 , 6  Kant holds that I cannot 
warrantedly judge that an object is beautiful unless I have personal 
acquaintance with it; and my judgement refers, ineliminably, to that personal 
encounter, not simply to the object judged. Accordingly, knowing that a certain 
object is beautiful for someone else tells me nothing about that object. I will not 
be able to claim, warrantedly, that the object is beautiful until I have experience 
of that apparent fact. (In effect, anti-realists claim that to state that an object is 
beautiful is not to state a fact, and that we do not really know that the object is 
beautiful. It merely seems to us that it is so. Indeed, Kant’s thesis is part of his 
                                               
2 For a recent brief explanation (and rejection) of aesthetic autonomy, see Levinson (2005, 
213). Levinson refers to two other rejections of aesthetic autonomy: Budd’s (1999) and 
Meskin’s (2004). As champions of the autonomy thesis, Levinson includes, among others, 
Isenberg (presumably his [1949]), Pettit (presumably his [1983]) and Mothersill (presumably 
her 1984). Pettit’s project is specific in that it aims to integrate the autonomy of aesthetic 
judgements in a realist view. 
3 Meskin (2004, 75) notes that acquaintance with the work (say, with a painting) is possible 
also through photographs, so that judgements made based on acquaintance with 
photographs can qualify as aesthetic. He also notes, however, that even though ‘perceptual 
experience is present in such cases’, ‘[p]hotographs fail to provide viewers with the kind of 
first-person information that seeing typically does.’  
4 Following Wollheim ([1968] 1980), some authors make reference to the ‘Acquaintance 
principle’: ‘judgements of aesthetic value, unlike judgements of moral knowledge, must be 
based on first-hand experience of their objects and are not, except within very narrow limits, 
transmissible from one person to another’ (1980, 233). 
5  For a specific discussion of the phenomenon of ‘autonomy’, see Hopkins (2001). 
Apparently it was Hopkins (2001, 167) who coined the phrase that refers to the 
phenomenon (and to the correspondent thesis): ‘I draw on Kant to describe a specific 
phenomenon, what I call the autonomy of aesthetic judgement.’  
6 I follow Hopkins’s referencing conventions (CPJ §n). 
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more general project according to which matters of taste are not cognitive.7 That 
is, they are not a matter of knowing that a certain item is beautiful, but of feeling 
it to be so). 
The so-called autonomy thesis is originally put forward by Kant in his 
Critique of the Power of Judgement, and is more directly suggested in passages like 
the following:  
 
it is required [...] that the subject judge for himself. (§32) 
 
Taste makes claim merely to autonomy. To make the judgements of others into 
the determining ground of one’s own would be heteronomy. (§32) 
 
If someone does not find a building, a view, or a poem beautiful, then […] he 
does not allow approval to be internally imposed upon himself by a hundred 
voices who all praise it highly. (§33) 
 
The judgement of others, when it is unfavourable to our own, can of course 
rightly give us reservations about our own, but can never convince us of its 
incorrectness. (§33)  
 
                                               
7 See CPJ §1: ‘The judgement of taste is [...] not a cognitive judgement, hence not a logical 
one, but is rather aesthetic, by which is understood one whose determining ground cannot 
be other than subjective.’ Cf. CPJ §32: ‘the judgement of taste, however, is not grounded on 
concepts at all, and is above all no cognition, but only an aesthetic judgement.’ 
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Kant’s view concerns, in short, the requirement that an aesthetic judgement be 
based on a felt, personal, response. My aim in this chapter is to consider that 
supposed requirement, and to consider, in particular, its bearing on the 
question of aesthetic realism.  
In reply to the anti-realist charge that aesthetic autonomy is incompatible 
with aesthetic realism,8 some realists have attempted to meet the challenge by 
rejecting aesthetic autonomy, or the claim that aesthetic judgements require 
first-hand acquaintance. But this is a little unnatural, and has unwelcome 
implications. If we reject autonomy, or the acquaintance principle,9 it seems that 
we have to countenance the scenario in which critics could write art criticism 
without having had any contact with the works of which they speak. In this 
chapter I will attempt to defend another realist alternative and claim that the 
requirement of first-hand acquaintance is not incompatible with aesthetic 
realism. I shall offer two arguments for my view. The first is an empirical 
argument. I will make an analogy with colours, mainly by criticizing a 
disanalogy offered by Hopkins. I will note that, just as in the aesthetic case, in 
the case of colours we would not change our judgement based only on the 
opinions of others. So I will be saying that ‘autonomy’ is not peculiar to the 
aesthetic case. The result for the realism/anti-realism debate is this: just because 
I need to rely on my own judgement to grasp a property, that does not entail 
                                               
8 The charge is made by Matravers (2005, 196 and 199-200). 
9 See note 4 above. 
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that the property in question is not an objective property of the object. If 
autonomy concerning colour judgements does not block realism, then aesthetic 
autonomy cannot be invoked, per se, as a claim against aesthetic realism.  
My second argument for the view that the thesis of aesthetic autonomy, 
if true, is perfectly compatible with aesthetic realism is, in a nutshell, that an 
epistemological thesis, such as the thesis of aesthetic autonomy, cannot 
decisively threaten an ontological thesis, such as the thesis of aesthetic realism.  
I wish to say, then, why I think that the thesis of aesthetic autonomy is 
true and compatible with realism. 10  I wish to claim, first, that aesthetic 
autonomy is a genuine phenomenon, one that any aesthetic theory must be able 
to accommodate. (So, if aesthetic realism cannot accommodate the autonomy of 
aesthetic judgement, then we should dispense with aesthetic realism.) But first 
consider what philosophers have to say on aesthetic autonomy. 
 
 
3.2 Philosophers on aesthetic autonomy 
 
Some philosophers have been led to reject the Kantian thesis of aesthetic 
autonomy. Levinson (2005) has claimed, in response to the challenge that 
                                               
10 Of course, the question of whether the autonomy thesis is true is independent of the 
question of whether it is compatible with realism. Compatibility just means that autonomy 
and realism could be jointly true. It does not require that either is true. They could both be 
false, and yet be compatible. But in this chapter I wish to claim that they are both true, and 
compatible. 
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realism would undermine the doctrine of aesthetic autonomy (Matravers 2005), 
that the doctrine has not yet been established (2005, 213), and that if realism 
undermines aesthetic autonomy, ‘that is all to the good’ (2005, 214). To argue 
against aesthetic autonomy, Levinson invokes the ambiguity of the word 
‘judgement’. Under one interpretation, he claims, one cannot make an aesthetic 
judgement unless the judgement is based on direct acquaintance with the object 
being judged. Levinson admits that our aesthetic ‘involvement’ (2005, 213) with 
‘aesthetically notable objects such as artworks’ (ibid.) concerns mainly this first 
interpretation of ‘judgement’. However, under another acceptable 
interpretation, Levinson claims, one can ‘judge’ that (say) a work of art has 
certain qualities, including aesthetic ones, based on judgements of reliable 
others, that is, without ‘perceptually experiencing’ (2005, 213) the work in 
question. One of Levinson’s examples is from music: ‘I judge the Adagio of 
Beethoven’s Third Symphony, on the basis of centuries of testimony as to its 
expressiveness, to be an extremely sad piece of music’ (2005, 213). This 
interpretation, Levinson explains, is similar to the interpretation of ‘judgement’ 
with respect to non-aesthetic matters, as in (again I cite his example): ‘I judge 
the candidate, from the dossier in front of me, to have insufficient qualifications 
for the post’ (ibid.).11  
                                               
11 Livingston (2003, 277) makes a similar distinction, between ‘knowing’ and ‘gauging’: 
‘someone’s descriptions can inform one perfectly well about how the work is surprising, but 
only through a first, description-free experience can one fully gauge the work’s surprise 
value.’ 
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What Levinson is suggesting is that judgements of taste are cognitive, 
and that their cognitive aspect can be conveyed in testimony. For this sort of 
knowledge to be transmitted, certainly someone has to have been acquainted 
with the object being judged, in order to gain such knowledge. However, claims 
Levinson (2005, 214), it does not have to be oneself: ‘Nor should the fact, if it is a 
fact, that no one could know how an object was aesthetically unless someone, 
somewhere and sometime, has had direct experience of it induce one to think 
that that someone must be you.’ According to Levinson, then, we can gain 
knowledge about the aesthetic properties of objects (such as works of art) even 
before we are personally acquainted with those objects. 
 Meskin (2004) has claimed that aesthetic autonomy would leave us 
‘hopelessly imprisoned in an impoverished set of aesthetic beliefs’ (2004, 67), 
and that this is a reason to reject the autonomy thesis, if it is the case that 
matters of beauty and art admit of testimony. Meskin claims that the testimony 
of others seems to give us at least some degree of aesthetic knowledge, and one 
symptom of this, he claims, is that we sometimes act and decide, with respect to 
aesthetic matters, based on what we seem to have learned from others. For 
instance: ‘knowledge of the beauty of a distant and unseen island may aid me in 
travel planning’ (ibid.). According to Meskin, ‘[i]f aesthetic testimony has any 
[…] epistemic value’, then the Kantian thesis is mistaken (2004, 75). Meskin 
concedes that the main (and proper) point of our engagement with art is direct 
and personal, focused on ‘appreciation’ (2004, 76), but that does not mean that we 
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cannot learn anything, and anything aesthetic in particular, from the testimony 
of reliable others.12 And if we do learn from others on beauty and art, then 
(contra Kant) there is something there that we know. (Meskin’s principal aim in 
the article is to argue against the autonomy thesis in order to preserve aesthetic 
cognitivism.) 
 Budd (1999; 2003) also addresses the Kantian thesis, as it is related, in 
particular, to the view that ‘[a] judgement that predicates beauty of an item 
does not characterise the intrinsic nature of the item (the item’s form) in any 
way at all’ (1999, 296). Budd’s account accepts that an aesthetic judgement must 
be based on a subjective experience, but claims that it is possible for one to come 
to believe that a certain judgement is true (or not) based on testimony:13 
  
this is not enough to show that, say, a consensus of judgements about an item’s 
beauty cannot be a sufficient basis for a belief with the same content as the 
assertoric content of an aesthetic judgement, so that, for example, someone who 
is not in a position to judge that an item is beautiful might nevertheless have 
compelling reason to believe that it is. (1999, 297)  
  
                                               
12 Meskin (2004, 76) even rejects the claim that an aesthetic judgement must be based on 
personal experience: ‘It is eminently plausible that the appreciation of a work of art requires 
experiencing it. So there are things that testimony may never provide—aesthetic 
experiences and artistic appreciation. But it does not follow from this that aesthetic 
judgement is essentially linked to experience.’ 
13  See also Budd (2003, 392). Against the ‘Acquaintance Principle’, Budd claims that 
‘judgements of aesthetic properties are as transmissible from one person to another as are 
other kinds of judgement’.  
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All three authors agree that there is a sense in which our proper engagement 
with works of art is, primarily, personal. Accordingly, art criticism is to be 
understood as an activity which aims at directing (and thereby enhancing) 
aesthetic experience—certainly not at replacing it—and this seems to be a sign 
that there is some knowledge that only aesthetic experience can give. All three 
authors emphasize that there is at least some genuine aesthetic knowledge that is 
conveyed in aesthetic characterisations, particularly in jutdgements of beauty or 
aesthetic value.  
Let me give a few examples of ways in which aesthetic knowledge is 
typically conveyed. When a critic whose aesthetic knowledge a person trusts 
(and whose aesthetic sensibility she shares in some sense) tells her that 
Giovanni Bellini’s St. Francis in the Desert14 is one of his favourite paintings, she 
may have good reason to believe the painting to be beautiful, or in some sense 
aesthetically rewarding, even before she sees it. The strength of her belief can be 
seen in her decision to go to the Frick Collection in New York, when she visits 
the city, to see this painting. The subscriber to aesthetic autonomy will add that 
only after seeing the painting (or a photograph of it, perhaps, if we accept the 
transparency of this medium)15 can she judge the painting to be beautiful, as 
Budd suggests. But her reliable critic’s testimony might lead her to believe that it 
                                               
14 C. 1480. Tempera and oil on panel, 124.4 x 141.9 cm, Frick Collection, New York. I thank 
Professor António M. Feijó for having called my attention to this painting. 
15 Meskin (2004, 74): ’The transparency theory holds that photographs actually allow us to 
see the objects that are represented in them’. 
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is beautiful and, to a certain degree, to guess or imagine how it is beautiful, 
even before she can fully appreciate that it is so.16  
What Levinson, Meskin and Budd reject in the Kantian thesis is its 
apparent commitment to non-cognitivism: the view that aesthetic judgements 
are not a matter of knowledge. For these three authors, aesthetic judgements are 
cognitive, conveying genuine knowledge. Knowledge by testimony is not 
meant to be a substitute for aesthetic experience, however. In claiming aesthetic 
judgement to be cognitive, these authors commit themselves to the claim that 
aesthetic assertions describe or refer to the object in question and, indirectly, to 
the sort of experience that the object might afford. Accordingly, the content of 
aesthetic description can be, at least in part, transmitted via testimony. My task 
now is to see whether we indeed have to reject aesthetic autonomy if we wish to 
preserve the view that aesthetic judgements are cognitive,17 or if we want to 
develop a realist view of aesthetic attributions.18   
Some philosophers (Pettit 1983; Hopkins 2000 and 2001; McGonigal 2006) 
have begun with the assumption that the thesis of aesthetic autonomy is 
                                               
16 Livingston (2003) has claimed that it is the ‘difficulty of describing the most elusive 
qualities of great works of art’ (p. 278) that has led philosophers to think that personal 
acquaintance is required for an aesthetic judgement. Livingston is another author who 
rejects aesthetic autonomy. 
17 For the claim that aesthetic autonomy is compatible with cognitivism, see McGonigal 
(2006). 
18  Note that Wollheim ([1968] 1980, 233) introduces the ‘Acquaintance principle’ as 
belonging to the realist project: ‘Realism is highly likely to insist upon some such experience 
as an epistemic condition of aesthetic evaluations. In doing so Realism acknowledges a well-
entrenched principle in aesthetics, which may be called the Acquaintance principle.’  
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correct,19 and have attempted (in different ways, and with different aims) to see 
which theory can best explain aesthetic autonomy, or at least which possibilities 
are still open after we recognize its truth. Pettit has understood aesthetic 
autonomy in terms of the essentially perceptual nature of aesthetic 
characterisations:  
  
We may assume [...] that aesthetic characterisations are all essentially perceptual. 
[...] What I seem to know when, having seen a painting, I describe it as graceful 
or awkward, tightly or loosely organised, dreamy or erotic, inviting or 
distancing, is not something which you can know, or at least not something 
which you can know in the same sense, just through relying on my testimony. 
(Pettit [1983] 2004, 162)  
 
Pettit begins with the assumption that aesthetic characterisations are peculiar in 
the sense that they refer to an experience that cannot be described in its entirety. 
Aesthetic characterisations may point to features of a work, but the meaning of 
such characterisations is not completely understood until the property in 
question is found (experienced) in the work. (Pettit’s aim is congenial to mine 
here: to account for the phenomenon of aesthetic autonomy within a realist 
construal of aesthetic characterisations). Let us now see why the thesis of 
aesthetic autonomy is true. 
                                               
19 Hopkins (2006), however, has more recently discussed the plausibility of the thesis of 
aesthetic autonomy, or the ‘Acquaintance Principle’. 
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3.3 Why the autonomy thesis is true 
 
Because philosophers have questioned the autonomy thesis, we should give 
reasons for thinking the autonomy thesis to be true, instead of assuming that it 
is true. The autonomy thesis consists, as we have seen, in the claim that 
aesthetic judgements must be made based on a personal experience. So, for 
instance, even if someone has read all that was written on (e.g.) the painting 
Mona Lisa, by Leonardo da Vinci, if he has never seen the actual painting (or a 
photograph of it, if we accept the transparency of photographs), then he cannot 
judge the painting to be beautiful (graceful, delicate, elegant, etc), even though 
he might have been led to believe, or perhaps to trust, that it is so. The same 
happens, mutatis mutandis, with literary works. If someone has read numerous 
detailed summaries of (e.g.) Virgil’s Eneid, together with every piece of literary 
criticism on the work, perhaps he can, through such testimony, come to know 
many facts about the Eneid: what is the main plot, who is the protagonist, who is 
Dido, what happened to each of them, etc. Still, he cannot make an evaluative 
(literary) judgement about the work until he has read it himself. (And in this 
sense it is true that we are confined, in terms of aesthetic knowledge, to what 
we have experienced!) In fact, some would claim that even a translation of a 
work such as the Eneid is not sufficient for someone to make a literary 
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judgement about the work, for a great deal that is arguably relevant for literary 
judgement of the work (rhythm, alliteration, etc.) is lost in the translation. So it 
seems that we have to accept that autonomy comes in degrees: ideally, to judge 
a work I should be able to have access to it in its original form. At least, I should 
read the work in a translation, or see a good reproduction, in the case of 
painting. In any case, what matters for my purpose here is that an aesthetic (or 
literary) judgement seems to require acquaintance with some acceptable version of 
the work.20  
The autonomy thesis claims that, at bottom, aesthetic knowledge, if it is 
knowledge at all, is, at least in part, knowledge by acquaintance, and this is 
what testimony cannot give. My aim, now, is to suggest that this fact, if it is a 
fact, does not make realism about the aesthetic any less plausible. 
Let us first look at some reasons for accepting the thesis of aesthetic 
autonomy. One is given by Arnold Isenberg ([1949] 1973). Isenberg attempted to 
support the thesis of aesthetic autonomy when he emphasized that when critics 
make aesthetic characterisations they are making very partial and sui generis 
descriptions. Speaking of a passage by Ludwig Goldscheider on El Greco’s 
painting The Burial of Count Orgaz, Isenberg ([1949] 1973, 162) notes that: 
  
                                               
20  Livingston (2003) has put pressure on the Acquaintance Principle by saying that 
surrogates (etc.) can convey aesthetic knowledge. I am not interested in discussing what 
counts as a version of the work to which one has to be acquainted with in order to make an 
aesthetic judgement. An intuitive notion of what counts as a version of the work is sufficient 
for my purposes. For the claim that acquaintance is a matter of degree, see Mothersill (1984, 
331 and 363). 
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there is a quality in the picture which agrees with the quality which we ‘have in 
mind’—which we have been led to think of by the critic’s language. But the 
same quality (‘a steeply rising and falling curve,’ and so on) would be found in 
any of a hundred lines one could draw on the board in three minutes. It could 
not be the critic’s purpose to inform us of the presence of a quality as banal and 
obvious as this. It seems reasonable to suppose that the critic is thinking of 
another quality, no idea of which is transmitted to us by his language, which he 
sees and which [...] he gets us to see.  
 
For Isenberg the property the critic refers to has a unique instance in that work, 
so the reader cannot know exactly what the critic means until he ‘finds’ the 
quality in the work. Someone could draw a curved line (corresponding to the 
description) on a board which would not lead to an equally favourable 
judgement, so the critic could not just mean to inform the reader of that which 
he is literally asserting. Accordingly, testimony gives only very general, 
qualitative, directions which point the reader to aspects of the work so that he 
(aided by his own sensitivity) may end up finding the property to which the 
critic’s description was pointing. By the lights of the autonomy thesis, properly 
aesthetic knowledge happens only in that finding: aesthetic knowledge requires 
acquaintance. 
Another way of motivating the thesis of aesthetic autonomy is by 
showing that its denial leads to absurd consequences. If aesthetic knowledge 
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did not require acquaintance with the objects of such knowledge, then we could 
have critics, even brilliant critics, who had not read any of the poems, or seen 
any of the paintings or sculptures, or listened to any of the pieces of music of 
which they speak. Their knowledge, and their claims, would be based only on 
art criticism (or literary criticism), that is, on the testimony of others. No matter 
how reliable such informants were, and how accurate, detailed and suggestive 
such testimony was, it seems appropriate to say that such critics would not 
really know what they were talking about.21 (I should add that this is not specific 
to the aesthetic case: it is similar to the case in which someone would say that he 
knows a person even though he did not know him personally, and knew only 
facts about that person. There is a sense in which to know a person does require 
that one is, in some way, personally acquainted with that person).22 Accordingly, 
if we reject aesthetic autonomy we cannot explain the apparent epistemic (and 
aesthetic) difference between the case in which subject S knows everything 
about work W but has not been acquainted (in the relevant sense) with work W 
and the case in which subject S knows that much and is also acquainted with 
work W. We would think that subject S learns something, of an aesthetic sort, 
                                               
21 It could turn out that such critics were sufficiently imaginative so as to produce criticism 
which was superior to criticism by critics who were acquainted with the work(s) in question. 
What we need to compare is pieces of criticism written by the same critic before and after 
acquaintance with the works. 
22  Again, I am not interested in contemplating difficulties concerning what counts as 
‘personally’. For instance, to be acquainted with a series of filmed images of the life of a 
person may convey knowledge that could count (or not) as conveying ‘personal’ 
information. 
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when he becomes acquainted with work W. What he learns is what testimony 
cannot teach; so aesthetic autonomy seems to hold.23,24 
The opponent of aesthetic autonomy may, at this point, invoke the case 
of conceptual art, or of (e.g.) Marcel Duchamp’s ‘readymades’. Arguably, to 
judge Duchamp’s Fountain I do not need to be in any way acquainted with the 
physical object that embodies the work. Acquaintance with a description of it is 
perfectly sufficient for me to judge the work. So it seems that aesthetic 
autonomy does not apply to these kinds of works. My reply is to accept that 
claim, and to suggest that it is a symptom that the work in question is to be 
distinguished from the physical object that embodies it. Clearly, criticism of the 
work Fountain (if we are to take it seriously as art) does not consist (at least, not 
ultimately) in pointing to features of the physical object: shape, size, texture, 
colour, etc. On the contrary, to invoke such features would be, for the most part, 
absurd as art criticism. This tells us that the work, arguably, is the idea, or the 
possibility explored, of turning an ordinary (arguably also ugly) object, a urinal, 
                                               
23  For a now classical account (meant to be a rejection of physicalism) concerning the 
epistemic difference between a subject who knows all the facts about colour but has never 
lived in a coloured world and a subject who (knowing all those facts) becomes acquainted 
with a coloured world, see Jackson (1982). Jackson’s analysis proceeds by putting forward a 
thought experiment involving Mary, a scientist who has learned absolutely everything that 
there is to know about colour, but who is confined to a room in which everything is in black 
and white and she investigates the world through a black and white television monitor. 
Jackson’s claim is that Mary learns something new about colour when she has her first 
colour experience. 
24 This might seem an over-statement: someone could reject autonomy without rejecting the 
idea that acquaintance with a work of art gives aesthetic knowledge of it. This is what 
Levinson, for instance, does. What I am trying to emphasize is that aesthetic knowledge 
requires acquaintance, with a work, with some acceptable version of a work, with aesthetic 
features, etc. 
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into a work of art. The relevant properties to be invoked by critics are the 
properties of that act or performance understood, I would say, as an aesthetic 
action or performance, not (or not finally) of the physical object that happens to 
embody the idea. So in the case in hand a description of the work does give 
access to the work, and of course this might be a reason for some people to 
reject the view that it is art, or any good as art, on account of its lack of 
complexity. But what matters is that acquaintance (with whatever constitutes 
the work) is, still, necessary.  
I should also say that the thesis of aesthetic autonomy does not 
undermine aesthetic education. In effect, aesthetic education can be understood 
as directing aesthetic acquaintance. Let me illustrate with a few examples from 
Portuguese literature.  
If someone tells me that Júlio Dinis’ poetry is of little literary value 
because it is ‘sentimental and naïve’, he is conveying to me distinctively aesthetic 
information about the poetry, hopefully made based on acquaintance with the 
work of Júlio Dinis. I may, perhaps, based on this information, decide to spend 
time reading poetry by some other author instead. My learning is, it seems, 
based on my judgement of those general qualities invoked, with which I am 
acquainted, even though I am not acquainted with the particular instances of 
those qualities. I know that the properties cited are cited as grounds for a 
negative judgement, and I can understand this based only on previous 
acquaintance with what could count as an instance of sentimentality and 
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naivety. Similarly, a teacher’s or a critic’s literary suggestions may allow me to 
learn about works and authors worth reading, and to learn also about specific 
aesthetic (literary) characteristics worth noting in those works and authors. By 
pointing to those characteristics, my attention is guided so as to help me find in 
the works and authors the features indicated. So it is not true that we cannot 
learn from others on aesthetic matters (that is, to learn specifically about the 
aesthetic qualities of works). Anyone can understand, and learn about, what it 
means for a work to be sentimental and naïve, even if these aesthetic 
characteristics are exemplified in very different ways in different works.  
Similarly, if I tell you that Cesário Verde’s poetry is ‘visual’, whereas 
Camilo Pessanha’s is ‘musical’, I am invoking distinctively aesthetic (or, more 
specifically, literary) properties of the works, taken globally, of these two 
poets.25  And any person can in principle understand what I mean by this 
qualitative contrast, even if he has not read any poems by these poets. Such a 
person would have to be acquainted with what could count as instances of 
visuality and musicality, ideally from poetry. In any case it seems that we learn, 
and that we learn about works, and that we learn aesthetically, even before we 
are directly acquainted with the work. We are perhaps aided by our own 
imagining and by recalling previous experiences of what could count as similar 
(identifiable) qualities. Such learning is also about how to engage with the 
                                               
25 Someone might say that these are not distinctively aesthetic properties (just like sadness is 
not always an aesthetic property). But in the context of an aesthetic (literary) evaluation, 
those properties qualify as aesthetic. 
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works and authors in question. What matters in the process is not only the 
learning of facts about the work, but its proper tone, and the general attitude it 
requires or indicates. Such learning, therefore, does not aim to replace, and is 
compatible with, aesthetic autonomy. Indeed, that another subject becomes 
capable of making autonomous aesthetic judgements is the goal of aesthetic 
education. 
 
 
3.4 The supposed contrast with colour judgements 
 
We have seen that the autonomy thesis is generally correct, and that the 
acquaintance principle holds for the aesthetic case. Now the would-be realist 
must explain how the requirement of first-hand acquaintance (and of autonomy) 
can be accommodated by his realism. I will attempt to give such an explanation 
in this section. In particular, I will draw an analogy with the case of colours, 
mainly by criticizing a disanalogy offered by Hopkins (2001). I will note that, 
just like in the aesthetic case, in the case of colour we would typically not 
change our judgement based only on the opinion of others. So ‘autonomy’ is not 
peculiar to aesthetic judgement. Hence, unless autonomy, per se, can block 
realism in the case of colour, aesthetic autonomy cannot be invoked as a 
decisive objection to aesthetic realism.  
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The (aesthetic) autonomy thesis has been put forward in this passage by 
Hopkins (2001): 
 
In many non-aesthetic matters the disagreement of others alone can indeed 
justify a change of mind. If on looking at something I judge it red, but everyone 
else I ask to look at it judges it brown, this can be reason enough for me to think 
my view wrong, and to adopt that of my informants. In an aesthetic case, in 
contrast, I am never justified in going that far. Suppose I think a new film 
beautiful, but all my cinema-going friends find it very ordinary. This should 
give me pause for thought. I should check that my impression wasn’t superficial, 
or based on my idiosyncracies. But I can’t reasonably adopt their view, not 
simply on the basis of noting their disagreement and reflecting on what it might 
mean. A justifiable change of mind requires me to respond to the film 
differently, either by watching it again, or by seeing for myself its defects as I 
reflect on it in memory. (Hopkins 2001, 168-169) 
 
What I wish to emphasize is that the contrast Hopkins makes, in the passage 
above, with colour judgements is not entirely happy. The case of colour is, with 
respect to autonomy, similar to the aesthetic case (in the relevant respect), 
unless the person judging is colour blind and knows he is colour blind. But in 
that case he knows that his colour judgements are sometimes (or always) 
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incorrect, so that he has become used to relying on and following (blindly!) the 
judgements of reliable others.26  
 An imaginary case can help to illustrate the difficulty with the 
disanalogy proposed by Hopkins. Imagine that ten of your friends decide to 
deceive you and that they all begin to claim that a certain cube is brown, even 
though it is (quite clearly) red. You are not colour blind, and you have generally 
good reasons to trust your perceptual capacities, including your capacity to 
discern colour. You also (equally) have reason to trust your friends’ perceptual 
capacities, including their capacity to discern colour. According to Hopkins (in 
the passage quoted above), the convergent judgement of your usually reliable 
ten friends can be a reason for you to adopt their view,27 even though you 
continue to see the cube as being red. By their testimony alone you could be led 
to believe that the cube was brown, even though you see it as red; whereas in the 
aesthetic case a judgement made by a number of usually reliable informants 
could only make you reconsider your own judgement (just as Kant suggests), 
but it would never be sufficient for you to change your view and adopt their 
view, unless your own response—your evaluation—had itself changed.  
                                               
26 One would be led to follow the judgements of others also in the case of an object with a 
dubious colour (so Hopkins’ analysis is correct concerning the case of an object with a 
difficult-to-discern colour). 
27 It is fair to note that Hopkins’ claim is only that the fact that your friends judge differently 
(in the colour case) can be a reason for you to change your view and adopt their view, 
whereas in the aesthetic case other people’s verdicts are never grounds for you to adopt 
someone else’s view. My claim is that in a clear case (concerning colour) a different 
judgement made by my friends cannot be a reason for me to change my view and adopt 
their view. 
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My claim is that Hopkins’ view is correct concerning aesthetic autonomy: 
in aesthetic matters, one would not, typically, change one’s judgement unless 
one’s own response to the work had changed. But the contrast with colour 
judgements is not happy.28 Even if you take your ten friends to be reliable 
informants concerning colour, if they all claim that a certain cube is brown, 
when you clearly perceive it as being red, you have—just as in the aesthetic 
case—good reason to reconsider your own judgement, and to try and look at 
the object more carefully, but unless you do see it as brown, your own 
perception is (again, typically) above other people’s colour judgement. So you 
would not typically adopt their view, even if they were a hundred voices trying 
to deceive you, instead of ten. Just as Hopkins claims about the aesthetic case, 
unless you are able to see that it is brown you will not simply adopt your 
friends’ view, because it appears to you that it is red. Granted, you might be 
puzzled by the situation: ‘I can usually discern colours appropriately!’; ‘My 
friends too!’; ‘This cube is clearly red!’ However, it is unlikely that you would be 
led to believe that the cube is brown on the basis of their judgement alone. A 
change in response would be required in the case of colour as well, unless, 
again, you knew that you were colour blind, or that you were in any way 
                                               
28 Hopkins (2000, 227) is right, however, in making the contrast with colour with respect to 
the reliability of testimony: concerning colour, there is, generally, agreement. In his words: 
‘beliefs about, say, colour can be acquired by transmission testimony, as beliefs about 
beauty cannot, because people disagree over the beauty of things, as they do not over their 
colour.’ All I dispute in Hopkins’ view is his claim that we would typically change our 
judgement, concerning colour, on the basis of other people’s judgements even if our 
experience would tell us otherwise. 
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permanently or temporarily defective in colour discrimination, or unless the 
case (the colour of the cube) was not evident. To see that the contrast Hopkins 
makes with colours, with respect to autonomy of judgement, is not correct, all 
that is needed is that your ten friends’ deceiving plan does not typically 
succeed—and it typically does not. 
This means, then, that the aesthetic case is not too peculiar: aesthetic 
judgements are no different from colour judgements concerning autonomy. The 
question for us here is whether autonomy will prevent the aesthetic domain 
from being construed in a realist manner. Colours, even when seen with the 
eyes of the realist, still need to be defined with reference to viewing subjects. So, 
similarly, we should not perhaps think that aesthetic autonomy will make 
realism impossible. 
 
 
3.5 Why autonomy is compatible with realism 
 
The Kantian thesis is sometimes considered to be at odds with aesthetic realism 
and this may be for various reasons. Firstly, the autonomy thesis is put forward 
as part of Kant’s non-cognitivist (a fortiori non-realist) aesthetic theory.29,30 This 
theory emphasizes that ‘the word ”aesthetic” connotes the subjective 
                                               
29 See note 7 above. 
30  For the claim that aesthetic autonomy is consistent with both cognitivism and non-
cognitivism, see McGonigal (2006). 
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contribution of a form of sensibility to a representation’,31 and claims that the 
beauty apparently ascribed to objects in aesthetic judgements is not, despite 
appearances, a property.32 But the thesis of aesthetic autonomy concerns only 
how we come to know. It does not concern that which we know, or with which 
we are acquainted. Think again of the case of colour. Even if the notion of 
colour requires reference to viewing subjects, that does not, by itself, preclude 
realism about colour. Similarly, perhaps we can say that even if the notion of an 
aesthetic property requires reference to a perceiving subject (perhaps even to a 
sympathetic, or desiring, perceiving subject), that, by itself, does not seem to 
rule out realism. Even if Kant runs together the view about autonomy and the 
view about non-cognitivism, that should not compel us to follow him in that.  
There is another reason, beyond habit, for thinking that aesthetic 
autonomy is at odds with realism. Aesthetic realism is the claim that there are 
aesthetic properties, which are independent of, and may transcend, what 
particular minds think. For the realist it is with respect to such independent 
properties that aesthetic judgements are to be reckoned adequate (or not). And 
for the realist there are, possibly, and probably, aesthetic properties that remain 
unapprehended—think of a beautiful, forever unknown, island, or the myriads 
                                               
31 Guyer (1997, 63). 
32 Cf. CPJ §6: ‘he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a property of the object and the 
judgement logical (constituting a cognition of the object through concepts of it), although it 
is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation of the representation of the object to the 
subject.’ 
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of aesthetic qualities of The Return of the Prodigal Son by Rembrandt33 that (as it 
happens) no one will ever notice. But if the Kantian thesis is correct, the 
judgement that an object is beautiful must be made based on the evidence 
provided by personal acquaintance. According to Kant, beauty just consists in 
that encounter (even though it appears to us as a property of objects, as Kant 
admits).34 If this is so, then aesthetic reality cannot transcend available evidence 
and available knowledge, as the realist wants. For aesthetic reality is, according 
to the anti-realist,35 confined to what is (or could be) given in experience. (In fact, 
it consists merely in that experience, with no need for an independent reality). 
So, if the autonomy thesis is true, all aesthetic ‘facts’ must be known facts, and 
known through a personal experience. If so, then aesthetic reality does not 
transcend what is in fact experienced and realism (which claims the opposite) is 
false.  
In reply to this second challenge the realist could perhaps say the 
following. Aesthetic autonomy is an epistemic claim (a claim about how we 
come to know something), whereas aesthetic realism, as we have been 
understanding it, is an ontological claim (a claim about what there is). To say 
                                               
33 I am here giving an example of a work by Rembrandt with which I am acquainted only 
through photographs. 
34 See CPJ §6 and note 32 above. 
35 The sort of anti-realism that appeals to our epistemic capacities having a constraining 
effect is Dummettian anti-realism. By the lights of the discussion in Chapter 1, it is not the 
sort of anti-realism with which I need to engage. The anti-realism that concerns me (anti-
realism about aesthetic properties) does not claim that what there is, aesthetically, is limited 
to what we know. It claims that there is no aesthetic reality (no distinctively aesthetic 
properties). Still, in this paragraph I address the Dummettian objection to realism, only to 
suggest that an epistemological objection (per se) is not decisive against ontological realism. 
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that what there is is constrained, in some way, by our epistemic limits is a very 
controversial thesis, requiring solid argument.  
Let me elaborate by considering a painting such as J. M. W. Turner’s 
Dawn after the Wreck,36 or the epic poem Os Lusíadas by Luís de Camões. I have 
chosen the first of these two great works because my reader may not have seen 
the painting, and the second because my reader may not have read it at all, or 
may not have had the privilege to read it in the original Portuguese. Here is 
what matters for our purposes. The aesthetic autonomy-theorist claims that an 
aesthetic judgement will require acquaintance with some acceptable version of 
the work. The aesthetic realist claims that the aesthetic properties of the works 
in question can be present whether or not they are discerned in the works by 
viewers and readers. All I claim is that these claims are independent. So, for 
instance, the features of Os Lusíadas that a foreign reader fails to find in a 
translation still belong, according to the realist, to the work, independently of 
that (or any) finding. That some of those features are apprehended whereas 
others are not in a translation does not change, for the realist, the features 
(aesthetic and otherwise) that the work possesses. We can say the same 
concerning Turner’s painting. If you have seen the actual painting, whereas I 
have only seen a very small black-and-white reproduction, the aesthetic 
judgements we are able to make, even granting that we have similar 
                                               
36 C. 1841. Graphite, watercolour, body colour, scraping, chalk (red) on paper, 25.1 x 36.8 cm, 
The Courtauld Gallery, London. 
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sensibilities and background knowledge, are still bound to be of a different 
degree of refinement. The aesthetic realist claims only that the work (with all its 
properties) is independent of, and is not altered by, those particular judgements, 
so our differences in apprehension have no implications concerning the 
properties the work has. The realist need not deny aesthetic autonomy, or the 
claim that only direct-acquaintance judgements qualify as aesthetic. 
Here is Wollheim connecting realism with the acquaintance principle 
([1968] 1980, 233):37 
 
Realism is highly likely to insist upon some such experience as an epistemic 
condition of aesthetic evaluations. In doing so Realism acknowledges a well-
entrenched principle in aesthetics, which may be called the Acquaintance 
principle, and which insists that judgments of aesthetic value, unlike judgments 
of moral knowledge, must be based on first-hand experience of their objects and 
are not, except within very narrow limits, transmissible from one person to 
another. The Realist, then, will take an interest in the correlated experience, but 
only as part of the epistemology of aesthetic value. 
 
We may still wish to reject the acquaintance principle, for instance by 
explaining, as Livingston (2003) does, the apparent requirement for 
acquaintance by reference to the limitations of our theoretical and descriptive 
                                               
37  Essay VI (‘Art and Evaluation’) appended to ([1968] 1980). It was Wollheim, in this 
passage, who coined the phrase ‘Acquaintance principle’. Realism for Wollheim is the claim 
that aesthetic properties have the status of primary qualities (see [1968] 1980, 231-232). 
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capacities. For Livingston, we need to see for ourselves because in most cases 
what we observe is more refined than what our descriptive resources allow us 
to identify. Livingston’s explanation of putative ‘aesthetic autonomy’ is that we 
lack words for some nuances that we are able to notice in works, so our verbal 
descriptions can only be approximate. Livingston is committed to the idea that 
matters aesthetic are not different from, for instance, the case in which a 
dermatologist discerns that a certain spot is a sign of a certain disease. (In both 
there are ‘facts of the matter’ which are hard to describe precisely, often to the 
majority of people). Livingston’s view is that, if we had enough vocabulary, and 
also enough sight, such knowledge could be transmitted. So the apparent 
peculiarity of such matters is that they involve characteristics which are far 
more refined than the vocabulary and vision that most of us have. The thought 
is that, given the appropriate vocabulary, and having the appropriate vision, 
anyone would, in principle, be able to transmit (and acquire) aesthetic 
knowledge.  
 Livingston’s view cannot explain, however, the putative aesthetic 
difference, mentioned earlier, between knowing all the facts about work W 
whilst not being acquainted with W, and knowing all such facts whilst being 
acquainted with W. Livingston’s account does not contemplate what we learn in 
the acquaintance. This seems to me a high price to pay to maintain realism. My 
preference was rather to preserve the intuition behind the idea of aesthetic 
autonomy, and see whether realism can accommodate it. Aesthetic autonomy 
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involves an epistemic requirement: that we have to be acquainted with an object, 
in order to judge it ‘aesthetically’. To my mind, such an epistemic requirement 
can do no decisive harm to the ontological doctrine which says that there is 
something there that we know or ignore. So nothing, so far, seems to preclude 
our realist starting point.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 98 
 
Chapter Four 
Hume’s Standard of Taste 
 
 
 
4.1 Introducing the standard of taste 
 
Hume can perhaps be construed (generally) as a sentimentalist in epistemology, 
and an anti-realist in ontology. Moreover, Hume has been construed by the 
logical positivists and their followers as an anti-metaphysician.1 But the essay 
on taste, which is Hume’s last word on aesthetics, seems to point to the 
possibility of beauty being, in some sense, objective, without giving up the 
epistemological doctrine that beauty is to be perceived with ‘sentiment’. The 
essay titled ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ was published in 1757. Various 
commentators have emphasized inconsistencies and ambiguities in the essay, in 
particular in Hume’s very notion of a standard of taste.2 My aim in this chapter 
is not to address those issues, but only to examine the evidence that Hume’s 
                                               
1 For the claim that Hume’s project was not per se anti-metaphysical, see McLeod (2001, 1-7). 
2 For a brief survey of previous discussions of Hume’s essay in the analytic tradition, see 
Levinson (2002, 228-229). 
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well-known scepticism may have been targetting some of his own previously 
held views.3,4  
Let me first summarise Hume’s project in the essay. The search for a 
standard of taste is introduced as a natural and commonsensical pursuit. Hume 
acknowledges the extreme diversity of preference and opinion concerning 
works of art, but also the fact that some differences of aesthetic merit are so 
obvious (or objective!) that denying them would be absurd:  
 
‘[w]hoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between OGILBY 
and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend no less 
an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as 
TENERIFFE, or a pond as extensive as the ocean.’ (par. 8)  
 
The standard of taste is a rule, or at least a decision (Hume allows himself a 
candid hesitation on this), which confirms or condemns the various sentiments 
towards the world: 
 
                                               
3 MacLachlan (1986, 18) has emphasized that irony permeates the essay, making it difficult 
to discern Hume’s ultimate view: ‘perhaps the greatest difficulty facing interpretation of 
this essay is the irony which Hume seems to use, for this raises the question of just how 
seriously we are to take some of the more conventional views contained in “Of the Standard 
of Taste”.’ 
4 Mothersill (1989, 271) refers to a ‘paradox of taste’ in Hume’s aesthetics, ‘generated for 
Hume by conjoining his general theory with his own critical convictions.’ See also p. 274: 
‘What “cuts off all hope of success” [...] and “represents the impossibility of ever attaining 
any Standard of Taste” is the skeptical philosophy, i.e., Hume’s own theory.’  
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It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various 
sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming 
one sentiment, and condemning another. (par. 6) 
 
For Hume ‘sentiment’ is what grounds value judgements (that is, value 
judgements are made based on sentiments).5 Disagreements can be explained as 
resulting from a malfunction of the natural capacity humans have to judge 
beauty: ‘where men vary in their judgements, some defect or perversion in the 
faculties may commonly be remarked; proceeding either from prejudice, from 
want of practice, or want of delicacy’ (par. 28).  
Hume also recognizes that there are sentiments that are not to be judged 
by any standard. As he points out, the sentiments stemming from natural 
propensities are diverse but not subject to dispute, and thus they do not need to 
be reconciled. Such sentiments concern personal preferences, which are 
blameless: 
 
it is almost impossible not to feel a predilection for that which suits our 
particular turn or disposition. Such preferences are innocent and unavoidable, 
and can never be the object of dispute, because there is no standard, by which 
they can be decided. (par. 30) 
                                               
5 What precludes the rule from being a mere convention is that a mere convention can be 
arbitrarily decided, whereas a standard of taste, as Hume conceives it, is not arbitrarily 
decided. My aim is to claim that the standard of taste as Hume conceives it reflects what has 
value. 
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Hume is clear about this: differences based on personal preference are not 
amenable to dispute. Accordingly, aesthetic disputes are not about such 
differences, since such differences are not universal claims, but only expressions 
of preference. 
The possibility of a norm or standard of taste is questioned especially by 
‘a species of philosophy, which cuts off all hopes of success in such an attempt’ 
(par. 7). Whilst Hume is traditionally viewed as endorsing this sceptical thesis, I 
should like to say that it is equally possible to see in his own words in the essay 
some distance (and perhaps even scepticism) with respect to that thesis. It is 
worth quoting the relevant passage: 
 
The difference, it is said, is very wide between judgement and sentiment. All 
sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, 
and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it. But all determinations of 
the understanding are not right; because they have a reference to something 
beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact; and are not always conformable 
to that standard. Among a thousand different opinions which different men 
may entertain of the same subject, there is one, and but one, that is just and true; 
and the only difficulty is to fix and ascertain it. On the contrary, a thousand 
different sentiments, excited by the same object, are all right: Because no 
sentiment represents what is really in the object. It only marks a certain 
conformity or relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the 
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mind; and if that conformity did not really exist, the sentiment could never 
possibly have being. Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely 
in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different 
beauty. […] To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an enquiry, 
as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. (par. 7, emphasis added) 
 
Taken non-ironically (or non-sceptically), the passage above acknowledges a 
wide difference between sentiment and judgement. It reads that seeking real 
beauty or deformity is fruitless because ‘each mind perceives a different beauty’, 
and beauty does not exist independently from that perception. Furthermore, 
whereas not all judgements can be correct, because they refer to real matters of 
fact, a sentiment is always correct, Hume claims, because it refers to ‘nothing 
beyond itself’.  
This sceptical reading is the reading attributed to Hume’s earlier 
writings on beauty.6 ,7  But in the passage quoted above Hume seems to be 
distancing himself from the view he is enunciating: ‘The difference, it is said, is 
very wide between judgement and sentiment’ (emphasis added). And if this is a 
sign that Hume is distancing himself from the view of that ‘species of 
philosophy’, it seems that we have to re-read the whole passage, not obviously 
                                               
6 Both Savile (1996) and Kivy (2003, 252) emphasize the discrepancy between Hume’s views 
in earlier writings and in the essay on taste.  
7 Cf. Hume in ‘The Sceptic’ ([1742] 1985, 165): ‘[Beauty] is only the effect, which that figure 
produces upon a mind’. P. 166: ‘the beauty, properly speaking, lies not in the poem, but in 
the sentiment or taste of the reader.’ 
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as Hume’s view, but perhaps as the view from which he is (or may be) 
distancing himself. So, the claims that all sentiments are right, that sentiments 
are not representational, that beauty is ‘no quality in things themselves’, that 
seeking the real beauty is a fruitless enquiry—all these claims are now to be 
seen from the same distance: ‘it is said’. It thus becomes far from clear that 
Hume is endorsing the sceptical philosophy that he had held in the past (and 
that many still attribute to him), and all those claims must now be at least 
suspended and in question. 
The sceptical species of philosophy is opposed, or at least it is modified 
and restrained, by a ‘species of common sense’ (par. 8). Common sense is 
associated by Hume with the attempt to defend the standard of taste, and the 
standard of taste is now related to the capacity to aptly judge (not just to feel) 
beauty: 
 
Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature [...]. A 
perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; 
if any of these circumstances be wanting, [...] we shall be unable to judge of the 
catholic and universal beauty. (par. 10)  
 
Besides saying that beauty is ‘judged’—thereby blurring the difference 
previously mentioned between (representational) judgement and (non-
representational) ‘sentiment’—, Hume also compares the discernment of beauty 
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to the discernment of colour. Just like common-sense denominates the colour of 
objects when perceived under certain conditions as being ‘their true and real 
colour’, we can derive the ‘idea of the perfect beauty’ when there is ‘a 
considerable uniformity of sentiment’:  
 
If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or a considerable 
uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the 
perfect beauty; in like manner as the appearance of objects in day-light, to the 
eye of a man in health, is denominated their true and real colour, even while 
colour is allowed to be merely a phantasm of the senses. (par. 12) 
   
The account is still anti-realist: beauty is an idea derived from uniformity of 
sentiment. But it seems that, contrarily to what the sceptical species of 
philosophy says, the difference between matters of sentiment and matters of 
fact may be smaller than it first seems, if the discernment of beauty is compared 
with discernment of colour.8 Sentiments may be more like judgements in what 
concerns appropriateness to an object, that is, they may possess capacity to 
represent.  
                                               
8 Kivy (2003) takes the assimilation of matters of sentiment to matters of fact to be one of 
Hume’s aims in the essay, which would support the thought that Hume may not be 
endorsing the sceptical view: ‘In questions concerning beauty and deformity, Hume is 
arguing, we can “translate” (so to say) matters of sentiment into matters of fact’ (2003, 252). 
If this thought is plausible, then Hume should perhaps not be identified with the species of 
philosophy objecting to the standard of taste, and the objection against the standard should 
be seen ironically. 
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Common sense has us inclined to search for a standard of taste, Hume 
claims. What is now open to dispute is the status of the standard: is it 
constituted by the joint verdict of the ‘true judges’, or is the standard a 
discovery that reflects what is the case? 
 
 
4.2 Standard of taste:  discovered or constituted? 
 
One aspect left clear in the essay is that the standard would be arrived at by the 
joint verdict of the true judges. It would be ‘a collection of empirical verdicts on 
certain objects by the best and the brightest of the species, against whose 
backdrop our individual judgments could and should play’.9 The true judges 
would be those having a ‘strong sense, united with delicate sentiment, 
improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice. […] 
the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of 
taste and beauty.’ (par. 23). What is less clear, or open to dispute amongst 
commentators, is whether the standard is ‘constituted’ or ‘discovered’ by the 
true critics. That is, it is uncertain whether the joint verdict of the true critics 
determines what is to count as the norm of taste, or whether it reflects that 
                                               
9 Tamen (2005, 211). Tamen remains neutral concerning the nature of the standard, but the 
contrast he makes between Kant’s project and Hume’s seems to suggest the view that 
matters of beauty are matters for discovery. See (2005, 219): ‘Where Hume says “imitate the 
experts,” Kant says “consult your conscience.”’ 
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existing norm. Deciding between the two readings is important because the 
normativity implied in the notion of a standard of taste seems incompatible 
with the reading that the standard is constituted, rather than found. 10 , 11 
However, the former is indeed the view attributed to Hume’s earlier writings 
on beauty. This view is not so obvious in the essay on taste as it is in Hume’s 
earlier writings on beauty,12  but some13 see Hume defending such a view in the 
essay on taste as well.  
The difficulty is that if we interpret the standard as being constituted by 
the joint verdict of the true critics, the norm of taste and aesthetic value becomes 
an incoherent notion: how could a stipulation motivate others to follow it?14 But 
if we interpret the standard as being found by the ‘true judges’ we need to 
                                               
10 So if the standard of taste is constituted by the ‘true judges’, Hume’s project might be (as 
some have claimed) incoherent. 
11 Someone might say that (e.g.) laws are constituted, but normative; so why shouldn’t the 
standard of taste be both constituted and normative? In reply, we can say that the 
normativity arrived at via a constitution (such as the case of law) is not yet like the 
normativity of aesthetic judgements, which seem to be based on what is the case 
(aesthetically). A law may or may not be based on what is fair: some laws are simply 
arbitrary (think of the case of right- and left-hand traffic). A standard of taste should to the 
contrary reflect what has aesthetic value in the first place. 
12 Both Savile (1996) and Kivy (2003, 252) emphasize the discrepancy between Hume’s views 
in earlier writings and in the essay on taste.  
13 For instance, Budd (1995). 
14 Someone might say that (e.g.) the commands and laws that govern a state, an army, etc., 
are both stipulated and motivating; there does not seem to be any philosophical difficulty, 
per se, in the idea that a stipulation can motivate. But we can reply by saying that the 
standard of taste is meant to accommodate the apparent fact that some claims (judgements) 
are correct or incorrect in virtue of the nature of the objects they are about, not in virtue of 
arbitrary stipulations. So yes, stipulations can motivate; but the motivations we are looking 
for (based on the aesthetic nature of certain objects) cannot be based on mere (arbitrary) 
stipulations. See also note 11 above. Cf. Budd (1995, 17):  ‘for [a standard of taste] to be 
possible, the authority of such a court of appeal must be justified, not arbitrary.’ 
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explain its nature: what is it that critics find? It is important to see which 
question is more appropriate to consider, and to answer. 
The doubt concerning the status of the standard of taste is introduced in 
the passage where the notion of the standard is first formulated: ‘a rule, by 
which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision’ (par. 
6, emphasis added). There seem to be two ways of interpreting the standard: the 
joint verdict of the true judges aims at identifying something in reality, against 
which aesthetic judgements are to be measured; or the standard is constituted 
(made) by the true judges, and determines what is to be approved by everyone 
else.  We should consider, and evaluate, both options. 
 
The norm is constituted by the true judges. Defending the constitutive 
reading of the standard is in conformity with Hume’s sentimentalism, the view 
that aesthetic truths are known through ‘sentiment’. But it then requires an 
answer to the objections mentioned earlier (how could a stipulated standard be 
normative, and motivate others to follow its recommendations?15). Or else it 
requires a rejection of the project of a standard of taste as incoherent. Budd 
(1995) has defended the constitutive reading of the standard.16 
                                               
15 This is what Levinson (2002) claims to be the ‘real problem’ in Hume’s essay. 
16 Budd (1995, 21): ‘the standard is set by the preferences of individuals who satisfy a certain 
condition’; ‘even if there were unanimity amongst the competent judges, their agreement 
would constitute, not a normative standard, but only a natural or fortuitous coincidence of 
preferences.’ 
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As Budd notes, the interpretation which regards the standard as 
constituted is suggested by assimilating delicacy of taste with the imagination: 
‘The high degree of the discriminatory capacity is described by Hume as 
delicacy of taste or imagination’ (Budd 1995, 19. See also p. 22). 17  This 
assimilation of delicacy of taste and imagination is interesting, first, because it is 
not present, or at least not obviously, in Hume’s own words in the essay, but 
also because it points to a crucial issue in discussion: is a fine perception 
sufficient for good criticism, or is a fine imagination also required? Budd, by 
conflating the two, seems to be suggesting that imagination is required for 
aesthetic judgements, or that imagination is included in aesthetic experience. 
The imaginative capacity would be what allows for the evaluative component 
of the judgement to be made. This assimilation is Kantian.18 The question is 
whether this element can be read into Hume’s essay, and if so whether it 
requires that the standard be constituted, rather than found, by the true judges.  
 Budd’s way of arguing for the constitutive reading is by taking Hume’s 
analogy between aesthetic value and secondary qualities such as colour to be 
mistaken. This disagreement is important, because the analogy is crucial for 
Hume’s solution to the problem of taste, as Budd admits: ‘Whereas the 
perception of a secondary quality is solely a matter of the exercise of a 
                                               
17 That Budd construes Hume as an anti-realist is clear in this passage (1995, 17): ‘[For Hume 
aesthetic pleasure] is a reaction to how the world is represented to the subject, rather than a 
representation of a possible state of affairs.’  
18 See Budd (2001). 
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particular discriminatory capacity, the appreciation of literary merit involves 
also an evaluation.’ (1995, 21) Budd explains that Hume tries to assimilate 
colour perception with literary (artistic) appreciation, both involving a 
sentiment, which must be seen as produced or influenced by the nature of the 
object. But for Budd the identification with colour is a mistake. Whereas colour-
blindness concerns an incapacity to discriminate (objective) differences in 
colour that are discriminated by ‘those with normal sight’, 
 
the sentiment felt by one of Hume’s true judges does not record the presence of 
an otherwise undetected feature; it is merely an index of the fact that the 
structure of her ‘internal fabric’ is pleasantly affected by the features she has 
detected […]. The supposed community of sentiment of the true judges could 
show only that their affective constitution is at bottom the same, not that the 
deliverances of this common nature are the reflection of a feature hidden from 
those who are unlike the true judges. (1995, 22) 
 
What Budd claims, then, is that community of sentiment is sufficient only for 
community of ‘affective constitution’. In a note (n. 28), Budd adds that this 
supports the conclusion that aesthetic value is not (like) a secondary quality. 
Granted, the ascription of aesthetic value must be understood in terms of 
subjective states (sentiments), just like the ascription of secondary qualities is 
understood. However, for Budd, contrarily to the case of secondary qualities the 
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ascription of aesthetic value does not involve an experience with 
representational content.  
Budd gives the example of the story of Sancho’s kinsmen19 as evidence 
that aesthetic value is not a secondary quality, and that Hume’s conception of 
delicacy of taste or imagination is ambiguous (1995, 22). The ambiguity is 
between the capacity to detect qualities in objects, and the capacity to respond 
appropriately, emotionally, to those qualities. Budd claims that whereas 
Sancho’s kinsmen’s judgements are correct in finely discriminating qualities of 
the wine, ‘nothing immediately follows about the status of their verdicts that 
the taste is good.’ (1995, 23). Judges who agree in the qualities they find may 
respond, emotionally, in a different way to those qualities and thus make 
different judgements about their value. So, a finely discriminating taste, though 
necessary for good taste or evaluation, Budd concludes, is not sufficient for 
good taste or evaluation. More importantly, if it is possible for the best judges to 
agree concerning the qualities detected and to disagree on their value, then one 
cannot say that one sentiment or evaluation is preferable to the other. 
Accordingly, ‘even if there is uniformity of response, this uniformity cannot 
provide a normative standard of taste’ (ibid.). 
                                               
19  In the story as Hume tells it, two of Sancho’s relatives had tasted a wine and had 
expressed different verdicts about the wine. One had said the wine was good, ‘were it not 
for a small taste of leather he perceived in it’. The other also said it was good, but noticed ‘a 
taste of iron.’ When the hogshead was emptied, an old key with a leathern thong tied to it 
was found and all acknowledged they were both (partially) right in their judgement. 
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This is in contrast with the case of colour, where agreement counts 
generally as evidence for a colour judgement. The main contrast is that colour 
perception is seen as a form of world sensitivity, whereas evaluation is not, 
because only the latter, Budd claims, ‘enables us to detect differences between 
objects in situations where, lacking colour perception, we would be unable to 
distinguish them—we discriminate objects on the basis of the colour appearances 
they present’ (1995, 21-22). 
Budd thus interprets the standard as being constituted (as opposed to 
being discovered), on the grounds that the sentiment of the true judges is non- 
representational, proceeding to claim that the project of providing a (normative) 
standard of taste fails. But if the standard could be discovered, then Hume’s 
project would not be incoherent. 
The assimilation between taste and the imagination can be made in a 
different way, which would leave room for the interpretation that the standard 
is discovered by the true judges. In fact Hume seems to suggest in the essay that 
value is perceived, even if it is not a specific or formal feature of objects:  
 
When objects of any kind are first presented to the eye or imagination, the 
sentiment, which attends them, is obscure and confused; and the mind is, in a 
great measure, incapable of pronouncing concerning their merits or defects. The 
taste cannot perceive the several excellencies of the performance. […] But allow 
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him to acquire experience in those objects, his feeling becomes more exact and 
nice. (par. 18) 
 
The suggestion is that the imagination and the eye are both required for the 
sentiment of beauty to be ‘exact’. It seems, then, that the sentiment of beauty 
also involves sight. So, contrary to what Budd claims, Hume seems to be saying 
that aesthetic judgements, despite requiring ‘sentiment’, can be representational: 
they concern seeing. Thus when critics agree about the formal features of a 
work of art and yet disagree about its overall value as a work of art they are still 
disputing something (objective), and not simply showing a subjective 
preference. 
 
 The standard is discovered by the true judges. One factor in favour of the 
standard’s being something discovered by the ‘true judges’ is the crucial role 
Hume gives to the absence of prejudice, which reinforces the connection 
between good taste and sound judgement. Just as judgements can be distorted 
by extraneous considerations such as prejudice, as well as by emotions, so 
aesthetic sentiments are susceptible of similar alteration. Hence, just as 
judgements are about the world, so are aesthetic sentiments towards the world.20 
In fact Hume calls aesthetic sentiments the ‘finer emotions of the mind’, neatly 
                                               
20 The idea that sentiments can be understood as ‘towards the world’ is developed in Goldie 
(2002, Chapter 3). 
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stressing the analogy, rather than the difference, between sentiment and 
judgement: 
 
The least exterior hindrance to such small springs, or the least internal disorder, 
disturbs their motion, and confounds the operation of the whole machine. […] 
A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the 
object; if any of these circumstances be wanting, [...] we shall be unable to judge 
of the catholic and universal beauty. (par. 10) 
 
Furthermore, the analogy with a machine, together with the emphasis on the 
proper functioning of mental capacities, suggest that the norm in question 
relates to features in the world, to which the critics must conform themselves, 
and which are objects of judgement and not only of sentiment. Beauty, in this 
sense, seems to be a feature of reality.  
Savile (1996) gives support to the claim that the standard of taste is 
discovered, rather than constituted, by the true judges. One reason Savile 
invokes for his view is the importance Hume gives to the delicacy of taste, 
understood as an aesthetic sensitivity. The analogy with the taste of iron and 
leather in the episode from Quixote is an example of a ‘world-sensitive delicacy’ 
(1996, 140), Savile claims, that Hume points out as an important characteristic of 
the true judges. That Hume refers to the delicacy of taste, ‘whether their taste be 
taken literally or metaphorically’, suggests that the standard is arrived at by 
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finding: it is a matter of discovery. As Savile notes (ibid.), delicacy of taste, a 
central characteristic of the true judges, is for Hume a ‘world-sensitive’ delicacy: 
‘the organs [are] so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them, and at the same 
time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition’ (par. 16). So it 
seems that, according to Hume in the essay, the truth of critical judgements is 
not constituted by the critics’ verdicts, but it reflects the true critics’ judgement 
of the features in the work. Their truth depends on reality, not merely on 
subjective experience.  
Another aspect that Savile notes (and that we can see as realist) is 
Hume’s claim that the truth of the judgements does not depend on verification. 
In the story, the judgements of Sancho’s kinsmen are seen to be true when the 
hogshead is emptied and the iron key with the leathern thong are found, but 
Hume’s view (as Savile notes) is that their judgements would be true even if 
that verification had not been possible: aesthetic truths are independent from 
verification: 
 
Though the hogshead had never been emptied, the taste of the one [the two 
experts] was still equally delicate, and that of the other [the onlookers] equally 
dull and languid: but it would have been more difficult to have proved the 
superiority of the former to the conviction of every bye-stander. (par. 16)   
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So the episode from Quixote helps explain, against the constitutive reading, that 
one crucial element in true aesthetic judgements concerns the discrimination or 
finding of real qualities of objects that can elicit an aesthetic experience. The 
presence of those qualities is a necessary condition for the response. As Savile 
puts it, 
 
the sentiments of true judges only enter the picture if they are responses to what 
is present in the object [and this] is not discernibly different from saying that 
beauty (for example) is a property that objects have in virtue of being thus and 
so conformed, to wit, the property of being liable to elicit such and such 
responses in sensitive and practiced judges. (1996, 141)21 
 
It seems, then, that according to Hume’s account taste and aesthetic value being 
normative means that the truth of judgements must be independent from the 
                                               
21 Someone might say that this passage does not favour realism over response-dependence. 
But the crucial aspect (which I think is at least compatible with realism) that Savile notes is 
that the sentiments of the true judges are responses to ‘what is present in the object’. So even 
if a response is involved, the presence of the property is not dependent on the response. (I am 
not saying, however, that I agree with Savile’s account of beauty). I should also mention 
that it is not clear that response-dependence is incompatible with realism. Levinson (2001), 
for instance, takes some aesthetic properties to be response-dependent, and his account is 
meant to remain realist. For the claim that realism (in general) is compatible with response-
dependence (concerning concepts), see Pettit (1991). For a recent survey of the debate over 
response-dependence, making also the claim that response-dependence is not compatible 
with realism, see Yates (2008). It is important to note that Yates (2008, 344) claims that 
response-dependence is to be seen as a thesis about properties, not concepts: ‘Response-
dependence is best conceived as a thesis concerning the properties of a particular domain—
specifically, that they are anthropocentric dispositions. […] That response-dependence is a 
thesis about properties is obscured by the fact that most theorists formulate it in terms of 
concepts. It is important to bear in mind that the distinction thereby aimed at is typically 
ontological, not conceptual.’  
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critics’ verdicts at least in the sense that we need to admit the possibility of 
critics being mistaken. Verdicts are to be measured against the world. 
Accordingly, the standard is not constituted by them but found (when their 
judgements are correct). 
Savile also notes that for the verdicts of the true judges to compell a 
person to follow them, it must be the case that ‘good judges speak true and we 
have an interest in truth’ (1996, 137). For one to change one’s own judgements 
for the judgements of good critics, Savile argues, it must be the case that critics 
judge not only differently, but that they judge better than oneself. And this must 
mean that their judgements accord to some standard external to them. As Savile 
also notes, if the standard of taste is constituted by the aesthetic judgements of 
the true judges then it does not account for the norm that the true judges seem 
to follow (and that we are encouraged to follow after them). 
Levinson makes a similar claim: we can only have reasons to follow true 
critics’ advice if the true critics are ‘detectors’ of beauty.22 If critics determine 
what is to be beautiful, we are left with no aesthetic reasons for following their 
determinations. 
Which reading should be preferred? As we have just seen, the only 
reading that allows for a genuine norm of aesthetic value, that everyone might 
                                               
22 Cf. Levinson (2002, 228): ‘The [more reasonable interpretation of Hume’s discourse is that] 
true judges are consistently described as reliable detectors of the beautiful, in virtue of their 
alleged superior capacities of discrimination and response, and not as constituters of the 
beautiful.’ 
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be motivated to follow, is the one claiming that the standard is in some sense 
discovered by the true critics. This view amounts to saying, contrarily to the 
sceptical view that Hume is often associated with, that the difference may not 
be wide between sentiment and judgement, between matters of value and 
matters of fact (Kivy 2003). Hume’s position may not be clear for us to discern, 
but it should be clear that it is only if the standard is the result of a well-
grounded response of the true critics that the normative project Hume embraces 
in the essay can make sense (Savile 1996). In effect, Hume ends up admitting 
that concerning aesthetic matters, and concerning who the ‘true judges’ are, the 
discussion is possible because these are, in the end, matters of fact, not of 
sentiment: 
 
But if we consider the matter aright, these [matters of taste] are questions of fact, 
not of sentiment. Whether any particular person be endowed with good sense 
and a delicate imagination, free from prejudice, may often be the subject of 
dispute, and be liable to great discussion and enquiry [...]. Where these doubts 
occur, men can do no more than in other disputable questions [...]: They must 
produce the best arguments [...]; they must acknowledge a true and decisive 
standard to exist somewhere, to wit, real existence and matter of fact [...]. It is 
sufficient for our present purpose, if we have proved, that the taste of all 
individuals is not upon an equal footing. (par. 25)  
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4.3 Sentimentalism and realism 
 
Hume’s last word concerning the standard of taste consists in a modest claim: 
that the tastes of different people are not upon an equal footing. The reason for 
his claim was, in short, that not all sentiments towards works of art are equally 
appropriate, and that not all aesthetic claims are true.23 So we can see that 
Hume’s sentimentalism is not incompatible with the project of defending the 
claim that there is a standard of taste (and Hume’s general project seems 
coherent). Rather, feeling is what guides critics in the discovery of the 
standard. 24  The task now is to give reasons for the claim that Hume’s 
sentimentalist epistemology leaves room for, and perhaps gives support to, 
aesthetic realism. 
 The first reason, and the simplest, is the general, primitive, claim that 
any epistemology (per se) will leave an ontology unharmed: a thesis about how 
we come to know something has, in practice, no direct implications concerning 
what there is to know. So, Hume’s thesis that we know aesthetic truths through 
aesthetic feeling—through ‘sentiment’—has no final bearing concerning what 
                                               
23  That not all sentiments towards works are equally appropriate is consistent with 
projectivism, which is an anti-realist view. But Hume´s claim is that some but not all 
aesthetic claims are true. (Recall the contrast made by Hume between the merits of Ogilby 
and Milton). 
24 I am now assuming that the standard, as Hume proposes it, is to be discovered by the true 
judges. 
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aesthetic reality and aesthetic truth are. Sentimentalism does not block aesthetic 
realism. 
 To the contrary, we may perhaps say that the essay suggests that 
sentimentalism is Hume’s epistemology for realism. (And this is the second 
reason for the claim that Hume’s sentimentalist epistemology perhaps gives 
support to aesthetic realism). The quest for a standard of taste, if we can read 
the standard as discovered by the true judges, is largely a realist project, at least 
in the modest sense that it claims that in our engagement with works of art we 
apprehend features whose existence and nature are independent from our 
apprehensions, rather than it being the case that our judgements constitute 
those features. Aesthetic experience is largely an experience of discovery. Think 
again of the story of Sancho’s kinsmen: the taste of leather and the taste of iron 
detected in the wine were ‘present’ independently of the fact that they were 
detected, and showing this was Hume’s main point in presenting the story. 
Hume readily admits that the story can be applied to ‘mental taste’: ‘a quick and 
acute perception of beauty and deformity must be the perfection of our mental 
taste’ (par. 17). So, as other commentators have noted, we can see the episode 
from Quixote as a mise-en-abîme of Hume’s main view in the essay. The project of 
viewing sentiment as a world-sensitivity, as Savile noted, and as being more or 
less appropriate to the object, was presented in the essay, also through this story. 
The converse approximation, of reason to sentiment, was, as Kivy noted, also 
attempted. To discern beauty, not only sentiment is needed but also reason, 
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Hume claims: ‘reason, if not an essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the 
operations of this latter faculty’ (par. 21). So we have a largely realist project in 
the essay: at bottom, Hume’s essay proposes that aesthetic reality is out there to 
be discovered. The main difficulty for the realist, and Hume’s main endeavour, is 
to offer an epistemology for aesthetic realism.  
 Hume’s epistemology is simple enough. As Tamen puts it: ‘imitate the 
experts’ (2005, 219). The aim of this imitation is to feel towards the world as the 
experts feel, as Levinson suggests, based on the thought that the experts feel 
more appropriately than the rest of us. The crucial aspect is that there is 
something special (often elusive) to apprehend or discover, that is worth the 
effort. Such a thing, about which Hume never speaks directly, is grasped 
through apt sentiment, and we know which sentiments are apt by listening to 
the true judges, who (we trust) know better.25 The claim, in the end, that not all 
tastes are upon an equal footing emphasizes the modesty, and the scope, of 
Hume’s project. Being incapable of identifying exactly what it is that taste 
allows us to know, Hume can only speak about the exercise of taste, largely by 
comparing it with the exercise of reason, so that he may claim, at least, that 
knowledge of what is beautiful is not impossible. 
                                               
25 It might be objected that the notion of aptness is the stock-in-trade of the projectivist: not 
of the realist. But the realist can perhaps reply by saying that whereas the projectivist stops 
in the notion of aptness (aesthetic judgements are acceptable in so far as they involve 
sentiments appropriate to an object), the realist demands more than aptness: aesthetic 
judgements must reflect or represent what is the case. 
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 Some are disappointed with Hume’s modest result. As Kivy notes, an 
anonymous reviewer of Hume’s essay at the time of publication remarked that 
‘instead of fixing and ascertain the standard of taste, as we expected, our author 
only leaves us in the same uncertainty as he found us: and concludes with the 
philosopher of old, that all we know is, that we know nothing.’26 But Hume is 
not so sceptical. For Hume we indeed know something, and countries and 
cultures, according to him, know well and simply who are their great authors 
and which are their outstanding works. As Hume’s account suggests, unlike 
scientific and philosophical theories, which change continuously, many if not 
most aesthetic verdicts concerning masterworks and major authors tend to 
remain largely unaltered:  
 
Theories of abstract philosophy, systems of profound theology, have prevailed 
during one age: In a successive period, these have been universally exploded: 
Their absurdity has been detected: Other theories and systems have supplied 
their place, which again gave place to their successors: And nothing has been 
experienced more liable to the revolutions of chance and fashion than these 
pretended decisions of science. The case is not the same with the beauties of 
eloquence and poetry. Just expressions of passion and nature are sure, after a 
little time, to gain public applause, which they maintain forever. (par. 26) 
 
                                               
26 Kivy (1967, 65). 
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So, Hume claims, even though in theory it is difficult to ascertain a standard of 
taste, in reality, at least the best cases are straightforward, and art history tells 
us about many consensual works. What is a masterwork is, generally, easy to 
discern, and Hume’s last word is, as Kivy has noted, that these are ‘questions of 
fact, not of sentiment’ (par. 25).  
The epistemology Hume proposes recommends that, if we want to find 
what is truly beautiful, we should pay attention to the verdicts of the best 
judges, which generally remain constant. We should attend to the standard of 
taste. That a standard of taste exists somewhere, to which our aesthetic beliefs 
and assertions must conform (in order to be true), is sufficient for Hume’s 
project to be reckoned successful, against those who claim that it is incoherent. 
Hume’s epistemological considerations, prima facie, aim at promoting such a 
standard.  
 The main difficulty for any realist project concerns the explanation of 
how we can know the reality in question. But Hume has provided us with an 
epistemology that seems to at least allow for realism. My next task will be to 
provide a sketch for a metaphysics of aesthetic reality.  
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Chapter Five 
Arguments for Aesthetic Realism 
 
 
 
5.1 A last anti-realist argument considered 
 
In the previous chapters I have introduced and characterized the realism/anti-
realism debate, in general and more specifically in the philosophy of art 
(Chapter 1); and I have considered two principal attempts to discourage 
aesthetic realism: the error-theoretic account of value discourse, offered by 
Mackie (Chapter 2), and the argument from ‘aesthetic autonomy’, most 
famously deployed by Kant, which I considered more or less on its own 
(Chapter 3). But so far I have not given positive argument for realism, except to 
claim, not uncontroversially, that Hume’s project in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ 
can be seen as largely, if not entirely, congenial to realism (Chapter 4). I shall 
attempt to provide a more positive defence and characterisation of aesthetic 
realism in this chapter and the next. 
 As we have also seen earlier, realism needs defence once it has been 
challenged: realism can be seen as a reply to the sceptic. Recall the sceptical 
 124 
species of philosophy evoked by Hume in his essay on taste, and to which he 
attempts to reply (or so I argued). Replying to the sceptic is important, because 
it may turn out that the sceptic is correct. Reasons for listening to the sceptic are 
old and well-known. If a stick appears to be bent because it is half-submerged in 
water,1 we should listen to the sceptic when he says that, in reality, the stick is 
not bent, despite appearances. The best and most useful description of it is that 
it is not bent, but that it appears to be so when half-submerged in water. 
Appearing to be bent is not a conclusive reason for saying that something is 
bent: when taken out of the water, the stick appears not to be bent. So the same 
stick appears to be bent and appears not to be bent in these different 
circumstances. The sceptic who claims that, despite appearances, the stick is not 
bent is certainly correct, and his opponent is certainly mistaken. Similarly, it 
may turn out that aesthetic reality is not best construed as the realist wants to 
construe it. It may turn out that, despite appearances, and in spite also of the 
ways we think and speak about aesthetic matters, aesthetic properties 
apparently referred to in aesthetic judgements should not be seen as objective 
properties after all. If this is so, the thought that they are real should be taken as 
an illusion from which we had better be released. The would-be realist has to 
address the sceptic’s challenges, and he must be able to answer to them. 
                                               
1  See this classical example in Zemach (1997, 59), invoked to explain what ‘standard 
observation conditions’ (SOC) are: under standard observation conditions, a stick that is not 
bent appears as non-bent; to claim that a stick is straight we must be able to observe it in 
SOC. 
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 The major threat to realism which persists, as various authors have 
noted,2 is that disputes over aesthetic matters, even among well-informed critics, 
sometimes remain unsettled. Accordingly, aesthetic disagreements need not 
imply an error or misapprehension on the part of any of the disputants, the 
thesis goes, but only a difference in sensibility towards the same features. So we 
have irresolvable disputes (they are irresolvable because they involve no 
mistake).3 Such irresolvable disputes seem to suggest that there is no ‘fact of the 
matter’ (Bender 1996), and hence that realism is false. Before going on to 
consider some positive reasons for preferring aesthetic realism, I shall address, 
and hopefully refute, this last anti-realist claim. Goldman sums up the difficulty 
for the realist thus: 
 
The most salient problem for the realist [...] reflects our suspicion that 
differences in taste, or in evaluative responses, and hence disagreements in 
ascriptions of aesthetic properties, survive extensive training in music and other 
art forms and hence persist within the class of ideal critics. If this is true, then 
                                               
2 See, especially, Bender (1996) and Goldman (1993; 1995). What these authors claim, to 
invoke Wright’s account discussed in Chapter 1, is that aesthetic discourse does not ‘exert 
cognitive command’. My reply will be, in brief, that such claim remains unsupported. 
3 More recently (2001) Bender has suggested that differences in ‘sensitivity’ pose an even 
stronger problem for realism, because ‘it is much more difficult to argue that sensitivities 
ought to converge as more experience or expertise with the art is accumulated’ (2001, 73). 
But I think we can reply to this by saying that a finer sensitivity is always superior to a less 
fine one—whereas differences in sensibility, that is, in our ‘propensities or abilities to 
identify that certain features of a work are aesthetically significant’ (2001, 77), may not 
involve any misapprehension, so we may say that they do not need to converge. I will not 
consider Bender’s argument (from ‘sensitivity’) any further.  
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ascribing real aesthetic properties by reference to this class of perceivers 
generates contradictory ascriptions to the same objects. (Goldman 1993, 33)  
 
What Goldman is emphasizing is that even ‘ideal critics’ disagree, so if we wish 
to maintain that ideal critics’ aesthetic attributions pick out genuine properties, 
we will have the result that contradictory, equally acceptable, evaluations are 
made of the same works. I should like to reply to this charge with three claims. 
Firstly, and as Levinson has also argued,4 even if there are aesthetic disputes 
that remain unsettled, the vast majority can be decided, and the realist can be 
content with this.5 If critics are honest and open-minded, they can for the most 
part agree on which properties a work possesses (including its aesthetic 
properties). Of course, critics may have different personal sympathies or 
preferences for certain works (and kinds of works) and also for various 
properties: some people might, some might not, like garishness. But in principle 
and in most cases, claims of personal preference can be distinguished from 
claims about the features that the works in question are said to have.6 The 
realist’s claim is only that aesthetic discussion is about those features, not about 
                                               
4 See Chapter 1, p. 42. 
5  Levinson (2001, 80) claims, more precisely, that divergences due to sensibility are a 
minority among ‘the boring norm of widespread, unheralded agreement [...] among those 
with adequate experience’ and that the realist can be ‘content’ with such majority of 
consensus. 
6 See Chapter 1, p. 40 (main text and note 35) for the claim that we can, in many cases at 
least, separate subjective preference from objective judgement. 
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critics’ (subjective) preferences, and he claims that those features are to be 
reckoned objective. 
Secondly, aesthetic reality is not alone in having irresolvable matters.7 In 
many other areas of thought and discourse, including in science, there are 
persistent and even irresolvable disputes, and this need not count against there 
being a genuine, non-mental, reality that we can know even though only in part, 
and that our discourse represents. In effect, the limits in our knowledge of an 
area should not lead us to claim that there is not an independent reality. That 
such reality exists must be independent even of whether we are capable of any 
knowledge of it. (Think of very distant planets, whose existence is clearly not 
affected by our knowledge or ignorance).  
Thirdly, and more importantly, Goldman’s charge seems question-
begging: some example is needed of well-informed critics whose judgements 
about the same work (or features thereof) persist in being contradictory, 
without any of them being mistaken. More precisely, we cannot rely on the 
claim that critics’ claims contradict each other to establish anti-realism, because 
this claim is what needs support in the first place. Granted, well-informed 
critics often (or sometimes) disagree, but it is not clear that their disagreements 
do not involve, a priori, any misapprehension on the part of any of the 
disputants. To draw from the discussion of Wright’s proposal addressed in the 
                                               
7 Even though, of course, being alone in having irresolvable matters would not, by itself, 
preclude realism. 
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first chapter: argument is still needed before we conclude that aesthetic 
discourse does not exert cognitive command.   
Those dissatisfied with anti-realism may wish to consider arguments for 
the alternative view. In the remainder of this chapter I shall consider some of 
the main arguments (some of which are closely related) we might invoke for 
preferring aesthetic realism.  
 
 
5.2 Indispensability and explanation 
 
Aesthetic realism 8  is sometimes defended on the grounds that aesthetic 
properties are indispensable to aesthetic discourse (in another way of seeing it: 
they are ineliminable from aesthetic discourse), and also on the grounds that 
they are the best way to explain aesthetic experience.9 Levinson has claimed that 
without countenancing aesthetic properties, it is difficult to see ‘what competent 
critics with evaluative differences of opinion could really be talking about.’10 
Aesthetic discourse is explained by the realist as being about something 
properly belonging to external reality, and aesthetic disagreement is thought to 
concern the best way to construe (not to construct) such independent reality.  
                                               
8 In aesthetics and the philosophy of art, ‘aesthetic realism’ has been addressed as what 
Bender (2003, 81) calls ‘aesthetic property realism’. It is this realism that I wish to consider 
and defend in this chapter and the next, even though adaptations are perhaps available for 
similar theses focusing on (e.g.) aesthetic facts.   
9 Levinson (1994, 352; 2001, 65). 
10 Levinson (1994, 352). 
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In a similar spirit, now emphasizing the ‘universal’ (normative) 
aspiration of aesthetic judgements noted famously by Kant, Zangwill has said, 
in favour of realism, that ‘no other theory seems to be able to do justice to the 
normative aspirations of aesthetic judgments’.11 And speaking specifically of 
beauty, Mothersill has claimed, also in support of realism, that ‘it is beautiful’ 
often has an explanatory role (and this should count towards objectivity), and 
that realism about beauty is supported also by the fact that aesthetic judgements 
demand the agreement of all.12  
What the realist believes, then, is that when a critic claims that some 
work is elegant, delicate, unified, balanced, garish, etc, he is making genuine 
assertions which, when true, are true in virtue of the work’s being elegant, 
delicate, unified, balanced, garish, etc., not in virtue of our attitudes, feelings or 
desires towards the work. Aesthetic properties thus provide the grounds for 
aesthetic judgements (and for disagreements) and the realist has an explanation 
in hand for aesthetic thought and discourse.  
Realism also offers a plausible explanation of aesthetic experience: 
aesthetic experience is understood by the realist as a confrontation with 
something external to him.13 If we see aesthetic experience along these lines, 
aesthetic properties (including the aesthetic properties of works of art) are ‘there 
                                               
11 Zangwill (1991, note 2; see also 2000, 598; and 2003). 
12 See Mothersill (1984, 151 and 153).  
13 Tappolet (2000, 71): ‘Notre expérience des valeurs se présente comme celle d’une 
confrontation avec quelque chose d’extérieur à nous, qui existe indépendamment de nous et 
de nos conventions.’ This idea of a ‘confrontation’ with value is also suggested in McDowell 
(1983). 
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to be discovered’,14 being in this respect like colours. Accordingly, aesthetic 
experience can be understood as an experience in perception, even if it may not 
be simply an experience in perception. Pettit makes the following remarks on 
this:  
 
In the sense in which it is usually assumed that the colours of a picture are there 
to be perceived, there to be more or less exactly characterised in pictorial 
description, so the aesthetic properties are there to be detected and 
characterised. (Pettit [1983] 2004, 169) 
 
Pettit, in the article, is defending the possibility of aesthetic realism against the 
difficulty of the ‘elusive’ nature of aesthetic properties, and against also the 
difficulty of their essentially perceptual nature (that is, of the fact that aesthetic 
properties are to be understood as essentially linked to perception). Pettit’s 
main claim is that ‘what [an aesthetic description of a painting] captures when it 
is a faithful record is something which properly belongs to the painting and 
something which is in principle accessible to all’ ([1983] 2004, 169, emphasis 
added).  
A conditional claim can thus be made, in this spirit and in favour of 
realism, if we accept what was said in Chapter 2 concerning the objectivity of 
                                               
14 Mothersill (1984, 153): ‘The merits of a work of art are discovered, not conferred.’ 
 131 
colours.15  If properties understood with essential reference to perception (such 
as colours) can nevertheless be genuine properties of objects, and thus be part of 
‘objective’ reality, then the requirement of perception, by itself, cannot be 
invoked as a claim against aesthetic realism. In this sense, we can claim, more 
positively, and drawing still on Pettit’s claims, that just as colours can be 
manifest properties of objects, which are there to be perceived, a positive 
ontological status can be available for aesthetic properties as well. If so, 
aesthetic experience can be explained as an experience of genuine aspects of 
external reality.  
The elusive nature of aesthetic properties cannot be invoked conclusively 
against realism either. That a property is difficult to discern (or that it is difficult 
to discern for most or many of us) is not a reason for claiming that it is not 
real. 16  Zemach makes this claim with respect to the notion of ‘standard 
observation conditions’ (SOC): ‘SOC for some features (e.g., color) can be 
attained by nearly everyone; for other features (scientific and aesthetic ones) 
only experts attain the required SOC’ (1997, 55). This, however, should not 
make us consider such features unreal. Similarly, we should not reject realism 
even if (some) aesthetic properties are detected only by a minority of people.17 
                                               
15 To recall, in Chapter 2, building on argument by McDowell, it was claimed that colours 
can be objective (i.e., construed as being part of external reality) even though the concept of 
colour essentially makes reference to perception. 
16 Accordingly, pace Goldman (1995, 30, quoted on p. 35), lack of convergence in judgement 
is not, by itself, a good reason to eschew realism. 
17 Sibley, in ‘Objectivity and Aesthetics’ ([1961] 2001, 78-79), imagines a scenario in which 
the majority of people were partly colour-blind. Their convergence of opinion concerning 
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The aesthetic case is comparable with the following one. Even though only a 
small group of human beings (in which I am not included) can differentiate 
between a Lusitano horse and an Andalusian one,18 this does not imply that 
there is not a genuine distinction to be made. The distinction is based on real 
features, a distinction which only a few people happen to be able to make, even 
though it is, in principle, available to all with the relevant capacities and 
sufficient training. In effect, even if no one were ever able to distinguish them, 
the difference would still exist. The same applies to the capacity to tell varieties 
of cactuses or roses, brands of chocolate, shades of red, breeds of dogs, 
constellations, etc. In short, (vast) recognition is not a good criterion for 
existence. And this means also that we should not eschew aesthetic features 
only on the basis of their elusive nature. That is, elusiveness, per se, is not a 
good reason to reject realism. 
Tappolet invokes the following phenomenological observation in favour 
of realism.19 Value experience appears to be a confrontation with an external 
reality (see note 13 above), and positing real values provides the best 
explanation of this appearance. Tappolet writes the following, concerning the 
beauty of a painting, in support of realism: ‘La beauté d’une toile est perçue 
                                                                                                                                    
colour would not be the correct opinion. The minority ‘élite’, capable of making colour 
judgements, would be correct. According to Sibley, this is what happens in aesthetic matters: 
those capable of making ‘finer discriminations’ ([1961] 2001, 79) are correct even though 
they are (sometimes) a minority. 
18 Lusitano horses and Andalusian horses are very similar in conformation. 
19 In the book, Tappolet defends ontological realism about values, and she claims that values 
are monadic axiological properties. 
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comme se trouvant dans l’œuvre d’art et non pas comme projetée sur elle ou 
encore comme relative à notre sentiment esthétique ou à nos conventions 
sociales’ (Tappolet 2000, 71). For Tappolet, the way the beauty is ‘perceived’—as 
being in the painting—is the way it is: there are no reasons for thinking that the 
phenomenology is misleading. Moreover, axiological realism (i.e., realism about 
values) comes as a simple explanation: ‘Le réalisme axiologique est la façon la 
plus radicale, mais aussi la plus simple, de rendre compte de la grammaire des 
termes axiologiques, de la phénoménologie des valeurs et de l’objectivité que 
présuppose notre pratique’ (Tappolet 2000, 72). 
 
 
5.3 Descriptive limits of aesthetic attributions 
 
Another argument for aesthetic realism rests on the claim that aesthetic 
attributions seem to have ‘descriptive limits’.20 That is, not everything can (truly) 
be said to be elegant, delicate, balanced, garish, etc. Some realists 21 , 22  have 
claimed that aesthetic properties with an ‘evaluative component’ (such as being 
graceful, being elegant, being balanced, etc) have nevertheless a ‘descriptive 
component’ which can be isolated and which constitutes the core of the 
                                               
20 Levinson (2001, 62, 65). 
21 Levinson (2001, 61). 
22  The distinction between a ‘descriptive’ and an ‘evaluative component’ in aesthetic 
concepts is proposed by Sibley [1974] in Sibley (2001, 92). 
 134 
aesthetic property. One difficulty with this account—leaving aside the difficulty 
of separating the descriptive from the evaluative component23—is that a ‘solely 
evaluative’24 property such as beauty, which we may feel inclined to consider 
the aesthetic property par excellence, will be denied, even by aesthetic realists, 
the positive ontological status that more specific properties will enjoy. And this 
separate treatment of beauty might seem unjustified.25  
One parallel difficulty is brought out by a contrast Zangwill makes 
between ‘verdictive’ and ‘substantive’ judgements:26  
 
Let us call verdictive aesthetic judgments those judgments to the effect that 
things are beautiful or ugly, or that they have or lack aesthetic merit or value. [...] 
We also judge that things are dainty, dumpy, graceful, garish, delicate, balanced, 
warm, passionate, brooding, awkward, or sad. Let us call these judgments 
substantive aesthetic judgments.’ (Zangwill 2001, 9).  
 
This terminology suggests that ‘verdictive’ judgements are to be distinguished 
from ‘substantive’ ones, and the implicit claim is that only the latter seem to 
                                               
23  In defence of realists inclined to make this separation: the separation between the 
evaluative component and the descriptive component may be made similarly to the 
separation, mentioned in note 6 above, between an objective claim and a subjective claim. 
24 This phrase is suggested by Sibley in ‘Particularity, Art, and Evaluation’ [1974], in Sibley 
(2001, 91). 
25 I shall later on defend a unified account of aesthetic properties (against a separate account 
of beauty). 
26 Zangwill is building on a claim made by Sibley ([1965] 2001, 34). Lamarque (2009, 256) 
calls the former ‘summative’: ‘(X is good, Y is bad)’. 
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predicate something of an object, thereby leaving beauty with a dubious 
ontological status. 
But perhaps we need not separate the two kinds of properties, at least 
with respect to the descriptive limits of aesthetic attributions. The descriptive 
limits of aesthetic attributions seem to apply also to the more general forms of 
predication. Mothersill has defended what I have been calling a unified account 
of aesthetic properties, that is, an account which includes both more specific 
properties and the most general ones. Mothersill has claimed that attributions of 
beauty, too, have descriptive limits, and that a judgement of beauty makes a 
‘substantive’ claim about reality (as opposed to a claim merely expressing 
personal feelings about an object), a claim that is true of some but not all objects. 
In other words, Mothersill claims that to say that some work, X, is beautiful is to 
make a genuine, substantial, judgement, which can be true or false depending 
entirely on the nature of X, not at all on the feelings I might have with respect to 
X. Beauty may be detected through my feelings, but my feelings cannot confer 
beauty to an object. The example Mothersill gives is from music: 
 
In judging [Beethoven’s] Op. 59, No. 1 to be beautiful, by hypothesis, I implicate 
an avowal, but I also make a substantive claim, one that does not seem to me to 
involve any displacement or projection of my feelings on the object judged. 
(Mothersill 1984, 150) 
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Another implicit, and crucial, thought we can detect in Mothersill’s realist 
account is that no amount of feeling will make something beautiful. It is in this 
sense that beauty (and a fortiori the other aesthetic properties) can be construed 
by the realist as mind-independent: no amount of thought or feeling will change 
or take away the beauty of (to remain with Mothersill’s example) Beethoven’s 
Op. 59, No. 1, and beauty is never created by those feelings either. Aesthetic 
attributions are, ultimately, to be judged against reality, not against personal 
reactions. Accordingly, the limits of the application of the most general aesthetic 
terms are, too, indicated entirely by the objects, not at all by the feelings we 
might have concerning those objects. In short, aesthetic attributions (perhaps 
including the most general aesthetic attributions) have descriptive limits which, 
for the aesthetic realist, are simply imposed by the external, non-mental, reality 
they represent. 
 
 
5.4 Simplicity  
 
It is sometimes claimed that parsimony speaks in favour of anti-realism.27 
Granting for the sake of argument that simplicity is always a theoretical virtue,28 
                                               
27 See, for instance, Matravers (2005, 208). 
28 The issue is controversial. See Baker (2004) in the entry ‘Simplicity’ in Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. Baker takes parsimony to be a species of simplicity. For him simplicity divides 
into ‘syntactic simplicity’ or elegance (concerning ‘the number and complexity of 
hypotheses’); and ‘ontological simplicity’ or parsimony (concerning ‘the number and 
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I should still say something about where I think simplicity lies and suggest, to 
the contrary, that simplicity can be invoked in support of aesthetic realism.  
Some philosophers have explicitly invoked ontological parsimony as a 
reason to prefer anti-realism (the opposite of parsimony would be 
‘extravagance’). Matravers has argued for anti-realism on the grounds that it is 
‘ontologically parsimonious’, allegedly without loss of explanatory capacity: 
‘Aesthetic attributions are grounded in experiences of certain distinctive sorts 
that are caused by non-aesthetic properties, and which exhibit a wide measure 
of inter-subjective agreement’ (2005, 208). But as we saw earlier, according to 
other philosophers realism is to be defended on the grounds that it is ‘the 
simplest’ account of aesthetic experience, thought, discourse, and practice 
(Tappolet 2000, 72). How are we to adjudicate between these two apparently 
opposed claims?  
 I will address the issue by using a distinction29 between two principles 
(following Baker 2004): the principle of ontological simplicity (or ‘parsimony’) 
and the principle of theoretical simplicity (or ‘elegance’). 30  The principle of 
ontological simplicity claims that ‘entities should not be multiplied beyond 
necessity’ (a principle known as ‘Ockham’s razor’), whereas the principle of 
                                                                                                                                    
complexity of the things postulated’). So the distinction concerns, as he also explains, 
‘simplicity of theory’ versus ‘simplicity of world’. But he also claims that ‘the terms 
‘parsimony’ and ‘simplicity’ are used virtually interchangeably in much of the philosophical 
literature.’ 
29 Quine makes a distinction between ‘ontology’ and ‘ideology’, but not in this sense. In my 
distinction I follow Baker (2004). 
30 Baker (2004) calls the latter ‘elegance’. 
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theoretical simplicity (or ‘elegance’) claims that theories, or more precisely 
hypotheses, should not be needlessly invoked. Both principles aim at promoting 
simplicity by avoiding unnecessary complication, but they find simplicity in 
different things. 
 The anti-realist proceeds by rejecting what he considers an ‘extra kind’ 
(or ‘layer’) of properties: aesthetic properties are seen as an unnecessary 
extravagance, and the anti-realist strives for a theory without them. So his claim 
is a claim for ontological simplicity, or parsimony: the fewer entities the better. 
The realist, by contrast, invokes common-sense as a friend of realism, and 
claims that a philosophical theory which respects common-sense (thereby 
remaining simpler) is to be preferred. So he chooses something akin to 
theoretical simplicity, or elegance, when he claims that aesthetic properties are 
part of a simpler theory which contemplates all sorts of ‘manifest’ properties 
(including aesthetic properties). The question for us is which form of simplicity 
better acounts for the realm of aesthetics and the philosophy of art. I wish to 
make two claims in this respect. 
 Firstly, aesthetic properties are, per se, quite innocuous ontologically. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, in which I address more directly the nature of 
aesthetic properties, realists do not need to posit queer entities existing outside 
space and time, and with a dubious epistemology. Aesthetic properties need not 
be extravagant posits (which would offend against parsimony), but only the 
contents of the aesthetic predicates, genuinely invoked by the aesthetic 
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judgements we make (as in other areas of discourse). Their distinctive ‘aesthetic’ 
nature, as I shall suggest in the next section (§5.5), does not, by itself, count 
against parsimony either. Admitting properties which function aesthetically 
comes naturally in our discourse and practice, and the difficult task is, it seems 
to me, in dispensing with them (recall §5.2 above).  
 Secondly, common-sense is with realism in claiming that there is an 
aesthetic reality for us to discover, and it seems that we need argument before 
we abandon this intuition (recall Chapter 2). For in effect we not only enjoy 
looking at a painting, but we also learn by looking at it, and (to a great extent at 
least) our interest in art—and in aesthetic matters in general, at least with 
respect to art—is, at least in part, cognitive. People go to museums and libraries 
and concert halls, not merely in search of pleasure, but also in search of 
knowledge, of an aesthetic (and artistic) sort. (Contrast with the cases of the 
pleasures of swimming, cycling, or sun-bathing). Of course, acquiring artistic 
knowledge through aesthetic experience is pleasant, but what I wish to 
emphasize is that what drives us is, to a great extent at least, ordinary curiosity, 
arguably concerning something properly belonging to reality, rather than mere 
pleasure. Or at least the pleasure involved is one of a higher-order (more 
fulfilling) sort.31 
                                               
31  Lamarque (2009, 63) makes the claim that ‘[l]iterary works invite multiple readings 
because they offer content with depth, inviting reflection’ (my emphasis). 
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As Hume well noted in his essay on taste, in our aesthetic practice there 
is what we might call a ludic dimension which accords legitimacy to (blameless) 
preferences, but, as Hume emphasized, there are also facts which are 
undeniable and which seem to be there to be found. Realism concerns, and 
hopes to account for, these. As Mothersill has observed, with reference to 
Hume’s ‘central insight’: ‘one truth remains incontestable: the Iliad is beautiful.’ 
(1984, 259). For the aesthetic realist, the existence of instances of unquestionable 
beauty or aesthetic merit (which are there to be discovered) is sufficient to leave 
realism in place. Taking (aesthetic) claims to be about (aesthetic) reality, in turn, 
is in conformity with the rest of our understanding of aesthetic thought and 
discourse. Aesthetic realism, once again, is to be reckoned simple in its account 
of (aesthetic) thought and discourse. 
 
 
5.5 The aesthetic/ non-aesthetic distinction 
 
I shall now claim that the distinction between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘non-aesthetic’ 
(concepts, judgements, properties), made along the lines proposed by Sibley 
([1959] 2001), helps to support aesthetic realism. 32  The distinction Sibley 
                                               
32 In his work, Sibley is reluctant to speak of ‘properties’, preferring to speak of how we use 
aesthetic terms, concepts, and how we make aesthetic judgements. However, throughout 
his essays he often mentions ‘properties’ ‘qualities’, ‘features’, ‘characteristics’. His 
reluctance, he explains in ‘Objectivity and Aesthetics’ ([1968] 2001), concerns first the 
identity, and individuation, of some of aesthetic properties: ‘What would be the property 
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proposes is not without difficulties, which have been noted,33 but it seems to me 
that keeping the distinction is a better decision than rejecting it, and the 
distinction promotes aesthetic realism. In this section I try to explain how the 
distinction promotes realism.  
 Sibley points to the broad group of ‘aesthetic concepts’ through 
examples. In the following passage, he makes the contrast between ‘aesthetic’ 
and ‘non-aesthetic’: 
 
We say that a novel has a great number of characters and deals with life in a 
manufacturing town; that a painting uses pale colours, predominantly blues and 
greens, and has kneeling figures in the foreground [...]. Such remarks may be 
made by, and such features pointed out to, anyone with normal eyes, ears, and 
intelligence. On the other hand, we also say that a poem is tightly-knit or deeply 
moving; that a picture lacks balance, or has a certain serenity and repose, or that 
the grouping of the figures sets up an exciting tension; that the characters in a 
                                                                                                                                    
corresponding to ‘gemlike fire’ or ‘marmoreal hardness’?’ However, Sibley adds: ‘though 
we might say it has properties that make these descriptions apt’. Thus it seems that the 
individuation problem is not specific to the aesthetic case, but common to metaphorical 
ways of describing some feature. A further reason Sibley gives for his reluctance is that the 
philosophical uses of ‘property’ are ‘varied and often obscure’ (2001, 72). He explains that 
sometimes colours and tastes are not taken to be ‘”properties in” objects as sizes and shapes 
are’, because the latter are ‘organism-related’. So his reluctance is, again, not specific to the 
aesthetic case. Since for me here what matters is whether ‘objective characteristics’ (2001, 81) 
could be picked out by terms used in what Sibley calls aesthetic descriptions or judgements, 
I will use the term ‘property’. It is clear that Sibley is interested in emphasizing the presence 
of ‘objective’ features of objects, even when he admits that he has not succeeded in the task: 
‘I am far from thinking that I have made a case for aesthetic properties, even in the weak 
sense that some aesthetic characterizations are true or false, apt or inappropriate, etc.’ (2001, 
86-87, my emphasis). So, despite the occasional terminological reluctance, Sibley’s view 
seems animated by a form of realism about aesthetic properties. 
33 See, for instance, Cohen ([1973] 1989). 
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novel never really come to life, or that a certain episode strikes a false note. It 
would be natural enough to say that the making of such judgements as these 
requires the exercise of taste, perceptiveness, or sensitivity, of aesthetic 
discrimination or appreciation [...]. Accordingly, when a word or expression is 
such that taste or perceptiveness is required in order to apply it, I shall call it an 
aesthetic term or expression, and I shall, correspondingly, speak of aesthetic 
concepts, or taste concepts. (Sibley [1959] 2001, 1) 
 
This ‘perceptiveness’, ‘taste’ or ‘sensitivity’ is not a ‘quasi-sense’,34 as Sibley 
makes clear, but more simply a ‘characteristically human kind of awareness and 
activity’35 (p. 23), varying ‘in degree from the rudimentary to the refined’ (p. 21). 
Taste thus concerns an ordinary perceptual capacity, ‘an ability to notice or see 
or tell that things have certain qualities’, 36  which can be substantially 
sophisticated with experience and appropriate training. The term does not 
single out any particular reality, but only a way of contemplating reality—one 
using ‘taste’ or ‘aesthetic discrimination or appreciation’.  
As Sibley puts it, judgements the making of which requires ‘the exercise 
of taste’ qualify as aesthetic; whereas those which may be made by, and 
‘features which can be pointed out to’ (or by) ‘anyone with normal eyes, ears, 
and intelligence’ qualify as non-aesthetic. Paradigmatic cases of non-aesthetic 
                                               
34 Sibley ([1968] 2001, 72). 
35 In ‘Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic’ ([1965] 2001, 34) Sibley suggests that the subject-matter 
of aesthetics is a ‘kind of perception’. 
36 ‘Aesthetic Concepts’ (AC), p. 3. 
 143 
features are shapes, gustatory tastes, textures, and colours. 37  Whereas the 
properties of being elegant, being balanced and being garish would qualify, for 
Sibley, as aesthetic.  
The apparent fact that many of us may, in some cases, see the texture but 
not the balance, the colour but not the garishness, the shape but not the elegance 
seems to support Sibley’s distinction. ‘Aesthetic qualities are “emergent”’ 
([196538 ] 2001, 35) from non-aesthetic ones, Sibley explains, and cannot be 
reduced to them (or inferred from them). Moreover, some aesthetic properties 
are elusive for many if not all of us, whereas non-aesthetic ones are usually 
perceived by everyone ‘with normal eyes, ears, and intelligence’. This is the 
crucial aspect of the proposed distinction. 
The important claim to make for our purposes is that Sibley’s account, by 
focusing on a ‘kind of perception’ (2001, 34)—understood as a substantial 
refinement of normal perception—presents taste as a world-sensitivity. Hence 
the aesthetic realm, to be known through taste, is presented as part of reality, 
since it is the object of such refined world-sensitivity. So, Sibley’s account is 
realist in spirit and, more importantly for our aims, it provides an epistemology 
for aesthetic realism. The implicit ontological claim in his account is that 
aesthetic properties, too, are there to be perceived—if only we have taste. So the 
                                               
37 Authors disagree with respect to colour. Sibley takes colour to be non-aesthetic (De Clercq 
(2008, 896 and 904) too). But Beardsley (1981, 64) gives ‘blueness’ as an example of an 
aesthetic quality, and Eaton (1994, 386) claims that ‘colour attributions can be aesthetic’. 
38 Essay ‘Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic’ [1965] reprinted in (2001). 
 144 
distinction between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘non-aesthetic’, made on the basis of a 
different degree of sophistication in perception, encourages realism when it 
promotes what Sibley calls ‘aesthetic discrimination’ and ‘appreciation’,39 which 
involves a finer discrimination.  
What seems to be missing in Sibley’s aesthetic theory is an account of the 
relation between the more specific aesthetic properties (in which he is interested) 
and the more general ones that his account neglects. Austin is credited for 
having recommended that philosophers focus on the more specific aesthetic 
properties: ‘if only we could forget for a while about the beautiful and get down 
instead to the dainty and the dumpy’.40 In the same vein, Goodman (1976, 262) 
has claimed that ‘[e]stimates of excellence are among the minor aids to insight’41 
and many aestheticians have indeed focused on what Zangwill has called 
‘substantive’ (i.e., more specific) aesthetic judgements, as opposed to 
‘verdictive’ 42  (i.e., general) aesthetic judgements. Furthermore, some realists 
about aesthetic properties have explicitly or implicitly rejected realism about 
beauty, due to beauty’s supposed lack of a ‘descriptive component’ which is 
believed to be present only in the more specific aesthetic terms.  
                                               
39 Sibley [1959] 2001, 1 (quoted above). 
40 Essay ‘A Plea for Excuses’ quoted by Mothersill (1984, 252). (Austin’s essay can be found 
in Austin [1956-7] 1979, and the quote appears on p. 183 of the 1979 edition). Mothersill 
replies that without the ‘beautiful’ we do not ‘get very far with the “dainty and the dumpy”’ 
(1984, 253). 
41 But Goodman also claims, just before the passage quoted above, that ‘If a connoisseur tells 
me that one of two Cycladic idols that seems to me almost indistinguishable is much finer 
than the other, this inspires me to look for and may help me find the significant differences 
between the two’ (1976, 262).  
42 The phrase ‘verdictive’ is probably inspired in Sibley ([1965] 2001, 34). 
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But I think the neglect of beauty, and of the most general aesthetic 
judgements (considered ‘uninteresting’), is a mistake. Think of the role of 
background knowledge in making general value judgements. Consider an 
analogy with the evaluation of a person’s actions: M. makes a break in his work 
at lunch time and goes and read in a quiet café near his office. Someone seeing 
him there frequently reading his book could think that he is a spy. The 
appearances are compatible with the spy thesis. But such judgement would 
misrepresent the facts (we and M. know): such judgement would tell us more 
about the person judging than it would tell us about M. and his motives. Those 
calling him a spy would be making an incorrect general judgement (verdict) 
with respect to his behaviour. The example shows that the general, qualitative, 
value to attribute to a person’s actions is not always a trivial matter: one can 
sometimes, and sometimes easily, misrepresent the general nature of an action, 
not only the details. 
 Similarly, concerning works of art, I think that even the most general 
aesthetic judgements can be substantial, both in the sense that they are (at least 
sometimes) not trivial, and in the sense that they can (apparently) make an 
objective claim about an object (as opposed to a claim of merely subjective 
preference). Moreover, it is possible, and in some cases it is even plausible, that 
we can be entirely mistaken about the general, qualitative, nature of an aesthetic 
object. For example, whether or not Jackson Pollock’s or Mark Rothko’s pictorial 
work is good as pictorial art is open to dispute (I especially like one of 
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them). Also, construing particular works by these artists as generally good or 
bad (and also as better or worse than other works) is at least sometimes a 
complex task: it is easy to neglect relevant aspects, to over-emphasize other 
aspects or to see them distorted by our own preconceptions, current 
preoccupations, preferences, etc. Two different communities may judge the 
same work very differently even at a general level, based not only on different 
sensibilities but also on the different amount and quality of background 
knowledge they possess about the work. So, general (aesthetic) value 
judgements are at least sometimes difficult, and interesting.  
 We have looked at some reasons for preferring aesthetic realism: at 
bottom, explanatory reasons are what ultimately motivates realism. Aesthetic 
terms seem indispensable in aesthetic discourse; aesthetic attributions exhibit 
descriptive limits; explaining aesthetic attributions with aesthetic properties is 
simple; and the taste-based distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
(predicates, judgements, concepts, properties) presents aesthetic experience as 
an experience in perception, though sophisticated. What I shall do in the next 
chapter is to build on Sibley’s useful distinction and consider also what his 
account consciously neglects: what Sibley calls ‘verdicts’, that is, ‘purely 
evaluative judgements: whether things are aesthetically good or bad, excellent 
or mediocre, superior to others or inferior’.43 I shall attempt to support the 
thought that, with respect to most artistic matters at least, ‘beauty is in the 
                                               
43 Sibley ([1965] 2001, 33-34). 
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background’ (Mothersill). So, a finer discrimination, which Sibley correctly takes 
to be the means by which aesthetic reality is known, is also, at least in the case 
of art, a discrimination directed at beauty or aesthetic value. I will be suggesting 
that the proposal of a distinctively aesthetic realm (implicit in Sibley’s ‘aesthetic’ 
/ ‘non-aesthetic’ distinction) is to be seen not only as an elusive reality, requiring 
and rewarding fine, subtle, precise perception, but also as a reality to be seen 
‘through loving spectacles’.44 
My aim is also to suggest that a focus on the most general aesthetic 
claims is relevant and perhaps necessary for our understanding of the more 
specific ones, and of aesthetic matters generally. Of course, I am not alone in 
this endeavour (see, especially, Mothersill 1984; Zemach 1997; Zangwill 2001; 
Nehamas 2007; Scruton 2009). In the first instance, I will claim that what unifies 
the aesthetic properties is the requirement of an admiring perception (they are 
to be seen through loving spectacles), a feature which, I shall claim, need not 
prompt anti-realism. Secondly, my claim will be conditional: I will claim, 
relying on Sibley’s notion of ‘aesthetic’ as requiring taste, that the ontological 
status we give to the more specific aesthetic properties must be available to the 
most general ones (such as beauty). That is, if any aesthetic properties exist, 
understood along the lines Sibley proposes (and accepting that his aesthetic 
concepts correspond to properties), then beauty must be one of them, because at 
least some ascriptions of beauty require taste, and even Sibley provides at least 
                                               
44 On this metaphor, which I borrow from Charles Hazlewood, see Chapter 2, p. 67, note 24. 
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one example which promotes this conclusion. This will be the unified account of 
aesthetic properties. As an adjunct, I will claim that this account helps to 
promote a theory of art which stands in opposition to one current and 
widespread theory holding that art (including literature) is best understood as 
fundamentally institutional.45  
                                               
45 The institutional theory of art is championed by Danto and Dickie, among others. See, for 
example, Danto ([1964] 2004) and Dickie ([1983] 2004). 
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Chapter Six 
The nature of aesthetic reality 
 
 
 
I am now speaking to those inclined to choose aesthetic realism. More precisely, 
I am concerned in this chapter with what we are to think if we endorse realism. 
Let us bear in mind that aesthetic realism (as well as the aesthetic anti-realism 
we rejected) is meant to give an account of what art critics’ aesthetic thought 
and discourse is fundamentally about. Before going on to consider some of the 
main contributions to aesthetic property realism, 1  I should like to give an 
illustration from painting (similar examples are of course available concerning 
poetry, music, dance, architecture, etc.). 2  Consider the following piece of art 
criticism, offered by Hobson (1989), on the work of the English painter John 
William Waterhouse, in particular on his first and most successful pictorial 
rendering of (a passage from) Tennyson’s poem ‘The Lady of Shalott’.3 The 
                                               
1 For an introduction the notion of aesthetic properties which remains neutral with respect 
to the realism/anti-realism debate, see Goldman (1992).  
2 I have been assuming all along that my reader is familiar with art criticism (including 
literary criticism). Here I pause only to look briefly at one example, to call more explicit 
attention to what criticism (typically) consists in. 
3 The Lady of Shalott (1888). Oil on canvas, 153 x 200 cm, The Tate Gallery, London.  
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piece refers to various aspects of Waterhouse’s work and it includes, among 
many other comments, the following: 
 
(1) General characterization of the painting:  
‘a full-scale scene from nature’ (Hobson 1989, 40). 
 
(2) Identification and appraisal of the artist’s choices: 
‘Waterhouse [...] carefully selects the moment within the 
incident to hold us in contemplation—the moment between the 
words: ”She loos’d the chain and down she lay”’ (Hobson 1989, 
41). 
 
 (3) Description, speculation: 
‘the centre scene is held by the haunting beauty of the figure, 
probably in this case the artist’s wife’ (ibid.). 
 
 (4) Categorization, including criticism of different categorizations: 
‘Waterhouse has been wrongly called Pre-Raphaelite, but he was 
a Romantic Classicist: he had the Northerner’s love of legend 
and mystery, but his Italian birth lent a warm personality to his 
rendering of classical myths’ (1989, 9). 
‘Modern critics have too easily accepted the label [‘Pre-
Raphaelite’] but their invocation of Burne-Jones is wide of the 
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mark: the whole tenor of Waterhouse’s work is classical and 
Italianate, rather than medieval and Gothic as with the Pre-
Raphaelite Brotherhood and their followers’ (1989, 122). 
 
(5) Support of positive (or negative) judgements, comparisons: 
‘[Burne-Jones’s] girls are anonymous and anaemic: Waterhouse’s 
are individual, sensitive and warm-blooded: they are in fact the 
living models of his studio, with their own youth and their 
inimitable combination of modesty and sexuality imbued with 
the painter’s creative imagination’ (1989, 9). 
‘At the very first glance, his paintings have a virtually universal 
appeal: skilled in execution and harmonious in colour, they are 
inhabited by beautiful people and recall well-known stories or 
instantly acceptable personal situations’ (1989, 122). 
 
(6) Criticism (appraisal) of another piece of criticism, detailed description, 
including reference to colours: 
‘Critical appreciation of the picture [The Lady of Shalott (1888)] is 
nowhere better shown than in the retrospective article of 1909 by 
R. E. D. Sketchley in the Art Journal:  
The harmony of the willow-green, darkened with rain and 
closing day, of the shadowed white of the dress, the black 
prow, and the grey light afloat on the water, has the cool 
open-air unity of French naturalism. Gold and rose of the 
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embroidered web, dipping unheeded into the green 
shadow of the boat, the candles, taken from the inner quiet 
air of some shrine to burn failingly in the drift, are imagery 
that paint more than the vision in the poem.’ (1989, 41). 
 
Art criticism includes all of these.4 For the most part, it consists in description 
(sometimes, if not always, suggesting a positive or negative evaluation), and in 
general the claims made by the critic refer clearly to the work: to its colours, 
representational and expressive content, connection with movements or schools, 
etc. What the aesthetic realist distinctively holds is that aesthetic sentences, too 
(those attributing aesthetic properties or aesthetic value to an object) refer to the 
object judged and to its genuine properties, not to the critic’s feelings projected 
onto it. That is, the aesthetic realist believes that harmony, unity (etc.) invoked 
by the critic are, in an important sense, in the painting (in the piece of music, in 
the poem) to be detected, in a sense just like the colours and contours are there 
to be seen. Accordingly, art criticism concerns the discovery, characterization 
and evaluation, from an aesthetic and artistic point of view, of an object and its 
properties. So, even if such activity requires the active participation of the mind 
and the emotions, the discourse is properly about the objects being judged and 
their properties. Similarly, the properties invoked by the critic, including the 
aesthetic ones, are to be construed as real. What remains to be said is what 
                                               
4 For a similar listing of the ‘methods we use as critics’, see Sibley ([1959] 2001, 18). 
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aesthetic properties, and aesthetic reality, must be. I shall look at some main 
proposals in this chapter, and outline my own view.  
I should make one preliminary note on method. When considering each 
contribution to aesthetic realism, I focus mainly on the insights to be preserved. 
I wish primarily to consider what the various authors bring to the debate, rather 
than the limits of their contributions, even though I also mention some of those 
limits. The aim is to arrive at a set of possible ways of capturing the notion of 
aesthetic properties, without hoping for a definition in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. I should make one note, still, on terminology. Sibley was 
famously reluctant to speak in terms of ‘properties’,5 even though he did use the 
term occasionally. And Levinson (1978; 2006) has argued for a metaphysical 
distinction between properties and qualities, even though he has sometimes (2005) 
spoken in ways inconsistent with the distinction proposed (I shall address this 
in §6.3). My preference is for using the terms ‘qualities’ and ‘properties’ 
(‘features’, ‘characteristics’, ‘traits’) as synonymous.  
 
 
6.1 The epistemic notion of ‘taste’ 
 
                                               
5 See Chapter 5, p. 140, note 32. See also Sibley ([1968] 2001, 72). 
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Frank Sibley’s contribution to aesthetic realism is clear, even though he never 
calls himself a realist: Sibley offers an epistemology for realism. The ‘aesthetic 
concepts’ are said to be concepts the application of which requires ‘taste’. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, Sibley’s taste is an epistemic notion, and it is 
understood by Sibley, not as an odd ‘quasi-sense’, but as a (substantial) 
sophistication of ordinary perception, so that people ‘with normal eyes, ears 
and intelligence’ may sometimes fail to notice aesthetic features even when they 
are able to notice all of the non-aesthetic ones. Taste is, then, a finer perception 
which allows for the grasp of finer traits, a way of perceiving which need not be 
always directed at works of art. As we have seen, Sibley’s explicit concern is 
with a ‘kind of perception’6 rather than with attention to a specific kind of object. 
The aesthetic kind of perception in which he is interested encompasses ‘scenery 
and sunsets, animals, faces, and people’, together with art.  
If we accept that Sibley’s aesthetic concepts identify properties, then we 
will find the following ontology implicit in his work. First, we find properties 
such as [being] gemlike, picked out by terms which are ‘merely descriptive’, this 
meaning that they bear no direct relation to the overall value of a work (when 
speaking of art). The attribution of such properties has no positive or negative 
valence: it makes no reference to the value of the work. Then we find aesthetic 
properties which are partially evaluative, such as being balanced, or being 
graceful. Sibley takes the terms picking out these to be descriptive: even if 
                                               
6 Sibley (2001, 34). 
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balance can be invoked to support a positive evaluative judgement of a work, it 
also has a descriptive component, in the sense that it corresponds to, or at least 
is compatible with, some but not all formal features. Finally, we have the 
‘purely evaluative’ properties, such as [being] beautiful, [being] ugly. These last 
are especially problematic in Sibley’s account, and I wish to focus on them,7 for 
they are good as a test: if the purely evaluative properties can be reckoned 
genuine properties of objects, then all the others can, too.  
The difficulty for Sibley’s account concerning evaluative concepts (and 
properties) is as follows. On the one hand, since Sibley does not take the terms 
‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’ to be descriptive, it seems that he does not take them to be 
terms corresponding to objective properties of works. However, Sibley also 
claims that the concepts in question may require taste to be grasped, so this 
points towards the objectivity of the (supposedly) corresponding properties. 
The general value of a work may also be elusive (or require taste), as an 
example from Sibley (2001, 7) shows: ‘A failure and a success in the manner of 
Degas may be generally more alike, so far as their non-aesthetic features go, 
than either is like a successful Fragonard’. The example in this passage was 
meant to emphasize that possessing aesthetic value does not amount to 
possessing any specific (formal) feature common to all works that can be taken 
to possess aesthetic value. But the passage shows also that the difference 
                                               
7 Most authors have focused on the difficulties of the very distinction between ‘aesthetic’ 
and ‘non-aesthetic’, a distinction which I am not questioning. On the usefulness of that 
distinction, see again Chapter 5, §5.5. 
 156 
between excellence and mediocrity in a work may be as elusive as any other 
more specific (formal) aesthetic distinction. And if we might need taste to tell 
mediocrity from excellence (‘failure from a success’, as Sibley sees it), then the 
ascription of general merit or demerit must count, according to Sibley’s own 
proposal, as aesthetic. But if general remarks such as (aesthetic) ‘failure’ or 
‘success’ are, as Sibley also claims, purely evaluative, which he takes as non-
descriptive, it is not clear how they can be taken as corresponding to genuine 
features of works. This seems to be a problem in his account.    
My suggestion is that we preserve Sibley’s insight concerning taste: the 
thought that certain features require a finer, more sophisticated, perception, and 
the related thought that the elusive nature of those features is no impediment to 
their reality. In many cases they are detected, even though sometimes only by a 
minority of experts. If we say that aesthetic features are those requiring taste, 
and if in some cases taste is required so that beauty is detected, then beautiful 
counts as an aesthetic concept and beauty as a genuine aesthetic property. All 
we need to reject in Sibley’s account is the (in my view unsupported) claim that 
beauty has no objective component.8 
But there is something about aesthetic judgements, concepts, and 
properties that Sibley’s notion of taste seems to leave out. For Sibley, taste is a 
                                               
8  Levinson (1994, 354, note 6) makes a similar suggestion pointing in the direction of 
objective beauty: ‘I believe that in their original and primary employment, in regard to 
visual objects or appearances, [“beautiful” and “ugly”] imply particular kinds of 
phenomenal impression (involving harmonious pleasingness, or the opposite thereof), and 
not simply approval or disapproval.’  
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capacity of the nature of ordinary perception, though sophisticated. But if we 
are to deal with art criticism (and perhaps also with the aesthetic experience 
and appreciation of natural landscapes, which Sibley’s considerations are to 
include), it seems that we have to account for the apparent fact that most 
aesthetic attributions refer ineliminably to the aesthetic value or beauty of what 
is being judged. This is an aspect that Sibley’s account explicitly neglects in his 
account of taste.9 So, for instance, Sibley’s view of taste cannot capture a crucial 
distinction between aesthetic properties (with an evaluative component) and 
the so-called secondary properties such as colour properties. But these are 
distinct in various ways. For instance, whereas to be able to attribute secondary 
qualities we need perception only, to attribute evaluative aesthetic qualities we 
seem to need also the participation of (appropriate) emotions.  
This difference can be seen in the apparent fact that some animals can 
discern colours, whereas only human beings can discern beauty (and moral 
properties). 10  Hume’s essay on the standard of taste makes clear how the 
discernment of literary beauty requires the participation of the ‘finer emotions 
of the mind’ (par. 10). The affective nature of aesthetic evaluations is something 
that Sibley does not consider in his account of taste, however. And his account 
does not contemplate either the fact that making more aesthetic discriminations 
                                               
9  See, for instance, Sibley ([1968] 2001, 71): ‘I deliberately ignore [...] questions about 
evaluation, though many assertions of the sorts I discuss are relevant to whether a work has 
merits or defects.’  
10 I am unable to say who else makes this contrast. 
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is not guarantee that we will be making an appropriate evaluation, whereas 
making more colour discriminations is always superior to making fewer colour 
discriminations11 (so it seems that colour discrimination is a matter of pure 
perception). When evaluating a work of art, someone might be paying attention 
to a myriad of irrelevant details and fail to appreciate the value of the work only 
because he has failed to notice (or neglected) the few details that were relevant. 
Recall the analogy I invoked earlier in Chapter 5 (p. 145), concerning the general 
evaluation of another person’s actions. Having the appropriate emotion 
towards the work in question seems to be a requirement for aesthetic 
apprehension, because it is, it seems, such emotion that guides one to perceive 
that which is relevant.  
McGinn (1983) is an author who makes clear this seeming disanalogy 
between values and secondary qualities by contrasting colour-blindness with 
value-blindness.12  Colour-blindness, McGinn claims, concerns ultimately the 
amount of (colour) discriminations that a person is capable of making, whereas 
a misevaluation by the value-blind ‘consists rather in assigning the wrong value 
to a situation’ (1983, 152), not necessarily in making fewer distinctions. 
Accordingly, a superior evaluation does not consist ‘in the ability merely to 
make more discriminations than others’ (ibid.), but in making the right ones (or 
better ones). So, McGinn’s view implies, whereas making more colour 
                                               
11 This contrast is also made by McGinn (1983, 152). See below. 
12 McGinn (1983, 151-152). McGinn is considering moral values only. 
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discriminations is never inadequate, because it always amounts to a finer colour 
discrimination, it might be inadequate to make too many evaluative 
discriminations.13  
Sibley’s notion of taste does not capture this contrast, or the evaluative, 
affective, nature of many (if not all) aesthetic attributions. In other words, Sibley 
implicitly treats aesthetic properties as ordinary, though more sophisticated, 
secondary properties. But Sibley’s notion of taste does bring, to realism, the 
conviction that the truth of aesthetic attributions is independent from 
convergence of judgement by a majority, since it acknowledges that aesthetic 
reality is discernible only to those whose perception is sufficiently sophisticated. 
Accordingly, his notion of taste also explains lack of convergence in a way that 
is compatible with, and perhaps promotes, aesthetic realism. So we should 
preserve the notion of taste, for it lets us understand why is it that sometimes 
aesthetic properties are elusive, without their reality being undermined by that 
apparent fact.     
 
 
6.2 Value-grounding properties 
 
                                               
13 McGinn (1983, 152). Cf. Hume’s ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ (par. 21): ‘to enable a critic the 
more fully to execute this undertaking, he must preserve his mind free from all prejudice, 
and allow nothing to enter into his consideration, but the very object which is submitted to 
his examination.’ 
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According to another strong proposal, aesthetic properties are ‘value-
grounding’ properties. Beardsley makes this proposal (1973; 1981).14 Beardsley  
(1973, 50) begins, explicitly, with realism about aesthetic properties: ‘I assume 
[...] that there are such things as aesthetic qualities (A-qualities), and that 
aesthetic attributions (e.g., ‘H’s recent sculptures have an air of ominousness’) 
are best construed as attributing such qualities to objects.’ In arguing for the 
objectivity of aesthetic properties, Beardsley considers the difficulty, for realism, 
of the ineliminable participation of the ‘perceiver’s emotional condition’ (1981, 
xxx) in aesthetic apprehension. His reply to this possible difficulty is that even 
though subjective (mental, emotional) factors do affect aesthetic perception, that 
does not imply that the presence of the aesthetic quality is dependent on that 
perception, so the subjective participation, per se, does not preclude the quality 
from being taken as ‘objective’. Beardsley deals with the objection in this 
passage:   
 
it is sometimes argued that whether you perceive restlessness in the painting, or 
how much of it you perceive, can be affected by your state of mind; if you 
happen to feel very laid back [...], a painting that is only slightly or moderately 
restless may strike you as greatly so. Then, restlessness is not to be considered a 
simple quality of the painting, but a quality it has relative to the perceiver’s 
emotional condition. Of course this particular argument is rather easily set aside, 
                                               
14 For a congenial proposal, see De Clercq (2008). 
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because we could say that although the perception of the quality may be affected 
by subjective factors, the presence is not affected. (1981, xxx. Emphasis in original) 
 
The crucial (realist) claim is that the presence of the quality in question is 
independent from any act of perception. For instance, we might experience the 
same literary work differently in different readings, and this should have no 
effect on the properties the work possesses. The aesthetic experience of reading 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet for the first time is of course different from the aesthetic 
experience of subsequent readings of the work. Yet we would not say that the 
work has different aesthetic properties in those different occasions: it is only 
that in each reading we notice different aspects.  
Accordingly, even though aesthetic feeling is subjective, aesthetic 
experience involves crucially also a discovery of ‘something phenomenally 
objective’, not merely a projection of the feelings of the viewer:15 
  
when I recall a tune [...], though the feeling of effort, or concentration, or 
satisfaction at success, is phenomenally part of myself as subject, the tune 
appears as something found, or made, and with its own individuality and self-
existence. [...] 
                                               
15 Later on in the book, when discussing beauty, Beardsley refers to the ‘objective’ definition 
of beauty thus: ‘beauty and the value that inheres in it are characteristics of the aesthetic 
object itself, quite independently of the way anyone feels about it.’ (1981, 512) 
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 When we say, therefore, that Debussy’s melody is sad, with an 
unutterably lost and hopeless sadness, we are again talking about something 
phenomenally objective, not about ourselves. (1981, 39) 
 
In considering the nature of aesthetic properties, Beardsley follows a proposal 
by Freedman 16  and suggests that aesthetic properties are ‘value-grounding 
qualities’ (1973, 62), that is ‘qualities that affect aesthetic value either positively 
or negatively’ (ibid.).  
Beardsley anticipates two objections to this view. One is the claim that 
‘any quality could be cited as a perfectly good reason for a value judgement’ 
(1973, 64). To this he replies by reformulating the proposal, saying that the 
property in question must count as a ground for aesthetic value ‘independently’, 
that is, ‘without the help of any other quality’ (ibid.). The second objection he 
considers is that some aesthetic predicates (such as, he suggests,  ‘languid’, 
‘calm’, ‘swaggering’, ‘grotesque’) seem to be neutral with respect to value. To 
this he replies that they are not properly value-neutral, but only variable in 
sense, or else vague (ibid.).  
 Beardsley (1973, 55) also mentions two problems in Sibley’s suggestion 
that aesthetic properties are those requiring taste or perceptual sensitivity. Both 
problems concern the thought that the criterion proposed to distinguish 
                                               
16 Beardsley quoting from Freedman (1968, 52): ‘The value-tending feature of B-predicates 
[corresponding to aesthetic properties] is not just an incidental and acquired feature, but is 
the distinguishing or defining feature of them.’ 
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aesthetic from non-aesthetic is not immune to counterexamples.17 Firstly, in 
order to distinguish (e.g.) shades of colours (Beardsley’s example) perceptual 
sensitivity is needed, and yet these are not, according to Sibley, aesthetic 
properties. See Beardsley: ‘it requires perceptual sensitivity to distinguish close 
shades of colors and subtle variations in the dynamics of music, or to notice 
difference between two slightly different ovals or harmonic progressions—and 
these are all NA-qualities’ (1973, 55). Secondly, some aesthetic properties are 
detected with no need for any special perceptual sensitivity.18  
Sibley could, perhaps, reply to these objections. First, when considering 
differences in shades of colours that require special sensitivity, he could take 
them to be aesthetic and include them in his account.19 Concerning the second 
objection, Sibley could also reply that for many (if not most) people the 
examples Beardsley gives20 are of properties that qualify as aesthetic. It is just 
that, for Beardsley, the sophistication required to grasp them is not noticed by 
him as special, arguably because it is so ingrained that it appears natural (or 
                                               
17 Kivy (1975) also objects to Sibley’s distinction: ‘it is usually said that “graceful” is an 
aesthetic term. Yet it seems false to say that applying the term “graceful” requires an ability 
beyond the capacities we think of as possessed by the “normal” person’ (1975, 199); and: 
‘aesthetic terms would not be the only ones that require for their application some talent 
beyond the “normal”. To apply terms in higher mathematics requires a talent that most 
“normal” people do not have.’ (ibid.)  
18 Beardsley’s example is this: ‘if he reports that the shapes in a late van Gogh seem to him 
tortured and tense, and that the finale of Beethoven’s D minor symphony is powerful, I 
don’t think we would want to say that he is “perceptive”.’(1973, 55) 
19 Eaton (1994, 386), for instance, claims also that ‘colour attributions can be aesthetic’. Sibley 
could perhaps accommodate this in his account: even though colours don’t generally 
require a special sensitivity to be discerned, in some cases the differences are very subtle—
and in those cases I think Sibley could say that the attributions are properly aesthetic. 
20 See note 18 above. 
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second nature) to him. As Sibley maintains, taste comes in degrees, and for a 
highly perceptive, aesthetically and artistically well-trained person, some 
aesthetic distinctions may indeed appear simple and straightforward, in a way 
that does not seem to involve the participation of taste.  
But Beardsley’s objections do point to something we also found wanting 
in Sibley’s account: the participation of emotion and the (related) evaluative 
dimension of aesthetic attributions, which a taste-based view of them leaves out. 
(Recall that Sibley’s interest was in a ‘kind of perception’ (2001, 34) rather than 
in art criticism. This might help to explain the conscious neglect of evaluation,21 
whereas for Beardsley the main endeavour of aesthetics is the theory of art 
criticism, in which the notion of aesthetic evaluation is crucial.)  
The major contribution of Beardsley’s proposal is, then, the restoration of 
attention to value. What his view does not capture entirely is the distinctively 
aesthetic nature of the value purported to be present in aesthetic properties: 
what kind of value is it that aesthetic properties ground? What is its basic 
nature? I can anticipate that the next proposal I will consider will not yet 
respond to these questions. 
 
 
6.3 Higher-order ways of appearing 
 
                                               
21 I am only claiming that Sibley neglects evaluation in his account of taste. 
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According to still another realist view, aesthetic properties are to be seen as 
‘higher-order ways of appearing’. This is the view championed by Levinson 
(1994; 2001; 2005). 22  Levinson’s view is clearly realist in that it holds that 
‘aesthetic attributions admit of being correct or incorrect because objects really 
do have or fail to have aesthetic properties’ (2005, 215). Aesthetic judgements 
are to be measured against the aesthetic world containing aesthetic properties, 
not against critics’ thought or feelings. Levinson’s distinctive proposal is that 
aesthetic properties are ‘higher-order ways of appearing’ (2005, 211). What are 
these? It seems to me that Levinson’s proposal is akin to Sibley’s, though with a 
metaphysical leaning: higher-order ways of appearing are manifest properties 
                                               
22  Levinson is the only author who explicitly addresses the purported metaphysical 
difference between properties and qualities (1978; 2006). According to Levinson, ‘attributes’ 
is the basic term for ‘the respects in which objects differ or are the same’ (1978, 1). But 
attributes, for Levinson, divide into two metaphysically distinct kinds: properties and 
qualities. According to Levinson (2006, 563), properties ‘are exemplified by being red, being 
heavy, being wise [...] and are standardly designated by gerundive expressions, most 
notably, ‘being___’.’ They are conditions, ‘being-a-certain-way’ (1978, 1). And they are 
‘indivisible, non-partitionable things’ (2006, 563). Qualities, by contrast, are ‘stuffs’, ‘seem to 
admit of quantization’ (1978, 10), and are ‘standardly designated by expressions formed 
from adjectives by appending certain suffixes’ (1978, 11). They are ‘exemplified by redness, 
heaviness, wisdom’ (2006, 563). For Levinson the difference between properties and 
qualities is not simply grammatical: ‘It is my contention that “being blue” and “blueness” 
designate distinct entities’ (1978, 10). Levinson, however, somehow deflates the distinction 
when he claims that the two are very closely related: ‘Of course a quality and the 
corresponding property are closely connected. As a rule, they will be coinstantiated; if an 
object has a certain condition (property) it will possess some related abstract stuff (quality) 
and vice versa.’ (1978, 11) Given that when one is present the other is present too (they are 
‘coinstantiated’), it is natural to conflate the two terms, as referring to slightly the same 
thing. Levinson himself occasionally calls his qualities ‘properties’ at least in his (2005), an 
article on ‘aesthetic properties’: first, he refers to ‘delicacy’ (2005, 219), to ‘gracefulness’ and 
‘garishness’ (2005, 222); then he more clearly conflates properties and qualities: ‘aesthetic 
properties such as gracefulness and garishness’ (2005, 223); ‘unity, or dynamism, or fluidity’ 
(2005, 224); and clearly again he calls his qualities ‘properties’: ‘aesthetic properties such as 
human beauty and ugliness’ (ibid.). I take the two alternative ways of invoking aesthetic 
attributes as equivalent, at least for our current purposes. 
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(the properties that figure in common-sense accounts of phenomena, as 
opposed to those cited in scientific theories), though of a special kind. They 
contain, Levinson maintains (2001), a descriptive component and an evaluative 
component. For Levinson, only the descriptive component, which constitutes 
the ‘core’ of an aesthetic property, is to be reckoned objective.23  
 Not surprisingly, the difficulties with Levinson’s proposal are similar to 
the ones we found in Sibley’s. First, it is not entirely clear what distinguishes 
aesthetic from non-aesthetic attributions: it seems that aesthetic attributions 
refer to features which require a finer perception, but it is not left clear where 
the frontier between them is. Second, the evaluative component, which seems 
essential to many (if not all) aesthetic attributions, is not taken into account. The 
merits of the proposal are visible, too: the inclusion of properties which are not 
simply phenomenal (or ‘manifest’) properties helps to explain aesthetic 
experience as a higher-order endeavour in perception (2005, 215), akin to 
Sibley’s explanation of aesthetic attributions based on sophisticated perception 
or taste. And the view makes sense also of art critics’ discourse as being about 
something in reality: more precisely, something of a higher-order sort. In a 
footnote, Levinson even claims that all aesthetic properties are ‘value-relevant 
properties, that is, perceivable properties it is at least prima facie intelligible to 
cite in support of aesthetic evaluations.’ (2005, 218, note 11). This footnote points, 
                                               
23 So, despite what he claims in (1994, 354, note 6—cf. note 8 above), according to his 
account beauty cannot be objective. 
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it seems to me, in the right direction when it emphasizes that aesthetic 
properties concern, in some important sense, the aesthetic value of works of art. 
Unfortunately, Levinson does not develop this idea any further. 
 
 
6.4 Desire-mediated properties 
 
Zemach’s proposal (1997) is distinctive in recommending a desire-based realist 
view of aesthetic properties. According to Zemach, aesthetic properties are 
observed when non-aesthetic properties are seen through desire (more precisely, 
through a ‘cognitive desire’). 24,25 And ‘aesthetic properties are features of things 
as they are in themselves’ (1997, 95). 
The account is realist because it holds that the truth of an aesthetic 
judgement depends on the (aesthetic) properties of the object, whereas an anti-
realist account would ‘maintain that aesthetic predicates describe attitudes or 
feelings of subjects’ (1997, 74).26 Moreover, Zemach’s account also preserves the 
realist intuition that aesthetic reality can be, and possibly sometimes is, beyond 
actual knowledge: aesthetic properties are grasped via desire, but no amount of 
cognitive desire will make an object have an aesthetic property if the property is 
                                               
24 Cf. Zemach (1997, 106): ‘an aesthetic property—a degree of unified significance—is a non-
aesthetic property when viewed through the medium of desire.’  
25 Zemach (1997, 105). 
26 See also Zemach (1997, 70). 
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not present. Furthermore, (and this is another feature of any realist account) 
what we happen to know of aesthetic reality is probably not all that there is to 
know: reality might transcend, and it plausibly transcends, actual knowledge. 
Another equally realist claim of his is that aesthetic properties do not depend on 
particular aesthetic attributions, so that a world with no human beings would 
still possess (unperceived, unjudged, unappreciated) aesthetic properties: 
‘[e]ven a lifeless world has aesthetic features, to wit, those that would be 
ascribed to it by an expert observing it under SOC’ (1997, 61). 27 In other words, 
too, aesthetic reality does not depend on aesthetic judgement.  
 The account Zemach promotes is new in that it gives unusual primacy to 
the aesthetic realm. Zemach (1997) suggests that, ‘whatever other properties the 
real world has, it has aesthetic properties too’ (1997, 68), and also that 
‘phenomenal terms are ineliminable from any empirical account of reality’ (1997, 
63). One of his main claims was that ‘[s]cience is constrained by aesthetic 
criteria’ (1997, 110): scientific theories are to be judged by their elegance and 
simplicity (among other virtues); elegance and simplicity are aesthetic 
properties; if progress in science is explained by the fact that aesthetic 
constraints are not entirely ‘irrelevant’ (1997, 110), then perhaps aesthetic 
properties are objective properties of reality.  
 The account is also radical for the same reason: the aesthetic realm is seen 
as basic. It is sometimes claimed that science provides the standard for what 
                                               
27 ‘SOC’ stands for ‘standard observation conditions.’ 
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there is. Zemach claims, on the contrary, that whatever else exists, aesthetic 
reality exists, since ‘a world that is unamenable to aesthetic valuation’ (1997, 68) 
is inconceivable. So,  ‘Even if there is no color or sound in the world, even if 
motion, space, and time do not exist, even if reality satisfies no predicate of our 
science, it must satisfy the aesthetic predicates’ (1997, 68). The novelty of 
Zemach’s approach is, also, in the recommendation of an account that is at odds 
with the widespread Kantian view that beauty (and aesthetic matters in general) 
require ‘disinterested’ apprehension. 28  Zemach is opposed to this view and 
makes clear that a disinterested mind (something that he finds difficult even to 
conceive) would grasp no aesthetic properties whatsoever. It is perhaps worth 
quoting the relevant passage: 
 
A mind that has no interests can discern nonaesthetic phenomenal properties, 
say, see X as blue, but it cannot see things aesthetically, that is, as having 
aesthetic properties. Aesthetic properties appear only to those whose seeing is 
modulated by desire. [...] 
When a real thing X impacts on a perceptual system, the latter presents 
X’s primary properties as modulated and modified by the system’s specific 
nature. The result is a phenomenal object having secondary properties: X’s 
                                               
28 Zemach claims: ‘Were we to look at things as Kant’s aesthetics says we should, that is, to 
bracket our desire and observe things as covered by Rawl’s veil of ignorance, abstracting 
from what they mean to us, we could discern no aesthetic properties in nature, and art 
would be impossible.’ (1997, 105) This might not be entirely fair with respect to Kant’s view, 
however. What Kant suggests, in my reading of him at least, is, rather, that aesthetic 
apprehension must not have other interests (that is, interests other than aesthetic ones). 
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properties as rendered by the system. A tertiary property results when yet 
another mental system further modulates a secondary property. That additional 
system is, I say, desire. (1997, 103) 
 
If Zemach’s account is correct, then we can understand what was missing in 
Sibley’s account of aesthetic reality, for according to Zemach’s proposal, it is 
clear that perception, no matter how sophisticated, is not sufficient for aesthetic 
apprehension. What Zemach (1997, 105) calls a ‘cognitive desire’ is also required. 
And we can also see what is not included either in Levinson’s proposal: 
Levinson excludes from his consideration, too, the evaluative component of 
aesthetic attributions, since he claims that the core of an aesthetic term is a 
descriptive core. Furthermore, Zemach’s proposal has the advantage of 
accounting for the subjective contribution in aesthetic perception, without 
falling into anti-realism. Zemach thus keeps aesthetic reality objective,29 whilst 
admitting that aesthetic properties require not only sentient but also feeling and 
desiring human beings in order to be fully grasped. In other words, his main 
contribution is to claim that aesthetic realism is not undermined by the fact that 
the grasp of aesthetic properties requires the participation of appropriate 
emotions. My aim in the next section is to develop this idea a little more. 
 
 
                                               
29 Zemach’s realist project, at least, is made clear: ‘let us now get to work: show the objective 
reality of the aesthetic properties.’ (1997, 56) 
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6.5 ‘Through loving spectacles’ 
 
We should now recall the metaphor introduced earlier in Chapter 2 30 
concerning seeing the work of an artist ‘through loving spectacles’. We should 
add now, to the realist proposals discussed above, the epistemological 
suggestion that aesthetic properties are phenomenal properties whose 
distinctive value and significance is to be detected ‘through loving spectacles’.31 
Something akin to this participation of positive emotions in the grasp of 
aesthetic properties is already implicit in Zemach’s account: ‘We interpret 
formal traits empathically’ (1997, 105). My claim is, more precisely, that 
aesthetic properties prompt, and require, admiration, or a form of love: those 
incapable of feeling such emotions will be unable to detect aesthetic properties. 
This evaluative (affective) nature of aesthetic properties, also implied in 
Beardsley’s account, helps explaining why some animals are capable of 
discerning colour, but only humans are capable of discerning aesthetic (and 
moral) properties.  
The realist accounts we considered can indeed be seen as complementary, 
and I build on all of them. Beardsley and Zemach note the ‘loving’ (evaluating, 
                                               
30 Cf. Chapter 2, p. 67, note 24. 
31 My aim is not to reduce aesthetic properties to something else—to define them in non-
aesthetic terms—but only to see them under a possible (hopefully also plausible) 
description. For a congenial approach to aesthetic experience, making the distinctive 
suggestion that aesthetic appreciation is a matter of ‘friendship’ and that critics and 
interpreters of works of art can be construed as ‘friends of interpretable objects’, see Tamen 
(2001). (For a definition of aesthetic properties in non-aesthetic terms, see De Clercq 2002). 
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admiring) aspect I also wish to emphasize of aesthetic apprehension. On the 
other side, Sibley and Levinson bring the ‘perceiving’ component into focus, 
and they thereby note the ‘contemplative’ element needed for appropriate 
aesthetic judgement, according to realism. My proposal is to combine elements 
of the two broad approaches, and claim that aesthetic properties can be seen as 
typically requiring not only sophisticated perception or taste (since they are to be 
conceived as higher-order, finer, features of reality), but also that aesthetic 
perception is perception focused on beauty or aesthetic value.32,33,34 The result of 
this combination is an understanding of aesthetic thought and discourse which 
emphasizes both apprehension and appreciation (other cognate designations of 
this pair of notions would be ‘understanding’ and ‘evaluation’).35,36 
                                               
32 In effect, sophisticated perception is not always needed in aesthetic apprehension: some 
aesthetic features are grasped easily by almost anyone (so, pace Sibley, elusiveness is not an 
essential feature of aesthetic properties). Still, and especially with respect to art, aesthetic 
apprehension indeed usually requires a finer perception. 
33 For the claim that Mothersill’s account (1984) has the merit of emphasizing and promoting 
the centrality of beauty in aesthetics, see Zemach (1987). 
34 I should make one note on terminology. I take ‘beauty’ and ‘aesthetic value’ as synonyms, 
denoting a kind of good, following Mothersill (1992) both in the account and in the caution. 
As Mothersill has noted (1992, 45), sometimes it is thought that ‘beauty’ is not the most 
appropriate term since it may suggest ‘something mildly pleasing and non-strenuous’. But 
as Mothersill also adds (ibid.), ‘aesthetic value’ is also problematic: ‘beauty is a good, so 
“value” is appropriate, but what do you say about “aesthetic”?’ 
35 The recommendation of an emphasis on ‘appreciation’ (in particular concerning the less 
obvious case of literature) is made by Lamarque, apparently (I am relying on Lamarque’s 
claims in lectures) after Olsen (supposedly his 1987). See, for instance, Lamarque (2007, 
passim). Cf. Olsen (1987, 152): ‘To say that the appropriate mode of apprehension of a 
literary work is appreciation is to suggest that this appreciation is in an important respect 
comparable to the appreciation of wine, of scenic or other beauty, rather than comparable to 
the understanding of an utterance, a sentence, or a physical event.’ 
36 For a congenial conflation of understanding and appreciation, see Kivy (1975, 210): ‘To 
describe something in aesthetic terms is to describe it; but it is also to savor it at the same 
time: to run it over your tongue and lick your lips; to “investigate” its pleasurable 
possibilities.’ For Kivy this is the reason why ‘aesthetic descriptions are “terminal”, [...] they 
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In particular, the account I recommend is meant to explain positive 
aesthetic judgements, which are understood as capturing the fact that a work 
(or whatever is being judged) is admirable, i.e. it can be seen as valuable 
aesthetically. And ‘aesthetically’ means ‘as beautiful’ (‘as possessing aesthetic 
value’). 
One concern someone might express with respect to this proposal is that 
by bringing in the notion of appreciation and love we fall into anti-realism. But I 
believe the account I am recommending is fundamentally realist, for various 
reasons. Firstly, and crucially, it does not claim that aesthetic properties are 
projected onto works, but that they are discerned in them, when aesthetic vision 
(admiration) is possible and appropriate. (So, it might be important to note, this 
view allows us to explain why immoral works fail to be beautiful: admiration is 
not appropriate in those cases.)37 What the account I suggest calls attention to is 
the requirement of a form of love or admiration in aesthetic apprehension: a 
feeling of affection and a positive attitude towards a work is required for 
aesthetic properties to be grasped. The account does not ignore the perceptual 
component, however. This account makes sense of the fact, noted by Hume in 
the essay on taste, that ‘[w]e choose our favourite author as we do our friend, 
from a conformity of humour and disposition.’ (par. 29). But this does not 
                                                                                                                                    
lead nowhere’; they provide ‘no reason for anything except continued contemplation.’ (1975, 
211) 
37 This sugestion is also made by Scruton with respect to the aesthetic judgement of works of 
art (2009, 99): ‘When it comes to art, aesthetic judgement concerns what you ought and 
ought not to like, and (I shall argue) the “ought” here [...] has a moral weight.’ 
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undermine the claim that there is a cognitive element in aesthetic experience: it 
is an experience of apprehension as well. The account helps also explaining why 
the relevance of aspects of the author’s biography for aesthetic judgement 
remains unchallenged.38 In particular, we cannot be a friend of a work39 if its 
author is our enemy, namely if we have strong moral objections against him. It 
is, then, inevitable on this account that moral considerations play a role in 
aesthetic apprehension, at least by excluding the aspects we cannot morally 
admire: positive affection and attitude is rendered impossible in cases of works 
promoting immoral ways of life.40 The account remains realist in that it is the 
work’s nature that allows for admiration or aversion in its apprehension, and a 
positive or negative aesthetic judgement of a work is still a genuine judgement, 
identifying the properties of the work (or at least nothing tells us otherwise), 
even though the identification of those properties requires the participation of 
appropriate emotions.  
Secondly, according to the account I am suggesting, aesthetic reality is 
still conceived as independent from, and transcending, particular judgements. 
Giovanni Bellini’s St. Francis in the Desert mentioned earlier would be delicate 
                                               
38 Of course, the extent to which biographical information matters aesthetically is open to 
dispute. 
39 I am here invoking the germane metaphor (of friendship) developed by Tamen (2001). 
40 As we shall see in the next paragraph, it is not only immoral attitudes represented or 
promoted in a work that prevent aesthetic appreciation: for instance a personal aversion to 
religion may prevent me from admiring religious paintings, for instance.  
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and mysterious even if no one would ever find it so.41 (The same could be said, 
it seems to me, with respect to general merit claims and what they mean: 
Augustine’s Confessions would be no less valuable (admirable) as a work of 
literature if the entire world would cease to admire the work, for instance due 
to a global aversion to religion, or to a global aversion to the Christian religion, 
which would probably prevent a sympathetic, admiring reading). So, the 
account I am recommending remains realist also in conceiving of aesthetic 
reality as independent of, and plausibly transcending, actual knowledge and 
judgement of it. 
Thirdly, according to this account aesthetic judgements are to be judged 
against the world. Works have, not only the properties we are able to identify, 
but also those that remain unjudged. And our aesthetic judgements are true or 
false depending only on those properties that works have, judged or unjudged. 
If we believe that the aesthetic properties of a work are seen in the aesthetic 
experiences that such work can afford (not only the ones the work actually 
affords), then we can simply expect that some of those possible experiences 
remain unexplored and, accordingly, that some of a work’s aesthetic properties 
remain unjudged. 
What the realism I advocate emphasizes is that the ‘admiring’ attitude 
apparently necessary for aesthetic contemplation can be accommodated by both 
                                               
41 Also, just as there might be aspects of reality which (happen to) remain forever unknown 
to us, according to realism there might be works of art (natural landscapes, etc.) which 
remain forever unjudged. 
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realist and anti-realist accounts (so a fortiori it does not undermine realism). This 
attitude, according to the realist, is directed at something in the world and, 
more importantly, it is the appropriate way to know (to become acquainted 
with) a portion of the world. So disagreements concerning what is or is not 
aesthetically ‘admirable’ are, at least sometimes, genuine disagreements, as 
opposed to being merely (faultless) contrasts of preferences. This is therefore a 
clearly realist project, one concerning the existence of an objective aesthetic 
reality, which nevertheless recognizes and includes the subjective (‘admiring’) 
element also apparently inherent in aesthetic contemplation. 
 Another concern someone might express is that admiration is not always 
the proper emotion required to engage with works of art. Some works prompt 
negative emotions, such as disgust, rage, indignation, sadness, etc. But we can 
perhaps reply to this by saying that there is ultimately an attitude of admiration 
(an ‘aesthetic attitude’) 42  which guides, invites and rewards our attention 
towards the artistic achievement which the work embodies, even in works 
inviting negative emotions: positive admiration (the aesthetic attitude) is 
directed, at bottom, at the achievement.  
It might be objected that some works are not great achievements by 
universal standards: they are not admirable simpliciter. But we can reply to this 
concern by saying that it may be necessary to construe the work within a 
                                               
42 This is also the central feature of Beardsley’s aesthetic conception of art. See Beardsley 
([1983] 2004, 58): ‘An artwork is something produced with the intention of giving it the 
capacity to satisfy an aesthetic interest.’   
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‘category’,43 and in certain cases charity might be needed, as when the work is 
an aesthetic achievement only if we consider e.g. the conditions under which it 
was produced (as opposed to an achievement which is an achievement by any 
standards). For instance, Ovid’s poetry of exile ought to be ranked inferior to 
the Metamorphoses, as a literary achievement tout court, but if read as poetry of 
exile it can be seen as a great poetic accomplishment given its sincerity, 
expressiveness and emotional depth. It is also astonishing how modern some of 
those poems are. 44  So in the end, when the work is properly construed, 
admiration towards its features is in the background, and it is admiration, I 
claim, what guides the reader.   
Consider another example in this respect. The poem sometimes known 
as ‘Lines: “I Am”’ (often simply called ‘I Am’), by the English poet John Clare, 
was written in 1846, during the years in which Clare was an inmate of the 
Northampton General Lunatic Asylum.45 The poem reads as follows:46 
 
I am—yet what I am, none cares or knows; 
My friends forsake me like a memory lost: 
I am the self-consumer of my woes— 
They rise and vanish in oblivion’s host 
Like shadows in love-frenzied stifled throes— 
And yet I am, and live—like vapours tossed 
 
                                               
43 On the now classical suggestion that works of art must be seen within a ‘category’, see 
Walton ([1970], 2004). 
44 For two good translations (for the modern reader) of Ovid’s poetry of exile, see Ovid 
(1990) and Ovid (2005). My preference is for Ovid (1990). 
45 For an excellent biography of Clare, see Bate (2003). 
46 I use Bate’s edition of the poem, in Clare (2004, 282). 
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Into the nothingness of scorn and noise, 
Into the living sea of waking dreams 
Where there is neither sense of life or joys 
But the vast shipwreck of my life's esteems; 
Even the dearest, that I love the best 
Are strange—nay, rather, stranger than the rest. 
 
I long for scenes where man hath never trod, 
A place where woman never smiled or wept, 
There to abide with my Creator, God, 
And sleep as I in childhood sweetly slept, 
Untroubling and untroubled where I lie, 
The grass below—above the vaulted sky. 
 
 
When we read the poem, there are many aesthetic (literary) possibilities47 we 
can explore, that is, there are various aspects we can consider which can be seen 
as sources of positive literary interest and value in the poem. However, we can 
also detect various flaws. For instance, the subject, as portrayed, overtly shows 
self-pity and is too emotional towards himself: ‘yet what I am, none cares or 
knows’ (l.1); ‘I am the self-consumer of my woes’ (l.3). Furthermore, there are 
also references to the subject which might appear too emphatic (‘And yet I am, 
and live’, l.6), and references to God which might seem too unsubtle: ‘There to 
abide with my Creator, God’ (l.15). So it is possible, if we want, to dismiss the 
poem as sentimental, artless, uncritical or naïve. But this would be to 
misrepresent the facts and in any case to throw the baby out with the bath water. 
The facts misrepresented include not only what is written in the poem but also 
its author’s circumstances: Clare’s condition of being confined to an asylum 
                                               
47 Cf. Kivy (1975, 210) and note 36 above. 
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(possibly medicated?), of having only a few books with him, of being mentally 
impaired, of being only minimally literate, of having a limitted supply of paper, 
etc. The poetic achievement is to be measured against the conditions of 
production as well. When we take all those aspects into consideration, we are 
free to contemplate, and admire, its merits. We can then see how candid, 
powerful and suggestive the poem is; how figures of repetition (especially 
alliteration) are both emotionally charged, and subtle: ‘And sleep as I in 
childhood sweetly slept, / Untroubling and untroubled where I lie’ (ll. 16-17). 
How rhyme is finally effective: ‘The grass below—above the vaulted sky.’ (l. 18). 
In this reading we are forgiving the flaws. It is that forgiveness that allows us to 
see the genuine merits of the poem. We can see48 how well the poem expresses 
the subject’s desire for peace and quietness; we notice how neatly is introduced 
in the poem the paradox of feeling lonely, abandoned, and at the same time of 
wishing to be left alone (with God); we observe how subtly the Romantic image 
of happiness and absence of concerns associated with childhood is suggested: 
‘And sleep as I in childhood sweetly slept’ (l. 16). In short, we explore the 
poem’s positive possibilities,49 that we can admire, and we can do this partly by 
forgetting, or forgiving, the poem’s aesthetic flaws.50 
                                               
48 The following three comments are made (with modifications) by Joshua (2008, 67-70). 
49 Cf. Kivy (1975, 210) and note 36 above. 
50 Note that one criticism often made of (some) avant-garde art is its apparent lack of skill: 
some people say ‘A 6-year-old could do that’. The accusation is that the work in question is 
not an achievement (arguably an aesthetic achievement), and so that it is not admirable as 
such. These accusations thus still depend on the claim that I am exploring: that art is to be 
an aesthetic achievement (calling for admiration on that account).  
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 It seems, then, that the suggestion that we aesthetically contemplate 
works of art by looking at them through loving spectacles is on the right lines, by 
capturing the cognitive and the evaluative (affective) component of aesthetic 
experience. The aesthetic properties of works are, according to realism, there to 
be detected (or to remain unnoticed) when we engage in aesthetic experience. 
Rather than noting their pleasure-related nature (which I do not deny) I have, 
like Tamen (2001), focused on the admiration which seems to be in place in 
aesthetic apprehension.  
My implicit contention was also that such aesthetic ‘admirability’ is, at 
the bottom, what distinguishes works of art: it is their aesthetic admirability 
(admirability based on their beauty) that in essence distinguishes works of art. 
Works are included in the ‘artworld’ not by arbitrary stipulation, but because 
they can be regarded as, or are thought to be, valuable (admirable) in a specific 
way, namely aesthetic. 51  Their ultimate nature, as works of art, is not 
institutional, but aesthetic. Ideally, then, all works included in the artworld 
would be aesthetically valuable. 
 
 
                                               
51 Beardsley ([1983] 2004, 58) describes an experience with an ‘aesthetic character’ thus: ‘it 
takes on a sense of freedom from concern about matters outside the thing received, an 
intense affect that is nevertheless detached from practical ends, the exhilarating sense of 
exercising powers of discovery, integration of the self and its experiences. When experience 
has some or all of these properties, I say it has an aesthetic character’. My view is not 
incompatible with Beardsley’s, but, rather like Mothersill’s (see note 56 below), it 
understands the aesthetic as related to beauty or aesthetic value. 
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6.6 Including beauty 
 
I should now turn to one aspect of aesthetic realism which requires decision. 
How should the aesthetic realist regard beauty? Zemach (1997, 111) readily 
admits beauty into his realist account. Beauty is clearly at the centre of his 
realist interest: ‘If cleaving to beauty [...] is a good guide to empirical adequacy, 
then perhaps beauty is an objective feature of reality.’ The contrast Zemach 
makes is between more general and more specific predicates, considered in a 
continuum: 
 
grade aesthetic predicates by their generality, from specific predicates to the 
most general ones. The most general aesthetic predicates are ’beautiful’ 
and ’ugly‘; they inform us of the total aesthetic value of a thing without saying 
how, in what way, that thing has that value. Low in generality 
are ’gaudy‘, ’vulgar‘, ’dainty‘, ’coarse‘, ’tragic‘, ’graceful‘, ’dramatic‘, etc.; they 
too are value-laden predicates, but give a more detailed view of the object that 
has them. (1997, 103) 
 
What Zemach was trying to do was to explain how an ‘aesthetic object is […] a 
desire-mediated phenomenon’ (1997, 103). But we can also read the passage as 
showing the above predicates as a unified class. What unifies these predicates 
(besides their desire-mediated nature) is their informative aspect, according to 
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Zemach: the most general ones convey the ‘total aesthetic value’ believed to be 
present, whereas the most specific ones say ‘how, in what way’ a certain thing 
possesses aesthetic value. So they are all taken as referring to something in the 
world. But other authors, such as, for instance, Levinson, are sceptical about the 
objectivity of the ‘evaluative component’ of aesthetic attributions, thereby 
apparently leaving out a ‘solely evaluative’ property such as beauty.52 What is 
the best decision? Should we include or exclude the most general evaluative 
properties? Zemach, by taking general aesthetic predicates to be informative, 
suggests that beauty is not a mere voicing of approval: something seems to be 
claimed of reality in a judgement of beauty. But, as Moore has observed,53 there 
seems to be an intuitive difference between properties and values (which, for 
Moore, are not properties). Moore is analysing the notion of an ‘intrinsic’ value, 
and he ends by contrasting it with an intrinsic property. In his words: ‘I can 
only vaguely express the kind of difference I feel there to be by saying that 
intrinsic properties seem to describe the intrinsic nature of what possesses them 
in a sense in which predicates of value never do.’ (1960, 274)  
 Moore grants, though, the objective existence of intrinsic value, which 
means: ‘To say, of “beauty” or “goodness” that they are “intrinsic” is only [...] to 
say that this thing which is obviously true of “yellowness” and “blueness” and 
“redness” is true of them.’ (1960, 269) The value in question does belong, 
                                               
52 Even though Levinson also claims the opposite: see note 8 above. 
53 Moore ([1922] 1960).  
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according to Moore, to the object, so that an exact duplicate will possess it to the 
same degree: ‘What is meant [by saying of such a predicate as “beautiful” that it 
is “intrinsic”] is just that if A is beautiful and B is not you could know a priori 
that A and B are not exactly alike.’ (1960, 271)   
 But the also intuitive distinction which Moore makes, between values 
and properties, leaves us in doubt as to whether it is appropriate to include 
beauty among the aesthetic properties. On the one hand, beauty would be the 
aesthetic property par excellence—the most basic one—denoted by the most 
general aesthetic judgements (as Zemach takes it to be). But, on the other hand, 
the claim that the predicate ‘is beautiful’ lacks descriptive content points in the 
opposite direction. It is uncertain whether this lack is suggested by the (frequent) 
uncommitted use of the term: we often or at least sometimes use ‘is beautiful’ as 
a way of voicing mere pleasingness. It is left open whether the predicate can be 
taken more seriously as referring to an objective feature of things. It seems that 
aesthetic realism is compatible with both of these options.  
I think we should make a stronger claim, however. It seems to me that, 
pace Moore, it is best to include beauty among the aesthetic properties. The 
reasons for this choice concern, firstly, at least two unwelcome implications I 
think follow from a separated (non-unified) view of aesthetic properties—the 
view that beauty should have a distinct ontological status from the more 
specific aesthetic properties. One implication could be put in this way. If we 
accept aesthetic realism, we claim that aesthetic judgements make genuine 
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attributions of properties, and (accordingly) that our judgements are to be 
measured against something in reality: the aesthetic realist claims that ‘X is 
balanced’ is true (or false) depending entirely on the (aesthetic) nature of X, not 
at all on the critic’s feelings towards X, even if feelings are necessary to judge 
the balanced nature of X. What the unified account proposes is only that, if any 
aesthetic properties (such as being elegant, being garish, being delicate) are 
taken as real, then being beautiful should be treated no differently, this meaning 
that ‘X is beautiful’ is true (or false) also depending entirely on the (aesthetic) 
nature of X, not at all on the critic’s feelings towards X.  
Those suggesting a separate view for beauty could perhaps say that ‘X is 
beautiful’ is entirely evaluative (as opposed to being descriptive), and that this 
would be a reason to reject beauty as an objective property of things, whereas ‘X 
is balanced’ includes both an evaluative component and a descriptive 
component, so that it is an objective judgement insofar as it contains the 
descriptive component. But it is not obvious, to begin with, that ‘is beautiful’ is 
not descriptive, at least in the sense that some things are, some are not, beautiful. 
Furthermore, eliminating beauty on the basis of its evaluative nature would 
require that we eliminate, also, the evaluative component of all the other 
aesthetic properties, a component which seems intrinsic to many (if not all) of 
them, and intrinsic in particular to their aesthetic nature. In other words, the 
elimination of evaluative properties, or of the evaluative component of aesthetic 
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properties, seems problematic, and so does the separate ontological treatment of 
beauty by the aesthetic realist. 
 Another (related) unwelcome implication would be this. We have seen 
that realism about aesthetic properties is attractive partly as an explanation of 
aesthetic thought and discourse: realism acknowledges that aesthetic thought 
and discourse is an exercise in apprehension; and it recognises also that 
aesthetic thought and discourse is directed at beauty or aesthetic value (it is an 
exercise in evaluation.) So if we accept realism about aesthetic properties but 
reject realism about beauty, we decline the explanation which says that general 
aesthetic judgements, too, can be an exercise in apprehension; and we also need 
to explain what sort of distinct evaluative activity is involved in those 
judgements (of beauty) that is not an exercise in apprehension. (So the unified 
account is also to be promoted as simple. According to the alternative, separate 
view, beauty, in contrast with the other aesthetic properties, is not a genuine 
property of reality. We can, then, ask the following: why would [being] 
balanced explain the judgement which says that ‘X is balanced’ whereas [being] 
beautiful would not be explanatory? It seems that we need reasons motivating 
the separate treatment.) 
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We should, then, at least consider counting beauty among the aesthetic 
properties contemplated by aesthetic realism.54 The inclusion of beauty both 
helps to explain the normativity of even the most general aesthetic judgements, 
and it makes sense, in a simple way, of the aesthetic nature of art. For better or 
for worse, in what it accepts and in what it rejects within its limits, art is to be 
conceived as intrinsically related to beauty.55,56 There are possible objections to 
this claim, but I think they can be answered. For example, someone might say 
that conceptual art is not aesthetic, or more precisely, it is not to be judged 
aesthetically. But I think even conceptual art can be accommodated in an 
aesthetic theory of art, as opposed to an institutional one: it is to count as art, 
not because it is included in the ‘artworld’ (to use Danto’s phrase), but it is 
(eventually) included in the artworld because it has, or is thought to have, 
aesthetic value, even when it appears to be anti-aesthetic. Its aesthetic value 
need not be discernible in perceptual properties: literature already teaches that 
aesthetic properties might be intellectual rather than strictly perceptual.57 It can 
be discernible either in a performance or in an idea (etc.) which embodies the 
                                               
54 This need not mean that beauty and the other aesthetic properties would have to behave 
similarly in every respect. Lamarque (2001, 106) suggests, for instance, that beauty may not 
be an essential property of works of art. I seek neutrality on this issue. 
55 Lamarque (2002, 142) makes what I think is a congenial claim, with respect to the identity 
conditions of works of art: ‘evaluative matters will turn out to be crucial in the delineation 
of identity conditions for works.’ (Lamarque, however, does not endorse an aesthetic theory 
of art). 
56 This aesthetic conception of art contrasts with the widespread institutional theory of art 
championed by Danto and Dickie. For an outline of an aesthetic theory of art, see Beardsley 
([1983] 2004). Another author who defends an aesthetic theory of art, in particular claiming 
that ‘Works of art are man-made items that are pre-eminently beautiful’, is Mothersill (1992, 
51). 
57 Sibley’s original list also includes these (e.g., ‘a poem is tightly-knit’ in [1959] 2001, 1). 
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work. The same can be said about ‘ready-mades’. As we have seen earlier in 
Chapter 3, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain (granting again that we can take it 
seriously as art) can be said to contain aesthetic properties not in virtue of the 
perceptual properties of the object which embodies the idea, but in virtue of the 
decision (the idea) of its author in converting an ugly or at least ordinary object 
into a work of art. So the notion of the aesthetic is still operative, even if the 
work appears as a rejection that art must be beautiful. In the case of Fountain, 
the author’s decision and performance—where the work is, apparently, 
located—may well be seen as provocative, disturbing, challenging and perhaps 
also powerful. Whether it is good art will depend, according to the aesthetic 
theory, on whether the properties that the work (not just the physical object) has 
are, in the context, aesthetically valuable, that is, whether the work invites and 
rewards aesthetic attention. So in the end the notion of the aesthetic is still 
present. The value might reside partly in its novelty: posterior works converting 
(equally or similarly) ordinary objects into works of art may lack the value 
Fountain can be said to have, just like pictorial or literary or musical works 
following an artistic movement or school certainly are (other things being equal) 
less valuable than those that inaugurate that artistic movement or school. What 
is certain, at least for the aesthetic realist endorsing the aesthetic theory of art, is 
that works of art must possess some form of aesthetic value, or beauty. In short, 
again, the artworld’s choices are not arbitrary: in an ideal world the artworld 
would include only aesthetically valuable works. 
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To those still suspicious of an aesthetic approach, and perhaps more 
inclined to choose an institutional theory of art, we could say the following. 
Firstly, and as Beardsley claims ([1983] 2004), the institutional conception 
cannot capture the apparent fact that artistic activity is (or can be) previous to its 
becoming an institution. Beardsley’s claim ([1983] 2004, 56) is more precisely 
that ‘we should want our definitions to leave open the possibility of new forms 
of artistic activity appearing before they become encompassed by institutions.’ 
It seems that the institutional theory does not allow for works of art previous or 
posterior to institutional recognition, and this might seem unnatural (think of 
e.g. buried works of art, which are to remain unrecognized). We should want 
our definitions to encompass value, and in particular the apparent fact that 
what gives works of art their value is (the realist claims) their qualities, 
irrespective of whether they will be recognized. Moreover, it is odd to suppose 
that artists’ activity consists fundamentally in producing items to be included in 
an institution, rather than aiming at producing items which might have the 
interest that works of art seem to have, namely aesthetic interest (‘aesthetic’ to 
be understood as related to beauty). 
What is also being rejected is that the notion of a work of art (and its 
value) is comparable to the case of a piece of chess58 which gains its value by 
stipulation. For the aesthetic theory the value of works of art is certainly not 
                                               
58 This example (included in an account of the institutional theory of art applied to literature) 
is offered by Lamarque (2009, 61). 
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based on stipulation, but on qualities agreed to be of aesthetic interest, or 
beauty (even in cases of works that defy an aesthetic conception of art). 
Beardsley makes the following claim, expressing his dissatisfaction with the 
institutional conception of art: ‘To classify them as artworks just because they 
are called art by those who are called artists because they make things they call 
art is not to classify at all, but to think in circles’ ([1983] 2004, 60). 
What aesthetic realism brings to aesthetics and the philosophy of art, 
then, including the philosophy of literature, is the emphasis on both 
apprehension and evaluation as inherent in our aesthetic engagement with 
works of art (and natural objects), and as grounding aesthetic judgements. Our 
concern and admiration for objects amenable to aesthetic apprehension and 
evaluation can be understood as both cognitive and affective, and aesthetic 
experience can be seen as a world-directed endeavour, despite the crucial 
subjective participation. Our concern and admiration for the works of artistic 
genius, seen in the study, appreciation, protection and promotion of such works, 
is explained also by the thought that such works, in virtue of all of their 
qualities, constitute a genuine and positive contribution to the real world.  
Aesthetic realism does not force us to endorse an aesthetic theory of art, 
but it does leave room for one. With a unified account of aesthetic properties, as 
outlined earlier, we can understand the aesthetic nature of art as essentially 
related to beauty or aesthetic value. We have seen that even conceptual art can 
be accommodated in this account (if the ideas or concepts explored can have 
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aesthetic value).59 The institution of art is made, and gives institutional status to, 
works considered to be admirable aesthetically. What are those works? Who 
decides (knows) what has aesthetic value? Again, the answer is not always easy, 
but Hume has outlined the beginning of a positive solution when he suggested 
that true critics can show us the standard of taste.   
 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation I have attempted to promote the thought that it is desirable 
to countenance aesthetic properties in our general ontology, as the grounds for 
the aesthetic judgements we make. I have considered some forms of opposition 
to realism, and I have found them wanting. The first was Mackie’s error theory, 
claiming basically that all aesthetic sentences are false because their truth would 
require that values exist, and for Mackie values do not exist. I have rejected the 
charge on the grounds that values need not be the extravagant posits Mackie 
finds ‘queer’. The second form of opposition to realism I considered was based 
on the claim, most famously made by Kant, that aesthetic judgements cannot be 
                                               
59 Beardsley ([1983] 2004, 60) adds, in his account of the aesthetic theory, that even though 
the theory can accommodate novelty, we should not ‘twist’ the definition so that it 
accommodates everything that aspires to artistic status: ‘I would incline toward generosity 
and a welcoming attitude toward novelty—but I would look for evidence of some aesthetic 
intention, and I see no reason to twist my definition to make room for something like, say 
Edward T. Cone’s one hundred metronomes running down with nobody silly enough to 
wait around for them’. 
 191 
based only on the testimony of others. My reply was to accept Kant’s claim, and 
claim that this does not undermine realism. My strategy was to say that colour 
judgements, at least in the case we considered, may also ultimately require 
acquaintance and that this is not a decisive claim against the objectivity of 
colour. Furthermore, I claimed that Kant’s epistemological claim does not, per 
se, threaten the ontological that aesthetic properties exist. The third argument I 
considered against realism was based on lack of convergence. My reply was 
brief: as in other areas, lack of convergence, per se, is not a reason to eschew 
realism. 
My positive defence of aesthetic realism began by considering Hume’s 
essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ as at least pointing towards a modest realism. 
My main claim was that Hume’s project is germane to the realist’s. Hume both 
wrote that at least some aesthetic matters are in the end ‘questions of fact, not of 
sentiment’ (par. 25), and the story of Sancho’s kinsmen helped support the 
(realist) thesis that reality is beyond verification.  
 The arguments I offered in suport of aesthetic realism were, at bottom, 
based on explanatory considerations. Aesthetic realism was promoted as the 
simplest explanation for aesthetic thought and judgement. I also claimed that 
realism makes sense of the apparently true intuition that aesthetic terms 
(including, perhaps, the most general aesthetic terms) have descriptive limits. 
My account of aesthetic properties emphasized that aesthetic experience 
involves both apprehension and evaluation. The metaphor I used to develop 
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this idea concerned both sight and love: aesthetic experience is to be understood 
as seeing ‘through loving spectacles’. The emphasis on admiration as both seeing 
and loving promotes an account that is still realist about the aesthetic, whilst 
acknowledging the ineliminable subjective contribution of feeling, or Humean 
‘sentiment’, in aesthetic contemplation. 
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